contempt hearing in Georgia

1995Additionally, a review of the transcript of the hearing on the rule nisi directed toward Deese demonstrates that O'Neal had become personally embroiled in the matter and, therefore, under Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135, 142 ( 304 SE2d 52 ) (1983), another judge was required to hold the contempt hearing.

1995Additionally, a review of the transcript of the hearing on the rule nisi directed toward Deese demonstrates that O'Neal had become personally embroiled in the matter and, therefore, under Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135, 142 ( 304 SE2d 52 ) (1983), another judge was required to hold the contempt hearing.

2021See In re Brinson, 299 Ga. 859, 859 (2) ( 791 SE2d 804 ) (2016) (“[I]t is for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, to 2 resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility;” in criminal contempt case, trial court was authorized to weigh the conflicting evidence on the question of willfulness) (citation and punctuation omitted); In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”). 3

2021See In re Brinson, 299 Ga. 859, 859 (2) ( 791 SE2d 804 ) (2016) (“[I]t is for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, to 2 resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility;” in criminal contempt case, trial court was authorized to weigh the conflicting evidence on the question of willfulness) (citation and punctuation omitted); In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”). 3

2026Accord Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 315 ( 509 SE2d 612 ) (1998) (concluding that a trial court’s notice of a contempt hearing did not comply with due process “because it failed to adequately inform appellant of the charge against him so that he would have the opportunity to defend himself against the 16 charge” at the hearing); Norred, 263 Ga. App. at 519 (4) (“[A] charge of contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order must apprise the respondent of the specific acts which he is charged with committing in violation of the subject order, so that he may be prepared to defend against suc

2026Accord Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 315 ( 509 SE2d 612 ) (1998) (concluding that a trial court’s notice of a contempt hearing did not comply with due process “because it failed to adequately inform appellant of the charge against him so that he would have the opportunity to defend himself against the 16 charge” at the hearing); Norred, 263 Ga. App. at 519 (4) (“[A] charge of contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order must apprise the respondent of the specific acts which he is charged with committing in violation of the subject order, so that he may be prepared to defend against suc

2022Cf. Horn v. Shepherd, 292 Ga. 14, 17 (3) ( 732 SE2d 427 ) (2012) (concluding that the trial court was not precluded from ruling on contempt motion, where counsel for party held in contempt stated at the contempt hearing that there was 7 no pending motion for new trial against the order, and where “the record is devoid of any evidence of a valid, pending motion for new trial”).5 (b) The husband alternatively claims that the trial court erred in its calculation of child support arreages at $4,320.

2022Cf. Horn v. Shepherd, 292 Ga. 14, 17 (3) ( 732 SE2d 427 ) (2012) (concluding that the trial court was not precluded from ruling on contempt motion, where counsel for party held in contempt stated at the contempt hearing that there was 7 no pending motion for new trial against the order, and where “the record is devoid of any evidence of a valid, pending motion for new trial”).5 (b) The husband alternatively claims that the trial court erred in its calculation of child support arreages at $4,320.

2018See State v. Hargis , 294 Ga. 818 , 756 S.E.2d 529 (2014).

2018See State v. Hargis , 294 Ga. 818 , 756 S.E.2d 529 (2014).

2017Chatfield v. Adkins-Chatfield, 282 Ga. 190, 194 (3) ( 646 SE2d 247 ) (2007) (affirming trial court’s contempt finding regarding husband’s violation of pre-trial order, even though finding was rendered based on evidence presented at the parties’ divorce trial rather than at a separate contempt hearing).

2017Chatfield v. Adkins-Chatfield, 282 Ga. 190, 194 (3) ( 646 SE2d 247 ) (2007) (affirming trial court’s contempt finding regarding husband’s violation of pre-trial order, even though finding was rendered based on evidence presented at the parties’ divorce trial rather than at a separate contempt hearing).

2017Accord Tafel v. Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 297 Ga. 334, 340 (5) ( 773 SE2d 743 ) (2015) (dictum).

2017Accord Tafel v. Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 297 Ga. 334, 340 (5) ( 773 SE2d 743 ) (2015) (dictum).

2015See Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, 580 (2) ( 619 SE2d 665 ) (2005). 4 Although nothing in the parties’ agreement addressed whether husband was to benefit from any financial aid daughter received, the trial court offset these sums from husband’s obligation citing Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 265 Ga. 460 ( 458 SE2d 117 ) (1995). 5 According to the evidence, when a student “drops” a course and falls below 12 hours, VSU no longer considers the student to be “full-time.” However, when a student “withdraws” from a course during the semester, that student is still officially registered as a full-time s

2015See Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, 580 (2) ( 619 SE2d 665 ) (2005). 4 Although nothing in the parties’ agreement addressed whether husband was to benefit from any financial aid daughter received, the trial court offset these sums from husband’s obligation citing Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 265 Ga. 460 ( 458 SE2d 117 ) (1995). 5 According to the evidence, when a student “drops” a course and falls below 12 hours, VSU no longer considers the student to be “full-time.” However, when a student “withdraws” from a course during the semester, that student is still officially registered as a full-time s

2015See Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, 580 (2) ( 619 SE2d 665 ) (2005). 4 Although nothing in the parties’ agreement addressed whether husband was to benefit from any financial aid daughter received, the trial court offset these sums from husband’s obligation citing Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 265 Ga. 460 ( 458 SE2d 117 ) (1995). 5 According to the evidence, when a student “drops” a course and falls below 12 hours, VSU no longer considers the student to be “full-time.” However, when a student “withdraws” from a course during the semester, that student is still officially registered as a full-time s

2015See Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, 580 (2) ( 619 SE2d 665 ) (2005). 4 Although nothing in the parties’ agreement addressed whether husband was to benefit from any financial aid daughter received, the trial court offset these sums from husband’s obligation citing Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 265 Ga. 460 ( 458 SE2d 117 ) (1995). 5 According to the evidence, when a student “drops” a course and falls below 12 hours, VSU no longer considers the student to be “full-time.” However, when a student “withdraws” from a course during the semester, that student is still officially registered as a full-time s

2013We have 23 (Citation omitted.) Id. 24 One named plaintiff even deposed that, after the filing of the lawsuit from which this appeal springs, he appeared at a contempt hearing and again did not request appointed counsel. 25 (Footnote omitted.) Carnett’s Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 130 (6) ( 610 SE2d 529 ) (2005) (court declined to remand a class certification action for further discovery where the plaintiff never sought discovery on the issue of whether a business relationship existed between all parties, and instead relied upon her conclusory argument that the business relationship exemption

2013We have 23 (Citation omitted.) Id. 24 One named plaintiff even deposed that, after the filing of the lawsuit from which this appeal springs, he appeared at a contempt hearing and again did not request appointed counsel. 25 (Footnote omitted.) Carnett’s Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 130 (6) ( 610 SE2d 529 ) (2005) (court declined to remand a class certification action for further discovery where the plaintiff never sought discovery on the issue of whether a business relationship existed between all parties, and instead relied upon her conclusory argument that the business relationship exemption

2012For the reasons that follow, we affirm. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine if a party is in contempt of its order, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless grossly abused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 11 (4) ( 709 SE2d 263 ) (2011).

2012For the reasons that follow, we affirm. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine if a party is in contempt of its order, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless grossly abused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 11 (4) ( 709 SE2d 263 ) (2011).

2026Id. at 551-52 .

2006See Floyd, supra at 553-554 (2), 277 S.E.2d 658 .

2018Judicial rulings adverse to a party are not disqualifying, as "the alleged bias must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion based on something other than what the judge learned from participating in the case." Henderson v. McVay , 269 Ga. 7 , 8, 494 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

2018Judicial rulings adverse to a party are not disqualifying, as "the alleged bias must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion based on something other than what the judge learned from participating in the case." Henderson v. McVay , 269 Ga. 7 , 8, 494 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

2018Cf. Post , 298 Ga. at 256 -258 , 779 S.E.2d 624 (explaining that argument over recusal issues "may draw the judge into presenting his side of the story, which in turn may create a perception that the judge is an advocate or hostile witness rather than an impartial adjudicator in the case," requiring disqualification).

2018Cf. Post , 298 Ga. at 256 -258 , 779 S.E.2d 624 (explaining that argument over recusal issues "may draw the judge into presenting his side of the story, which in turn may create a perception that the judge is an advocate or hostile witness rather than an impartial adjudicator in the case," requiring disqualification).

2026And after considering the record evidence, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not shown exhaustion of 22 OCGA § 9-15-2(b). 23 Id. 24 Cf. Roberts v. Roberts, 238 Ga. 256, 256 ( 232 SE2d 534 ) (1977) (holding appellant failed to meet his burden of showing his claim that “failure to pay was due to inability” when he only appeared at the contempt hearing “through his counsel” and “called no witnesses, but relied on his verified answer to the citation”). 14 all available assets and resources and thus held them in contempt for failing to pay their share of special-master fees.25 Defendants did

2026And after considering the record evidence, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not shown exhaustion of 22 OCGA § 9-15-2(b). 23 Id. 24 Cf. Roberts v. Roberts, 238 Ga. 256, 256 ( 232 SE2d 534 ) (1977) (holding appellant failed to meet his burden of showing his claim that “failure to pay was due to inability” when he only appeared at the contempt hearing “through his counsel” and “called no witnesses, but relied on his verified answer to the citation”). 14 all available assets and resources and thus held them in contempt for failing to pay their share of special-master fees.25 Defendants did

2026See 307 Ga. at 308–10.

2026Gallemore, 303 Ga. at 210 (1); Jones, 287 Ga. at 144 .

2026See OCGA § 10-6-58 (“Notice to the agent of any matter connected with his agency shall be notice to the principal.”); Dunlap v. C & S DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 897 (6) ( 216 SE2d 651 ) (1975) (“The rule imputing an agent’s knowledge to his principal is applicable to the attorney-client relationship.”).

2026See OCGA § 10-6-58 (“Notice to the agent of any matter connected with his agency shall be notice to the principal.”); Dunlap v. C & S DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 897 (6) ( 216 SE2d 651 ) (1975) (“The rule imputing an agent’s knowledge to his principal is applicable to the attorney-client relationship.”).

2026The notice shows that it was “filed in court” on the day of the hearing, and its certificate of service states that it was hand delivered to Russell’s trial counsel,5 Shara’s counsel, and the GAL, which indicates that hand-delivery occurred in court. 4 Shara also alleged that Russell had violated paragraphs B and D of the decree, but the contempt ruling was not based on violations of those paragraphs. 5 Russell was represented by new counsel at the contempt hearing. 7 “[N]otice to an attorney is notice to the client employing him, and . . . knowledge of an attorney is knowledge of his client,

2026The notice shows that it was “filed in court” on the day of the hearing, and its certificate of service states that it was hand delivered to Russell’s trial counsel,5 Shara’s counsel, and the GAL, which indicates that hand-delivery occurred in court. 4 Shara also alleged that Russell had violated paragraphs B and D of the decree, but the contempt ruling was not based on violations of those paragraphs. 5 Russell was represented by new counsel at the contempt hearing. 7 “[N]otice to an attorney is notice to the client employing him, and . . . knowledge of an attorney is knowledge of his client,

2026Accord Ford v. Ford, 270 Ga. 314, 315 ( 509 SE2d 612 ) (1998) (concluding that a trial court’s notice of a contempt hearing did not comply with due process “because it failed to adequately inform appellant of the charge against him so that he would have the opportunity to defend himself against the 16 charge” at the hearing); Norred, 263 Ga. App. at 519 (4) (“[A] charge of contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order must apprise the respondent of the specific acts which he is charged with committing in violation of the subject order, so that he may be prepared to defend against suc

2026Thus, “to find a respondent in contempt of a court order to pay a certain sum, due process requires the trial court to give the respondent,” among other things, “notice of his alleged wilful failure to pay.” Norred, 263 Ga. App. at 518 (2)(b) (reversing, in part, a contempt order to the extent it was premised on monetary obligations imposed for the first time at the contempt hearing).

2024See Dowdy, 251 Ga. at 142 (2) (reversing contempt order on due process grounds because contempt action should have been heard by a different judge, where announcement of punishment was delayed and allegedly contumacious conduct — an attorney’s failure to stand and respond to the court — was conduct directed at the judge and the 14 judge became involved in the controversy); cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-464 (91 SCt 499, 27 LE2d 532) (1971) (“Where [a judge] does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wis

2024See Dowdy, 251 Ga. at 142 (2) (reversing contempt order on due process grounds because contempt action should have been heard by a different judge, where announcement of punishment was delayed and allegedly contumacious conduct — an attorney’s failure to stand and respond to the court — was conduct directed at the judge and the 14 judge became involved in the controversy); cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-464 (91 SCt 499, 27 LE2d 532) (1971) (“Where [a judge] does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wis

2024See Froehlich v. Froehlich, 297 Ga. 551, 554-555 (3) ( 775 SE2d 534 ) (2015).

2024See Froehlich v. Froehlich, 297 Ga. 551, 554-555 (3) ( 775 SE2d 534 ) (2015).

2023“Because of this disposition,[14] we need not address [Husband’s] enumerations regarding whether he was properly served and had adequate notice of the contempt hearing.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 463 (4) ( 510 SE2d 810 ) (1999), disapproved in part on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2023“Because of this disposition,[14] we need not address [Husband’s] enumerations regarding whether he was properly served and had adequate notice of the contempt hearing.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 463 (4) ( 510 SE2d 810 ) (1999), disapproved in part on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2023“Because of this disposition,[14] we need not address [Husband’s] enumerations regarding whether he was properly served and had adequate notice of the contempt hearing.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 463 (4) ( 510 SE2d 810 ) (1999), disapproved in part on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2023“Because of this disposition,[14] we need not address [Husband’s] enumerations regarding whether he was properly served and had adequate notice of the contempt hearing.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 463 (4) ( 510 SE2d 810 ) (1999), disapproved in part on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2021See In the Matter of Gaines, 307 Ga. 459, 460 (836 SE2d 82) (2019) (concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.5 (d) where she failed to comply with a court order compelling her discovery responses and failed to appear in court for a contempt hearing).

2021See In the Matter of Gaines, 307 Ga. 459, 460 ( 836 SE2d 82 ) (2019) (concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.5 (d) where she failed to comply with a court order compelling her discovery responses and failed to appear in court for a contempt hearing).

2021See In re Brinson, 299 Ga. 859, 859 (2) ( 791 SE2d 804 ) (2016) (“[I]t is for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, to 2 resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility;” in criminal contempt case, trial court was authorized to weigh the conflicting evidence on the question of willfulness) (citation and punctuation omitted); In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”). 3

2021See In re Brinson, 299 Ga. 859, 859 (2) ( 791 SE2d 804 ) (2016) (“[I]t is for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, to 2 resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility;” in criminal contempt case, trial court was authorized to weigh the conflicting evidence on the question of willfulness) (citation and punctuation omitted); In re Bowens, 308 Ga. App. 241, 243 (1) ( 706 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (“[I]n a contempt hearing before a judge sitting as the trier of fact, the hearing judge, and not the appellate court, determines the credibility of witnesses.”). 3