contempt hearing in Mississippi

2010Impossibility of performance of a contract “is determined by whether an unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.” Hendrick v. Green, 618 So.2d 76, 79 (Miss.1993) (citing Littleton v. Employers Fire Ins.

2010Impossibility of performance of a contract "is determined by whether an unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract." Hendrick v. Green, 618 So.2d 76, 79 (Miss.1993) (citing Littleton v. Employers Fire Ins.

2020But the Supreme Court further held that David waived any objection related to service of process or due process because he appeared and “aggressively defend[ed] himself at the hearing” and “never made an objection pertaining to defective service from the beginning to the end of the hearing.” Id. at 610-11 (¶¶16, 18).3 3 In contrast, in Hanshaw, supra, the responding party did not waive her Rule 81 objection because the chancery court never held a contempt hearing, and the responding party “was never given an opportunity to present evidence on her behalf before a finding of contempt was made.”

2020Rather, she appeared at the hearing, defended against the charge of contempt on the merits, and “never made an objection pertaining to defective service from the beginning to the end of the hearing.” Dennis, 824 So. 2d at 611 (¶18).

2024Ct. App. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 829 So. 2d 712, 714 (¶9) (Miss.

2003The only defenses to a contempt violation include an inability to comply with the court order, McCracking v. McCracking, 805 So.2d 586, 589 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002), or that the court order was unclear, Davis v. Davis, 829 So.2d 712, 714 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2002).

2024There are only two defenses to a contempt violation: “the inability to comply with the court’s order . . . or that the court order was unclear.” Id. (citing McCracking v. Champaigne, 805 So. 2d 586, 589 (¶6) (Miss.

2003The only defenses to a contempt violation include an inability to comply with the court order, McCracking v. McCracking, 805 So.2d 586, 589 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002), or that the court order was unclear, Davis v. Davis, 829 So.2d 712, 714 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2002).

2023However, “[w]hether a party is in contempt is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at (¶43) (quoting Gilliland v. Gilliland, 984 So. 2d 364, 370 (¶19) (Miss.

2020“Whether a party is in contempt is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (quoting Gilliland v. Gilliland, 984 So. 2d 364, 369 (¶19) (Miss.

2012Id. at 105 (¶ 5).

2009Id. at 107 (¶ 9). ¶ 13.

2006Hampton relies on Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582 , 126 So. 485, 488 (1930), and maintains that the judgment should be clear and explicit in its order to constitute res judicata, and warrant an appellate court in affirming, reversing, annulling, or modifying the order.

2006Hampton relies on Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582 , 126 So. 485, 488 (1930), and maintains that the judgment should be clear and explicit in its order to constitute res judicata, and warrant an appellate court in affirming, reversing, annulling, or modifying the order.

2001The facts of Phoenix Exploration, Inc. v. Murexco Petroleum, Inc., 614 So.2d 72, 72 (La.1993), are similar to the present facts, where a realtor had filed bankruptcy proceedings at the time of a contempt hearing.

1999The facts of Phoenix Exploration, Inc. v. Murexco Petroleum, Inc., 614 So. 2d 72, 72 (La. 1993), are similar to the present facts, where a realtor had filed bankruptcy proceedings at the time of a contempt hearing.

2024“Although contempt proceedings in divorce cases often are filed in the same cause number and proceed with the underlying divorce case, they are held to be separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 81.” Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So. 2d 397, 402 (¶25) (Miss. 2008);16 see also Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So. 3d 143, 146 (¶9) (Miss. 2011) (recognizing that “contempt proceedings are distinct actions”).

2020But the Supreme Court further held that David waived any objection related to service of process or due process because he appeared and “aggressively defend[ed] himself at the hearing” and “never made an objection pertaining to defective service from the beginning to the end of the hearing.” Id. at 610-11 (¶¶16, 18).3 3 In contrast, in Hanshaw, supra, the responding party did not waive her Rule 81 objection because the chancery court never held a contempt hearing, and the responding party “was never given an opportunity to present evidence on her behalf before a finding of contempt was made.”

2024“Although contempt proceedings in divorce cases often are filed in the same cause number and proceed with the underlying divorce case, they are held to be separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 81.” Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So. 2d 397, 402 (¶25) (Miss. 2008);16 see also Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So. 3d 143, 146 (¶9) (Miss. 2011) (recognizing that “contempt proceedings are distinct actions”).

2024Specifically, we held in Curtis that “[i]n an unresolved domestic matter, where the parties have already been properly summoned before the chancery court and are aware of the on-going nature of the litigation, Rule 5 provides an efficient means of providing notice of hearing.” Id. at 632 (¶37);10 see also Garrison v. Courtney, 304 So. 3d 1129 , 1154 10 Curtis concerned a hearing on the division of marital property, not a contempt hearing to enforce a temporary order for support.

2024Curtis, 59 So. 3d at 625 (¶2).

2024“This Court’s scope of review in domestic-relations matters is strictly limited.” Curry v. Frazier, 119 So. 3d 362, 365 (¶8) (Miss.

2023The standard of review for civil contempt on appeal is manifest error, meaning “the factual findings of the chancellor are affirmed unless manifest error is present and apparent.” Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 797 (Miss. 1994). ¶26.

2023CONCLUSION 5 This Court has held that “[a]cting on the advice of counsel does not excuse a person from following an order, but it may be considered in determining whether there was willful contempt.” Price v. Snowden, 187 So. 3d 159, 165 (¶22) (Miss.

2022See In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949, 958 (Miss. 2006) (“The judge astutely bifurcated the hearing and considered sanctions subsequent to his ruling in the contempt hearing.

2020But the Supreme Court further held that David waived any objection related to service of process or due process because he appeared and “aggressively defend[ed] himself at the hearing” and “never made an objection pertaining to defective service from the beginning to the end of the hearing.” Id. at 610-11 (¶¶16, 18).3 3 In contrast, in Hanshaw, supra, the responding party did not waive her Rule 81 objection because the chancery court never held a contempt hearing, and the responding party “was never given an opportunity to present evidence on her behalf before a finding of contempt was made.”

2016See Williamson, 838 So.2d at 238 (¶ 34).

2016See Williamson, 838 So. 2d at 238 (¶34).

2016Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So.2d 961, 971 (¶ 43) (Miss.2000).

2016Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So. 2d 961 , 971 (¶43) (Miss. 2000).

2013R.K. v. J.K., 946 So.2d 764, 778 (Miss.2007). .

2013Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanders, 749 So.2d 1062, 1069 (Miss.1999).

2012The State conceded that “since it would appear the actions were more in the nature of a constructive attempt[,] it would have required the judge to have the actual contempt hearing conducted by another judge.” (Citation omitted.) This Court has provided that: in cases of indirect or constructive criminal contempt, “where the trial judge has substantial personal involvement in the prosecution, the accused contemnor must be tried by another judge.” ... [E]xamples of “substantial personal involvement in the prosecution” warranting recusal include cases where the trial judge acts as a “one-man gra

1995"An award of attorney fees in a contempt case is proper." Smith v. Smith, 545 So.2d 725, 728-9 (Miss. 1989) citing Stauffer v. Stauffer, 379 So.2d 922, 924 (Miss. 1980).