contempt hearing in Oregon

2010On appeal, we examined the record of the contempt hearing and concluded that it did not support that finding — that is, it “d[id] not show that the conduct that the contempt court found violated the restraining order was the same conduct that constituted any of the criminal charges.” Id. at 134 .

2010That led to the court’s finding: “ "Well, I will find that you did violate the restraining order by being on the premises described in the order and having contact with the petitioner.’ ” Id. (emphasis in Delker).

2026Thus, husband’s “loss or injury” related to the tool chest was a “temporary injury,” which “justifies damages measured by the loss of use or rental value during the period of injury * * *.” Hudson v. Peavey Oil Company, 279 Or 3, 10 , 566 P2d 175 (1977); cf. PGE v. Taber, 146 Or App 735, 739 , 934 P2d 538 , rev den, 325 Or 438 (1997) (“[W]here property is destroyed, the measure of damages is generally the market value of the property.”).

2026Thus, husband’s “loss or injury” related to the tool chest was a “temporary injury,” which “justifies damages measured by the loss of use or rental value during the period of injury * * *.” Hudson v. Peavey Oil Company, 279 Or 3, 10 , 566 P2d 175 (1977); cf. PGE v. Taber, 146 Or App 735, 739 , 934 P2d 538 , rev den, 325 Or 438 (1997) (“[W]here property is destroyed, the measure of damages is generally the market value of the property.”).

2021In particular, defen- dant contends that the trial court erred in imposing the following restitution awards: $14,967.50 to G for attorney Cite as 315 Or App 112 (2021) 117 fees for discovering and proving forgery, $8,188.00 to R for attorney fees for discovering and proving forgery, $51,303.62 to G for attorney fees for prosecuting the contempt viola- tion, $53,138.26 to R for attorney fees for prosecuting the contempt violation, $53,657.71 to G for attorney fees for representing G as the victim at hearings and at the trial, $11,070.66 to G for attorney fees for witness preparation, $66,169.00

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2020In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order and a separate judgment continuing defendant’s probation that converted defendant’s bench probation to formal probation.1 Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of cer- tain witness testimony at the contempt hearing, arguing that the testimony was admissible for impeachment pur- poses as prior inconsistent statements under OEC 613.2 As explained below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, because the testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence in the record and an

2018As relevant here, Count 2 alleged that defendant "willfully disobey[ed] an order of the Jackson County Circuit Court by *** attempting third party contact with [the petitioner]." At the contempt hearing, defendant acknowledged that her "actions *** indicate knowledge that if she sees the protected party she's not supposed to have contact with him" or "contact through a third party." Defendant argued, however, that the court could not find her in contempt for willfully attempting third party contact with the petitioner because defendant was "not sending a message to [the petitioner], [she was]

2018App. 199 , 203, 268 P.3d 765 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013Or Laws 2007, ch 636, § 1. 4 OEC 804(3)(a) provides: “The following are not excluded by [OEC 802, the hearsay rule] if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: “(a) Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding ***, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered * * * had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” 5 Cooley, 1 Constitutional Limitations 662 n 4 (8th ed 1927). 6 See, e.g., United States v. Benner, 24 Fed Cas 1084 (1830) (similarly to Jones , holding that certificate of s

2012Second, he argues that the court erred in proceeding with the contempt hearing despite plaintiffs absence. 7 *134 We reject defendant’s first argument because, “[a]s a general rule, a contemnor may not attack the underlying judgment that he or she violated in an appeal of a judgment of contempt.” Barrett and Barrett, 320 Or 372, 380 , 886 P2d 1 (1994).

2012Second, he argues that the court erred in proceeding with the contempt hearing despite plaintiffs absence. 7 *134 We reject defendant’s first argument because, “[a]s a general rule, a contemnor may not attack the underlying judgment that he or she violated in an appeal of a judgment of contempt.” Barrett and Barrett, 320 Or 372, 380 , 886 P2d 1 (1994).

2006At the contempt hearing, husband testified that his appellate counsel had confirmed the correctness of his position; however, he testified that he had “already figured that out for [himself].” Moreover, his testimony was given in the context of his ultimate assertion that he did not have “any choice in the matter, if I wish to appeal those items.” Before the trial court, husband relied on Kelly v. Tracy, 209 Or 153, 161 , 305 P2d 411 (1956), where the court stated the familiar rule that “[a] party may waive the right to appeal by acquiescence in or recognition of the validity of a judgment or

2006At the contempt hearing, husband testified that his appellate counsel had confirmed the correctness of his position; however, he testified that he had “already figured that out for [himself].” Moreover, his testimony was given in the context of his ultimate assertion that he did not have “any choice in the matter, if I wish to appeal those items.” Before the trial court, husband relied on Kelly v. Tracy, 209 Or 153, 161 , 305 P2d 411 (1956), where the court stated the familiar rule that “[a] party may waive the right to appeal by acquiescence in or recognition of the validity of a judgment or

1993This is in contrast to the situation in State v. McIntyre, 94 Or App 240 , 764 P2d 972 (1988), where the contempt court specifically found that the defendant had violated the restraining order on three different occasions and his conduct on one of these occasions was also the basis of the criminal charge.

1993This is in contrast to the situation in State v. McIntyre, 94 Or App 240 , 764 P2d 972 (1988), where the contempt court specifically found that the defendant had violated the restraining order on three different occasions and his conduct on one of these occasions was also the basis of the criminal charge.

1991See State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231, 238 , 708 P2d 1137 (1985); Langdon and Langdon, 100 Or App 661 , 788 P2d 473 (1990).

1991See State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231, 238 , 708 P2d 1137 (1985); Langdon and Langdon, 100 Or App 661 , 788 P2d 473 (1990).

1985The defendant previously appealed from the trial court’s contempt order, Dept. of Rev. v. Carpet Warehouse, 296 Or 400 , 676 P2d 299 (1984).

1985The defendant previously appealed from the trial court’s contempt order, Dept. of Rev. v. Carpet Warehouse, 296 Or 400 , 676 P2d 299 (1984).

1982Technically the contempt includes an element not present in the crime (knowledge of the court order), and the crime includes an element not present in the contempt (absence of license or privilege), but when the judicial gloss that the contempt of violation of a court order must be “willful and with bad intent,” see State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 280 Or 713 , 573 P2d 294 (1977), is considered, the two violations appear congruent enough to constitute the same offense.

1982Technically the contempt includes an element not present in the crime (knowledge of the court order), and the crime includes an element not present in the contempt (absence of license or privilege), but when the judicial gloss that the contempt of violation of a court order must be “willful and with bad intent,” see State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 280 Or 713 , 573 P2d 294 (1977), is considered, the two violations appear congruent enough to constitute the same offense.