contempt hearing in Texas

2019See Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding) (holding that by appearing at and participating in the contempt hearing, the accused waived any complaint he had regarding the irregularity of service of process).

2008See Ex parte Linder , 783 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding) (holding that by appearing at and participating in the contempt hearing, the accused waived any complaint he had regarding the irregularity of service of process).

2006Ex parte Rohleder , 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967).

2005“We treat the contempt order as void if the evidence offered at the hearing conclusively establishes that at the time of the contempt hearing relator did not have, and had no source from which he might be expected to obtain [the money required to purge himself of contempt].” Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d at 892 .

2021See In re Rogers, No. 12-12-00395-CV, 2012 WL 6707723 , at *2 (Tex. 7 The transcript of the March 10, 2021 hearing reflects the Court indicated during a January 20, 2021 “compliance” hearing that “it needed to have a show cause at that time,” and that it was scheduled for January 27, 2021, reset to February 3, 2021, and ultimately reset to March 10, 2021. 8 Allowing notice of a compliance hearing in a protective order to serve as legally sufficient, due-process-compliant notice of a contempt hearing for potential future violations of the order would enable trial courts to circumvent the notice

2015Preceding the violation, the court's May 24, See Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 262 (contemnor cannot be 2012 modification order is quoted, which required that held in contempt of court for actions that predate when each party promptly post: court's order is reduced to writing). b. knowledge that a child will not be attending a previously scheduled Because I find these arguments dispositive in extracurricular activity -- immediately, or determining that the commitment order is void, I would as soon as practicable under the not reach Fountain's other issues. circumstances; but no less [**36] than eigh

2018Ed. 2d 437 (1970) (determining whether defendant had a right to a jury trial); Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (determining whether relator had a right to a jury trial in a contempt hearing).

2009Ed. 2d 437 (1970) (determining whether defendant had a right to a jury trial); Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (determining whether relator had a right to a jury trial in a contempt hearing).

2017Id.; Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 422 (Tex. 1983).

1984(Emphasis added.) In Ex parte Johnson, supra, the relator, although cited to attend, failed to appear at the contempt hearing.

2016See Gonzalez, 187 S.W.3d at 170-71 (refusing to adopt a rule that constructive notice of a contempt hearing or of contempt charges can be appropriate).

2014See Gonzalez, 187 S.W.3d at 170-71 (refusing to adopt a rule that constructive notice of a contempt hearing or of contempt charges can be appropriate).

2014Ex parte Helms, 259 S.W.2d at 186 ; Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, orig. proceeding).

1999Ex parte Helms, 152 Tex. 480 , 259 S.W.2d 184, 186 (1953) (orig.proceeding).

2012Id.; Ex parte Papageorgiou, 685 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding).

2009Ramon, 821 S.W.2d at 713 ; Ex parte Papageorgiou, 685 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding).

1977Ex Parte Cardwell, supra. Since the record demonstrates the absence of a show cause order requiring relator to appear before the court for a contempt hearing on July 14, 1977, and there being no showing that relator voluntarily made an appearance at said hearing and knowingly and intelligently waived any invalidity in the manner of notice required by law, this court must hold that the trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over relator’s person and that the order of commitment is, therefore, invalid. *28 This disposition renders it unnecessary that we consider relator’s allegation that he i

1975The Supreme Court of Texas again reached the same results in Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382 (1967), where the Relator was arrested and jailed until a contempt hearing was held three days later.

2022See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding) (“It is well established that constructive notice of the contempt hearing or contempt allegations is constitutionally inadequate.”).

2022See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding) (“It is well established that constructive notice of the contempt hearing or contempt allegations is constitutionally inadequate.”).

2019“But the burden is on the contemnor to establish in the trial court that [she] cannot perform the act necessary to purge [herself].” Jones, 602 S.W.2d at 402 ; see also Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d at 224 (“we treat the contempt order as void if the evidence offered at the hearing or hearings conclusively establishes that at the time of the contempt hearing it was not within the power of the Relator to perform the act or acts which would release him from the punishment authorized by the court’s judgment”).

2019“But the burden is on the contemnor to establish in the trial court that [she] cannot perform the act necessary to purge [herself].” Jones, 602 S.W.2d at 402 ; see also Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d at 224 (“we treat the contempt order as void if the evidence offered at the hearing or hearings conclusively establishes that at the time of the contempt hearing it was not within the power of the Relator to perform the act or acts which would release him from the punishment authorized by the court’s judgment”).

2007See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 , 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1888 , 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (determining whether defendant had a right to a jury trial); Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex.1976) (determining whether relator had a right to a jury trial in a contempt hearing).

2007See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 , 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1888 , 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (determining whether defendant had a right to a jury trial); Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex.1976) (determining whether relator had a right to a jury trial in a contempt hearing).

2008Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Elmore, 161 Tex. 585 , 342 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Cox, 479 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ.

2008Ex parte Cardwell , 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Elmore , 161 Tex. 585 , 342 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Cox , 479 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ.

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2024Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 877 (2009). 6 Id. at 883-84 . 7 See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 4 (2016) (“One of the justices on the State Supreme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.”); Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (An appellate “justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of, the board chairman and principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.”); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[T]he same judge presidi

2014See Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d at 522 (granting habeas corpus relief - 18 - because alleged contemnor’s right to due process was violated where he was not served with motion for contempt, show cause order, or equivalent legal process notifying him of contempt hearing; any oral notification alleged contemnor received was inadequate and notice at prior hearing, on same date as order he allegedly violated, was deficient on its face); Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d at 643 (discharging alleged contemnor because he was not provided with legal process apprising him of accusations until the contempt h

2014See Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d at 522 (granting habeas corpus relief - 18 - because alleged contemnor’s right to due process was violated where he was not served with motion for contempt, show cause order, or equivalent legal process notifying him of contempt hearing; any oral notification alleged contemnor received was inadequate and notice at prior hearing, on same date as order he allegedly violated, was deficient on its face); Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d at 643 (discharging alleged contemnor because he was not provided with legal process apprising him of accusations until the contempt h

2014See Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d at 522 (granting habeas corpus relief - 18 - because alleged contemnor’s right to due process was violated where he was not served with motion for contempt, show cause order, or equivalent legal process notifying him of contempt hearing; any oral notification alleged contemnor received was inadequate and notice at prior hearing, on same date as order he allegedly violated, was deficient on its face); Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d at 643 (discharging alleged contemnor because he was not provided with legal process apprising him of accusations until the contempt h

2014See Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d at 522 (granting habeas corpus relief - 18 - because alleged contemnor’s right to due process was violated where he was not served with motion for contempt, show cause order, or equivalent legal process notifying him of contempt hearing; any oral notification alleged contemnor received was inadequate and notice at prior hearing, on same date as order he allegedly violated, was deficient on its face); Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d at 643 (discharging alleged contemnor because he was not provided with legal process apprising him of accusations until the contempt h

2012See Pruitt, 6 S.W.3d at 365 (denying relator’s writ of habeas corpus where trial court properly complied with the strictures of family code 157.163).

2012See Pruitt, 6 S.W.3d at 365 (denying relator’s writ of habeas corpus where trial court properly complied with the strictures of family code 157.163).

2003Ex parte Hightower , 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Loftin , 522 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ.

2001Ex parte Hightower , 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Loftin , 522 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ.

2003Ex parte Hightower , 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Loftin , 522 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ.

2001Ex parte Hightower , 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Loftin , 522 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ.

2024Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988) (granting relief when no motion for contempt was filed and no show-cause order or equivalent legal process was issued before the contempt hearing); see Tex. Fam.

2014Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d at 599 .

1987Ex parte Townsley, 156 Tex. 402 , 297 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1956).

1987Ex parte Townsley, 156 Tex. 402 , 297 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1956).

1982In Ex parte Elmore, 161 Tex. 585 , 342 S.W.2d 558 and cases cited therein, the court takes into consideration the entire record including the evidence offered at the contempt hearing to determine whether due process has been accorded.

1982In Ex parte Elmore, 161 Tex. 585 , 342 S.W.2d 558 and cases cited therein, the court takes into consideration the entire record including the evidence offered at the contempt hearing to determine whether due process has been accorded.

2014See, e.g., Ex parte Savelle, 398 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1966) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding). 7 In re City of Dallas, No. 05-14-00922-CV, 2014 WL 4900455, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2014, orig. proceeding); see also In re McAllen Med.

1990See Ex parte Savelle, 398 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.1966); Ex parte Nivens, 592 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, orig. proceeding).

1958Ex Parte Fisher, 146 Texas 328 , 206 S.W. 2d 1000 ; Ex Parte Henry, 147 Texas 315 , 215 S.W. 2d 588 .” In the case of Ex Parte Henry, supra, this Court said: “Under our holding in Ex Parte Fisher, 146 Texas 328 , 206 S.W. 2d 1000 , we are authorized to consider the facts proved in the contempt hearing to determine whether they were sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to hold relators in contempt.

1958Ex Parte Fisher, 146 Texas 328 , 206 S.W. 2d 1000 ; Ex Parte Henry, 147 Texas 315 , 215 S.W. 2d 588 .” In the case of Ex Parte Henry, supra, this Court said: “Under our holding in Ex Parte Fisher, 146 Texas 328 , 206 S.W. 2d 1000 , we are authorized to consider the facts proved in the contempt hearing to determine whether they were sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to hold relators in contempt.

2014See Johns, 807 S.W.2d at 773, n.1 (in a civil contempt, a relator must establish the inability to perform the act which will purge him from the contempt); see also Ex parte Ramon, 821 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding).

2009Ramon, 821 S.W.2d at 713 ; Ex parte Papageorgiou, 685 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, orig. proceeding).