IAC claim in New Jersey

2026In substantively reviewing defendant's IAC claim, Judge Lytle applied the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).

2026Additionally, the second judge reviewed defendant's petition under the PCR framework established under the court rules and the two-prong IAC test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

2026To satisfy the prejudice prong of an IAC claim, "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2026In substantively reviewing defendant's IAC claim, Judge Lytle applied the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).

2020Because there is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant A-5870-17T4 11 decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment[,]" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , a defendant "bears the burden of proving" both prongs of an IAC claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).

2020Because there is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant A-5870-17T4 11 decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment[,]" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , a defendant "bears the burden of proving" both prongs of an IAC claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).

2025To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009), that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; accord State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52-58 (1987).

2025To establish a prima facie IAC claim, defendants must demonstrate "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009), that their attorneys' performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 88 (1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987), and that the outcome would have been different without the purported deficient performance.

2024In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on an IAC claim, the second prong is established when the defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2024In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on an IAC claim, the second prong is established when the defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2025Super. 368, 387 (App. Div. 2009) ("[W]hen the trial itself provides an adequately developed record upon which to evaluate defendant's claims, appellate courts may consider the issue on direct appeal." (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313 (2006))).

2025Trial counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient "merely A-3822-22 47 because . . . defendant is dissatisfied with his . . . exercise of judgment during the trial." Castagna, 187 N.J. at 314 .

2024However, a defendant also must show "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).

2024However, a defendant also must show "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).

2024In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on an IAC claim, the second prong is established when the defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2024In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on an IAC claim, the second prong is established when the defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2026To satisfy the prejudice prong of an IAC claim, "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2026To satisfy the prejudice prong of an IAC claim, "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2025In rejecting defendant's IAC claim based on trial counsel's purported failure to investigate, relying on State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

2025It is clear, to establish a prima facie IAC claim warranting an evidentiary hearing, "a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel," but must instead "allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J.

2026Super. at 16-17 (quoting McCauley-Bey, 97 F.3d at 1106 ).

2021There, we specifically addressed how a judge considering an IAC claim premised on failure to call a witness should proceed: "a court should consider: '(1) the credibility of all witnesses, including the likely impeachment of the uncalled defense witnesses; (2) the interplay of the uncalled witnesses with the actual defense witnesses called; and (3) the strength of the A-1388-19 8 evidence actually presented by the prosecution.'" Id. at 16–17 (quoting McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996)).

2025To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), "by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Nash, 212 N.J. at 541 (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "'To sustain that burden, specific facts' which 'would provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision' must be articulated." State v. Hand, 480 N.J.

2025To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), "by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Nash, 212 N.J. at 541 (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "'To sustain that burden, specific facts' which 'would provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision' must be articulated." State v. Hand, 480 N.J.

2021In her written decision, the judge acknowledged that in order to demonstrate that "his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a speedy trial A-0315-19T1 6 motion, [defendant] must establish that the motion would have had merit." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (noting that in order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an IAC claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish that the motion had merit); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute [IAC].").

2021In her written decision, the judge acknowledged that in order to demonstrate that "his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a speedy trial A-0315-19T1 6 motion, [defendant] must establish that the motion would have had merit." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (noting that in order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an IAC claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish that the motion had merit); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute [IAC].").

2021In her written decision, the judge acknowledged that in order to demonstrate that "his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a speedy trial A-0315-19T1 6 motion, [defendant] must establish that the motion would have had merit." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (noting that in order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an IAC claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish that the motion had merit); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute [IAC].").

2021In her written decision, the judge acknowledged that in order to demonstrate that "his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a speedy trial A-0315-19T1 6 motion, [defendant] must establish that the motion would have had merit." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (noting that in order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an IAC claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish that the motion had merit); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute [IAC].").

2025Trial counsel's decision to not present an identification expert "followed a sound strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015) (acknowledging that deciding which witnesses to call at trial is "one of the most difficult strategic A-3822-22 43 decisions that any trial attorney must confront" (quoting State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 320 (2005))); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731 , 739 (2021) ("Defense lawyers have 'limited' time and resources, and . . . certain tactics carry the risk of 'harm[ing] the defense' by undermining credibility with the jury or distracting from

2022"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 ).

2025However, a court may consider an IAC claim on direct appeal if the record below "discloses the facts essential to [defendant's] [IAC] claim." See State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002) (evaluating a defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal for failure to raise a meritorious double jeopardy defense); see also State v. Veney, 409 N.J.

2025However, a court may consider an IAC claim on direct appeal if the record below "discloses the facts essential to [defendant's] [IAC] claim." See State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002) (evaluating a defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal for failure to raise a meritorious double jeopardy defense); see also State v. Veney, 409 N.J.

2025However, a court may consider an IAC claim on direct appeal if the record below "discloses the facts essential to [defendant's] [IAC] claim." See State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002) (evaluating a defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal for failure to raise a meritorious double jeopardy defense); see also State v. Veney, 409 N.J.

2025However, a court may consider an IAC claim on direct appeal if the record below "discloses the facts essential to [defendant's] [IAC] claim." See State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 285 (2002) (evaluating a defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal for failure to raise a meritorious double jeopardy defense); see also State v. Veney, 409 N.J.

2026See State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 595 (2006) (By electing to self-represent oneself, a defendant "waive[s] . . . any future ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland/Fritz test in respect of those matters in which the defendant represents himself in."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).

2026See State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 595 (2006) (By electing to self-represent oneself, a defendant "waive[s] . . . any future ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland/Fritz test in respect of those matters in which the defendant represents himself in."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).

2026See State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 595 (2006) (By electing to self-represent oneself, a defendant "waive[s] . . . any future ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland/Fritz test in respect of those matters in which the defendant represents himself in."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).

2026See State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 595 (2006) (By electing to self-represent oneself, a defendant "waive[s] . . . any future ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland/Fritz test in respect of those matters in which the defendant represents himself in."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).

2025Trial counsel's decision to not present an identification expert "followed a sound strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015) (acknowledging that deciding which witnesses to call at trial is "one of the most difficult strategic A-3822-22 43 decisions that any trial attorney must confront" (quoting State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 320 (2005))); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731 , 739 (2021) ("Defense lawyers have 'limited' time and resources, and . . . certain tactics carry the risk of 'harm[ing] the defense' by undermining credibility with the jury or distracting from

2025State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).

2025State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).

2025Trial counsel's decision to not present an identification expert "followed a sound strategic approach to the case." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015) (acknowledging that deciding which witnesses to call at trial is "one of the most difficult strategic A-3822-22 43 decisions that any trial attorney must confront" (quoting State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 320 (2005))); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731 , 739 (2021) ("Defense lawyers have 'limited' time and resources, and . . . certain tactics carry the risk of 'harm[ing] the defense' by undermining credibility with the jury or distracting from

2025Id. at 12; cf. Taccetta, 200 N.J. at 193-94, 198 (rejecting the defendant's IAC claim that he "could have entered a guilty plea to the purported plea offer if correctly advised [by his attorney] concerning the sentencing A-2225-22 10 consequences" because to do so defendant would have "commit[ted] perjury in giving a factual basis for a crime he insist[ed] he did not commit[,]" a practice "antithetical to our court rules, case law, and the administration of justice").

2025Id. at 12; cf. Taccetta, 200 N.J. at 193-94, 198 (rejecting the defendant's IAC claim that he "could have entered a guilty plea to the purported plea offer if correctly advised [by his attorney] concerning the sentencing A-2225-22 10 consequences" because to do so defendant would have "commit[ted] perjury in giving a factual basis for a crime he insist[ed] he did not commit[,]" a practice "antithetical to our court rules, case law, and the administration of justice").

2025As the judge astutely explained, defendant's claims are belied by the record and although he now claims to the contrary, "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[W]ithout a constitutional right to standby counsel, a defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel." (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 55 (2d Cir. 1998))); Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he inadequacy of standby counsel's performance, without the defendant's relinquishment of his Faretta right, cannot give rise to an [IAC] claim under the Sixth Amendment."); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 , 90 A-2846-23 10 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Absent a const

2025See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[W]ithout a constitutional right to standby counsel, a defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel." (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 55 (2d Cir. 1998))); Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he inadequacy of standby counsel's performance, without the defendant's relinquishment of his Faretta right, cannot give rise to an [IAC] claim under the Sixth Amendment."); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 , 90 A-2846-23 10 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Absent a const