award clause in Connecticut

1997Bizzoco v. Chinitz, 193 Conn. 304, 310 , 476 A.2d 572 (1984); Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680 , 443 A.2d 486 (1982).

1992An award under such a clause requires an CT Page 7677 evidentiary showing of reasonableness where as here the issue is contested, Appliance, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673 , 680 (1982).

1998Bizzoco v. Chinitz , 193 Conn. 304 , 310-11 (1984).

1997Bizzoco v. Chinitz, 193 Conn. 304, 310 , 476 A.2d 572 (1984); Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680 , 443 A.2d 486 (1982).

2003A trial court may rely on its own general knowledge of the trial itself to supply evidence in support of an award of attorney’s fees.” (Citations omitted.) Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 77 , 689 A.2d 1097 (1997).

1998"Where a contract expressly provides for the recovery of attorney's fees, an award under such a clause requires an evidentiary showing of reasonableness"; Rizzo Pool Company v. Grosso , 240 Conn. 58 , 77 (1997); and a court may rely on its own knowledge of the circumstances in the exercise of discretion.

2013Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly applied the decision of this court in Russo Roofing, Inc. v. Rottman, 86 Conn. App. 767 , 863 A.2d 713 (2005), and, in turn, improperly excluded from the award of attorney’s fees an award for the defense of the counterclaim filed by the defendants.

2013Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly applied the decision of this court in Russo Roofing, Inc. v. Rottman, 86 Conn. App. 767 , 863 A.2d 713 (2005), and, in turn, improperly excluded from the award of attorney’s fees an award for the defense of the counterclaim filed by the defendants.

2012In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S. Ct. 1933 , 76 L.

2012In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S. Ct. 1933 , 76 L.

2002Supersedence approval refers to "the request . . . for approval of any provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement which are in conflict with any statute or any regulation of any state agency which must be submitted to the legislature at the time a collective bargaining agreement is to be voted upon." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State College American Assn. of University Professors v. State Board of Labor Relations, 197 Conn. 91 , 96 n. 5, 495 A.2d 1069 (1985); see also General Statutes § 5-278 (b) (requiring legislature be apprised of collective bargaining provisions in confli

2002Supersedence approval refers to "the request . . . for approval of any provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement which are in conflict with any statute or any regulation of any state agency which must be submitted to the legislature at the time a collective bargaining agreement is to be voted upon." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State College American Assn. of University Professors v. State Board of Labor Relations, 197 Conn. 91 , 96 n. 5, 495 A.2d 1069 (1985); see also General Statutes § 5-278 (b) (requiring legislature be apprised of collective bargaining provisions in confli

2002Schoonmaker v. Cummings and Lockwood, P.C ., 252 Conn. 416 , 428 (2000).

2002If the claimant protests the award, and waives immediate payment, his claim must be submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to § 4-159 , for action by that body. 7 Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with a similar argument in Chotkowski v. State , supra, 240 Conn. 246 , where it rejected the state's interpretation that § 4-148 (c) bars a claim against the state if that claim has already been reviewed by the claims commissioner, the legislature, or the judiciary whether or not the reviewing body considered the merits of the claim.

2001The City challenges the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators issued an award in violation of public policy. "[T]he public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreements is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. . . ." (Brackets omit

2001The City challenges the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators issued an award in violation of public policy. "[T]he public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreements is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. . . ." (Brackets omit

2000The public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and a court's refusal to enforce an award because of that exception must be based on a finding that the enforcement of the award "would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents." Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown , 210 Conn. 333 .

1997Since the arbitrator's decision was based on a provision contained in the collective bargaining agreement which was approved by the City Council, the award is not in violation of the claimed public policy enunciated by the court in Fennell v. City of Hartford, 238 Conn. 809 , 816 (1996), that government fostered expectations cannot give rise to an implied contract.

1992An attorney who applies for court ordered compensation must document the application with contemporaneous time records, Tedesco v. City of Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 222 Conn. 233 (1992).

1992An attorney who applies for court ordered compensation must document the application with contemporaneous time records, Tedesco v. City of Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 222 Conn. 233 (1992).

1990"Under an unrestricted submission, the arbitrator's decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for error of law or fact." Id. at 186 .

1990"Such is not the case with statutorily mandated or compulsory arbitration." Id. at 187 . "[V]oluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under our system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or deprivations, if compelled by government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process." Id.

1984Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680 , 443 A.2d 486 (1982); Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 186 Conn. 237, 245-46 , 440 A.2d 306 (1982).

1984Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680 , 443 A.2d 486 (1982); Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 186 Conn. 237, 245-46 , 440 A.2d 306 (1982).

1983Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 741-42 , 453 A.2d 1151 (1982).

1983Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 741-42 , 453 A.2d 1151 (1982).