award hearing in Arizona

1976Having set forth all of the facts in a light most favorable to the award of the hearing officer, Micucci v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 108 Ariz. 194 , 494 P.2d 1324 (1972), it is clear that the decision of the hearing officer is amply supported by both the facts and the law of this jurisdiction.

1976Having set forth all of the facts in a light most favorable to the award of the hearing officer, Micucci v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 108 Ariz. 194 , 494 P.2d 1324 (1972), it is clear that the decision of the hearing officer is amply supported by both the facts and the law of this jurisdiction.

1985Rossi v. Hammons, 34 Ariz. 95 , 268 P. 181 (1928).

1985Rossi v. Hammons, 34 Ariz. 95 , 268 P. 181 (1928).

1979Petitioner initially attacks the award because the hearing officer relied extensively on our holding in Blickenstaff v. Industrial Commission, 116 Ariz. 335 , 569 P.2d 277 (App.1977) in finding the medical reports to be inadequate and too distant in time to support the petition to reopen.

1979Petitioner initially attacks the award because the hearing officer relied extensively on our holding in Blickenstaff v. Industrial Commission, 116 Ariz. 335 , 569 P.2d 277 (App.1977) in finding the medical reports to be inadequate and too distant in time to support the petition to reopen.

1977She relies upon our decision in Brock v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz.App. 95 , 486 P.2d 207 (1971), to support her award.

1977She relies upon our decision in Brock v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz.App. 95 , 486 P.2d 207 (1971), to support her award.

1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing.

1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing.

1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing.

1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing.

1977Luke’s Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 114 Ariz. 118 , 559 P.2d 674 , 678: “ . . . [T]he court is aware that on occasion, because of legal positions assumed by the parties appearing before the Commission, the Industrial Commission has a legitimate interest in appearing as an advocate in this court to defend the integrity of the Special Fund, to defend the Commission’s procedures and to assist the Court in reaching a correct result where matters involving the general interest of the Commission in carrying out its statutory authority or policies are concerned.” We therefore hold that the Comm

1977Luke’s Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 114 Ariz. 118 , 559 P.2d 674 , 678: “ . . . [T]he court is aware that on occasion, because of legal positions assumed by the parties appearing before the Commission, the Industrial Commission has a legitimate interest in appearing as an advocate in this court to defend the integrity of the Special Fund, to defend the Commission’s procedures and to assist the Court in reaching a correct result where matters involving the general interest of the Commission in carrying out its statutory authority or policies are concerned.” We therefore hold that the Comm

1976While the carrier characterizes the question presented to this Court as one regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Arizona to enter an award when a claim was filed more than two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations set out in A.R.S. § 23-1061A, that particular issue is well settled in the supplemental opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Van Horn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 111 Ariz. 86 , 523 P.2d 783 (1974), supplemented, 111 Ariz. 237 , 527 P.2d 282 (1974).

1976While the carrier characterizes the question presented to this Court as one regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Arizona to enter an award when a claim was filed more than two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations set out in A.R.S. § 23-1061A, that particular issue is well settled in the supplemental opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Van Horn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 111 Ariz. 86 , 523 P.2d 783 (1974), supplemented, 111 Ariz. 237 , 527 P.2d 282 (1974).

1976While the carrier characterizes the question presented to this Court as one regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Arizona to enter an award when a claim was filed more than two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations set out in A.R.S. § 23-1061A, that particular issue is well settled in the supplemental opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Van Horn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 111 Ariz. 86 , 523 P.2d 783 (1974), supplemented, 111 Ariz. 237 , 527 P.2d 282 (1974).

1976While the carrier characterizes the question presented to this Court as one regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Arizona to enter an award when a claim was filed more than two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations set out in A.R.S. § 23-1061A, that particular issue is well settled in the supplemental opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Van Horn v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 111 Ariz. 86 , 523 P.2d 783 (1974), supplemented, 111 Ariz. 237 , 527 P.2d 282 (1974).

1975The court, in finding that the award of the hearing officer was not final stated: “More than two years prior to the Industrial Commission’s order of dismissal, in an unanimous decision of this Court authored by Chief Justice Hays, we decided Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972).

1975The court, in finding that the award of the hearing officer was not final stated: “More than two years prior to the Industrial Commission’s order of dismissal, in an unanimous decision of this Court authored by Chief Justice Hays, we decided Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972).

1974This issue has been decided adversely to the petitioner in the case of Dickerson v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 125 , 516 P.2d 334 (1973), which held that the Industrial Commission has broad powers to review both the legal and factual basis of awards of the hearing officer.

1974This issue has been decided adversely to the petitioner in the case of Dickerson v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 125 , 516 P.2d 334 (1973), which held that the Industrial Commission has broad powers to review both the legal and factual basis of awards of the hearing officer.

1972We quote: “ * * * that it is further recognized that applicant obtained rather extensive chiropractic and/or naturopathic attention to his left knee, commencing in February 1970, but there is no reasonable evidence to establish that said treatment was necessary or beneficial; that the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that the treatments may have been detrimental to the applicant’s knee condition; furthermore, the aforesaid examinations and/or treatments were obtained and undertaken without the authority of the Commission or the Defendant Insurance Carrier as required by ‘old’ Com

1972We quote: “ * * * that it is further recognized that applicant obtained rather extensive chiropractic and/or naturopathic attention to his left knee, commencing in February 1970, but there is no reasonable evidence to establish that said treatment was necessary or beneficial; that the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that the treatments may have been detrimental to the applicant’s knee condition; furthermore, the aforesaid examinations and/or treatments were obtained and undertaken without the authority of the Commission or the Defendant Insurance Carrier as required by ‘old’ Com

1972We quote: “ * * * that it is further recognized that applicant obtained rather extensive chiropractic and/or naturopathic attention to his left knee, commencing in February 1970, but there is no reasonable evidence to establish that said treatment was necessary or beneficial; that the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that the treatments may have been detrimental to the applicant’s knee condition; furthermore, the aforesaid examinations and/or treatments were obtained and undertaken without the authority of the Commission or the Defendant Insurance Carrier as required by ‘old’ Com

1972We quote: “ * * * that it is further recognized that applicant obtained rather extensive chiropractic and/or naturopathic attention to his left knee, commencing in February 1970, but there is no reasonable evidence to establish that said treatment was necessary or beneficial; that the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that the treatments may have been detrimental to the applicant’s knee condition; furthermore, the aforesaid examinations and/or treatments were obtained and undertaken without the authority of the Commission or the Defendant Insurance Carrier as required by ‘old’ Com

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1972We quote from the findings contained in the award of the hearing officer. “ * * * that the medical testimony of orthopedists Dr. Bishop and Dr. Goldsmith, establishes that although applicant does have a minimal medical impairment (permanently compressed L-l vertebra) which could reasonably, under certain conditions, produce some discomfort, said condition does not constitute a physical functional impairment, or functional disability at the present time (Russell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (1969), 104 Ariz. 548 , 456 P.2d 918 ; Cramer v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, supra [ 13 Ariz

1970Schultz v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 44 Ariz. 357 , 37 P.2d 372 .

1970Schultz v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 44 Ariz. 357 , 37 P.2d 372 .

1945This action was taken at a time when the commission had jurisdiction within the rule established in the Atkinson case, supra. The position we take here also had the sanction of Doby v. Miami Trust Co., 39 Ariz. 228 , 5 Pac. (2d) 187 , where estoppel was invoked against the commission from contending that a payment to an injured employee, resulting from a compromise agreement, was not an award that the claim was compensable.

1945This action was taken at a time when the commission had jurisdiction within the rule established in the Atkinson case, supra. The position we take here also had the sanction of Doby v. Miami Trust Co., 39 Ariz. 228 , 5 Pac. (2d) 187 , where estoppel was invoked against the commission from contending that a payment to an injured employee, resulting from a compromise agreement, was not an award that the claim was compensable.