contempt hearing in Florida

2018See rule 3.840(a); Goral, 553 So. 2d at 1283 (two working days’ notice of the contempt hearing did not provide a reasonable amount of time for preparation of a defense); Russ v. State, 622 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding hearing less than two 9 days after service of order to show cause violated due process rights of contemnor).

2015See Russ v. State, 622 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (two days after service of order to show cause held insufficient); Goral v. State, 553 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (two “actual working days notice of the contempt hearing” held insufficient); see also Gratz v. State, 84 So.3d 1219, 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding six days notice to defense counsel was “insufficient time for counsel to prepare for final contempt hearing”); Givner v. State, 559 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that serving order to show cause on “the 26th for a contempt hearing on the 29th was insufficient

2018Woolf, 901 So. 2d at 910 .

2015See Russ v. State, 622 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (two days after service of order to show cause held insufficient); Goral v. State, 553 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (two “actual working days notice of the contempt hearing” held insufficient); see also Gratz v. State, 84 So.3d 1219, 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding six days notice to defense counsel was “insufficient time for counsel to prepare for final contempt hearing”); Givner v. State, 559 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that serving order to show cause on “the 26th for a contempt hearing on the 29th was insufficient

1993In the Interest of S.L.T., 180 So.2d 374, 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).

1993In the Interest of S.L.T., 180 So.2d 374, 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).

2019P. 1.090(d) (requiring that a notice of hearing on a party's motion "shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing"); Russ v. State , 622 So.2d 501 , 501-02 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (finding that a contempt hearing held less than two days after service of the order to show cause violated the defendant's right to due process); Donner v. Smith , 517 So.2d 709 , 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (determining that a notice mailed two days before the hearing was inadequate and a violation of due process).

2019P. 1.090(d) (requiring that a notice of hearing on a party's motion "shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing"); Russ v. State , 622 So.2d 501 , 501-02 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (finding that a contempt hearing held less than two days after service of the order to show cause violated the defendant's right to due process); Donner v. Smith , 517 So.2d 709 , 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (determining that a notice mailed two days before the hearing was inadequate and a violation of due process).

2017Id.

2016It does not appear to me - 14 - that this circuit judge predicated convening the summary proceeding on first obtaining the results of a court-ordered alcohol test or that he premised the guilty adjudication or sentence on the results of that test,3 unlike the circuit judge in Plank, who very clearly did both. 190 So. 3d at 597 (noting that, after receiving complaints about prospective juror's apparent intoxication, defendant was ordered to take a breathalyzer test outside of court, following which, "an hour later . . . the trial judge held a contempt hearing").

2015Specifically, when a court has found that a civil contempt has occurred, it must determine the appropriate means of obtaining compliance and, if incarceration is selected, “the court must make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possesses the present ability to comply with the purge conditions set forth in the contempt order.” 471 So.2d at 1279 .

1999The trial court made all of the necessary findings required by Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1278 (Fla.1985), all of which were supported by the evidence.

2006And, in J.B. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 768 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 2000), a father received only twenty-four hours' notice of an advisory hearing on termination of parental rights.

2005Goral v. State, 553 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); see also J.B. v. Fla. Dep't. of Children and Family Servs., 768 So.2d 1060, 1066 (Fla.2000) (noting that two days notice has been held insufficient when far less important interests than parental termination is at stake) (citing Montgomery v. Cribb, 484 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that two days notice is insufficient for motion to strike)).The contempt order must therefore be reversed and remanded for a new hearing upon adequate notice.

2004While the court recognized the disruption to orderly judicial administration caused by a defendant’s failure to appear for a contempt hearing after due notice, the court noted that the “issuance of an arrest warrant for failure to appear at the show cause hearing would have preserved both the dignity of the court and the basic constitutional rights of the defendant.” Id.

1989The proceedings leading to the entry of the order were not conducted in conformity with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 in the following respects: (1) the order to show cause lacked proper predicates, see Paris v. Paris, 427 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Deter v. Deter, 353 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); (2) defendant, being absent from the contempt hearing, was not afforded rights given by rule 3.840(a)(4) and (a)(7), see Bradley v. State, 420 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and (3) the order from which this appeal has been taken does not recite the facts constituting the contempt a

2003Walker v. Edel, 727 So.2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); see Cook v. Navarro, 611 So.2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

1997In LeNeve v. Navarro, 565 So.2d 836, 837-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we granted habeas corpus relief, and discharged the petitioner where we reviewed the evidence presented in the contempt hearing and found that it failed to support the required Bowen finding that petitioner held the "keys to his cell." See also Cook v. Navarro, 611 So.2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

2025We conclude the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in finding the father in contempt and ordering him to pay a $20,000 purge to avoid incarceration.”); Peterson v. Asklipious, 855 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“At the contempt hearing, Peterson had the burden of demonstrating that he no longer had the ability to make the payments ordered in the attorney’s fee order[.]”); Carlton v. Carlton, 816 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“The trial court’s order expressly found that [the former husband] had the ability to pay.

2025We conclude the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in finding the father in contempt and ordering him to pay a $20,000 purge to avoid incarceration.”); Peterson v. Asklipious, 855 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“At the contempt hearing, Peterson had the burden of demonstrating that he no longer had the ability to make the payments ordered in the attorney’s fee order[.]”); Carlton v. Carlton, 816 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“The trial court’s order expressly found that [the former husband] had the ability to pay.

2024In this context, the appointed attorney’s involvement generally amounts to nothing more than “calling witnesses, conducting examinations, and making argument at a contempt hearing.” Hudson v. Marin, 259 So. 3d 148, 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). “[S]uch involvement assists a judge who might otherwise handle the hearing ‘without assistance of counsel,’ and be in the difficult position of both a ‘quasi’ prosecutor and judge, a situation sanctioned by contempt jurisprudence.” Id. (quoting Fla. R.

2024In this context, the appointed attorney’s involvement generally amounts to nothing more than “calling witnesses, conducting examinations, and making argument at a contempt hearing.” Hudson v. Marin, 259 So. 3d 148, 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). “[S]uch involvement assists a judge who might otherwise handle the hearing ‘without assistance of counsel,’ and be in the difficult position of both a ‘quasi’ prosecutor and judge, a situation sanctioned by contempt jurisprudence.” Id. (quoting Fla. R.

2024See Gordon, 960 So. 2d at 37 (“Although [the trial court] appointed [opposing counsel] as a ‘prosecutor,’ 29 the effect of his order was to appoint [opposing counsel] to ‘assist’ the court within the meaning of Rule 3.840(d) by calling witnesses at the contempt hearing.

2024See Gordon, 960 So. 2d at 37 (“Although [the trial court] appointed [opposing counsel] as a ‘prosecutor,’ 29 the effect of his order was to appoint [opposing counsel] to ‘assist’ the court within the meaning of Rule 3.840(d) by calling witnesses at the contempt hearing.

2023See Nunes v. Nunes, 112 So. 3d 696 , 701–02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2021See Cutwright v. State, 934 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Phelps, 236 So. 3d at 1163 . 5 Moreover, the record establishes that Mr. Hall was not provided a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence.2 While the court paid lip service to rule 3.830 at the contempt hearing by asking Mr. Hall if there was "[a]nything [he] wish[ed] to say in mitigation," Mr. Hall and defense counsel were told only moments before that the court was hosting a contempt proceeding "at that point"—leaving defense counsel no meaningful chance to gather mitigating evidence.3 To make matters worse

2021See Cutwright v. State, 934 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Phelps, 236 So. 3d at 1163 . 5 Moreover, the record establishes that Mr. Hall was not provided a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence.2 While the court paid lip service to rule 3.830 at the contempt hearing by asking Mr. Hall if there was "[a]nything [he] wish[ed] to say in mitigation," Mr. Hall and defense counsel were told only moments before that the court was hosting a contempt proceeding "at that point"—leaving defense counsel no meaningful chance to gather mitigating evidence.3 To make matters worse

2018“It is a fundamental tenet of our system of civil justice that a party must have actual notice of and time to prepare for a contested hearing.” Dileo v. Dileo, 939 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).

2018Nevertheless, we do not find a knowing, intelligent waiver to have occurred here. 3 “Only an express waiver will suffice to estop the aggrieved party from challenging the adjudication on appeal.” Reins v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 911, 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (citing Persoff, 589 So. 2d at 1007).

2018Nevertheless, we do not find a knowing, intelligent waiver to have occurred here. 3 “Only an express waiver will suffice to estop the aggrieved party from challenging the adjudication on appeal.” Reins v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 911, 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (citing Persoff, 589 So. 2d at 1007).

2017Corp. v. Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley P.A., 107 So.3d 552, 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2017Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.7(a) (“A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client ....”) (emphasis added); Lieberman, 160 So.3d at 74 (“As is well established by numerous Florida courts, the fact that Ferrer [attorney and current wife] was a potentially necessary witriess at the contempt hearing would not prevent her from serving as the former husband’s attorney in other pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings.”); see also KMS Rest.