IAC claim in Arizona

2026It found Vigorito failed to state a colorable IAC claim under the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which required Vigorito to demonstrate that (1) his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as defined by prevailing professional norms, and (2) he was actually prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficient performance.

2026Accordingly, on review, and with respect to his convictions, the only relevant inquiry is whether Lawrence knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the plea agreement. ¶8 To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner must “demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 407 , ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984)).

2025See State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543 , 548 ¶ 12 (2021). 2 STATE v. BUTTON Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶4 We review the summary dismissal of a petition for post- conviction relief for an abuse of discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402 , 407 ¶ 6 (2021). ¶5 To state a colorable IAC claim, Button “must show both that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced [him].” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562 , 567

2025See Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 567 -68 ¶¶ 22, 25 (requiring the defendant to establish, in an IAC claim involving appellate counsel, that the attorney omitted an issue “clearly stronger than those selected for appeal” and “a reasonable probability that [the omitted issue] . . . would have succeeded on appeal”).

2026To establish prejudice, Jiron must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180, ¶ 6 (citation omitted). ¶7 In resolving an IAC claim, we must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and the defendant must overcome a presumption that the conduct could be sound trial strategy.

2026To establish prejudice, Jiron must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180, ¶ 6 (citation omitted). ¶7 In resolving an IAC claim, we must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and the defendant must overcome a presumption that the conduct could be sound trial strategy.

2026Accordingly, on review, and with respect to his convictions, the only relevant inquiry is whether Lawrence knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the plea agreement. ¶8 To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner must “demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 407 , ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984)).

2026Accordingly, on review, and with respect to his convictions, the only relevant inquiry is whether Lawrence knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the plea agreement. ¶8 To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner must “demonstrate that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 407 , ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88 (1984)).

2025P. 32.1(a); State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002). ¶7 To state a colorable trial IAC claim, a defendant must prove counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial.

2017See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9; cf. State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 14 (1989) (rejecting defendant’s IAC claim on direct appeal).

2025Id. at 283 ¶ 23. ¶18 Traverso petitioned this Court to review whether his successive IAC claim is subject to preclusion, which we granted.

2025See Diaz, 236 Ariz. at 363 ¶¶ 10–13 (resolving successive IAC claim without reference to Stewart’s automatic preclusion language); Anderson, 257 Ariz. at 231–33 ¶¶ 20–26 (same).

2025The State further argued that this Court’s decision in Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446 (2002), required automatic preclusion of Traverso’s successive IAC claim. ¶13 With respect to the timeliness of his successive PCR, Traverso acknowledged that his petition was untimely.

2025Thus, “[w]hether a defendant must personally waive an IAC claim to warrant preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3) depends on the particular right implicated by the allegedly ineffective representation.” Id. ¶ 9 (citing Stewart, 202 Ariz. at 450 ¶ 12).

2026See State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 419, 425, ¶ 25 (App. 1998) (mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims do not create a colorable IAC claim); see also Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 21 (to warrant evidentiary hearing, Rule 32 claim “must consist of more than conclusory assertions”).

2026See Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 21 (“To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the defendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.”). ¶13 Therefore, Lawrence has failed to show the superior court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing his IAC claim. 4 STATE v. LAWRENCE Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶14 We grant review but deny relief.

2025See State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369, 373, ¶ 11 (App. 2010) (IAC claim pursuant to Rule 32.1(a)); Ariz. Sup. Ct. Ord.

2024Noting that preclusion requires defendants to “raise all known claims for relief in a single petition” (emphasis added) (citation omitted), this Court reasoned that “[p]ermitting Diaz to file his first petition to assert an IAC claim under the circumstances here [would] not result in repeated review of the IAC claim; it would result in its first review.” Id. ¶ 12; see also State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369 , 373 ¶ 11 (App. 2010) (“The ‘purpose of the preclusion rule’ is to 7 STATE V.

2025State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (“[D]efendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). ¶8 Like a trial IAC claim, a presumption exists that appellate counsel provided effective assistance.

2025State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (“[D]efendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). ¶8 Like a trial IAC claim, a presumption exists that appellate counsel provided effective assistance.

2022See, e.g., State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 585 (1984) (explaining averments in the petitioner’s “self-serving affidavit” did not alone provide a “sufficient factual basis” to support his IAC claim); see also State v. Wilson, 179 Ariz. 17 , 1 Campos did not raise an IAC claim based on trial counsel’s failure to object to the superior court’s imposition of an aggravated sentence based solely on “catch-all” aggravators; therefore, he has waived any such claim.

2022See, e.g., State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 585 (1984) (explaining averments in the petitioner’s “self-serving affidavit” did not alone provide a “sufficient factual basis” to support his IAC claim); see also State v. Wilson, 179 Ariz. 17 , 1 Campos did not raise an IAC claim based on trial counsel’s failure to object to the superior court’s imposition of an aggravated sentence based solely on “catch-all” aggravators; therefore, he has waived any such claim.

2026Instead, the crux of Gilmore’s IAC claim is that counsel should have arranged for a witness to conduct a scene inspection to be able to offer testimony, based on personal knowledge, about the position of the setting sun under conditions similar to those found at the intersection of Indian School Road and Litchfield Road at the time of the collision. ¶20 Of course, trial counsel is not required to “pursue all avenues of investigation,” and counsel may reasonably decide “not to pursue a particular investigative path based on his or her reasoned conclusion that it . . . is . . . unnecessary in li

2025State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (Both the prejudice and performance prongs of an IAC claim are mixed questions of law and fact.).

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2026See Roseberry, 237 Ariz. at 508, ¶ 7 . ¶12 To state a colorable IAC claim under the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must show “that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.” State v. Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377 , 382–83 (App. 1987) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986)). ¶13 Dudley fails to show his claim is meritorious.

2026We will affirm the court’s ruling “if it is legally correct for any reason.” State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 (2015). ¶7 Navarro contends the superior court erred by (1) requiring him to provide an affidavit from trial counsel to establish a colorable IAC claim; (2) misapplying the Strickland prejudice standard; and (3) denying his request for a DNA expert and then dismissing his IAC claim for lack of expert evidence.

2025State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (“[D]efendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). ¶8 Like a trial IAC claim, a presumption exists that appellate counsel provided effective assistance.

2025State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414, ¶ 21 (App. 2000) (“[D]efendant’s challenge must consist of more than conclusory assertions and be supported by more than regret.”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). ¶8 Like a trial IAC claim, a presumption exists that appellate counsel provided effective assistance.

2025See State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 (1985) (“Disagreements in trial strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance so long as the challenged conduct has some reasoned basis.” (citations omitted)); see also Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 182-83, ¶¶ 13-16 (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective by forgoing cross-examination of the State’s expert for fear that “a cross-examination would give the expert a chance to inflict greater damage,” since defense counsel “clearly had, at a minimum, some reasoned basis” for that decision (cleaned up)). ¶29 In dismissing Cramer’s PCR petit

2021See, e.g., State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 (1985) (reasoning that “[d]isagreements in trial strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance so long as the challenged conduct has some reasoned basis” (emphasis added)); Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 183 ¶ 21 (rejecting IAC claim based on failure to cross-examine because it “was a strategic decision that defendant has not demonstrated falls below the level expected of a reasonably competent defense attorney”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (listing relevant factors courts may consider in deciding whether certain strategic choices were rea

2024See State v. Noleen, 142 Ariz. 101, 108 (1984) (holding that counsel’s failure to request a self-defense instruction in murder case did not constitute IAC because defense was based on “the theory of accidental homicide . . . rather than self-defense”); see also State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 408, ¶ 12 (2021) (“[M]atters of trial strategy and tactics are committed to defense counsel’s judgment and generally cannot serve as the basis for an IAC claim.”) (cleaned up); State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 14 (1989) (“Defense counsel’s determinations of trial strategy, even if later proven unsuccessful,

2017See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9; cf. State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 14 (1989) (rejecting defendant’s IAC claim on direct appeal).

2023See State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345 , 353–54 ¶ 40 (2004) (remarking that where a matter is committed to “the sound discretion of a trial judge,” an appellate court “will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances”).

2023See State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345 , 353–54 ¶ 40 (2004) (remarking that where a matter is committed to “the sound discretion of a trial judge,” an appellate court “will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances”).

2023See Fahringer, 136 Ariz. at 415 . ¶18 The dissent also reads Diaz to hold that an attorney’s failure to raise a valid IAC claim cannot prevent a defendant from later raising that claim, in essence creating a general ineffective assistance of PCR counsel exception to waiver and preclusion.

2023See Fahringer, 136 Ariz. at 415 . ¶18 The dissent also reads Diaz to hold that an attorney’s failure to raise a valid IAC claim cannot prevent a defendant from later raising that claim, in essence creating a general ineffective assistance of PCR counsel exception to waiver and preclusion.

2023See id. at 438–39 ¶ 21 (noting this court defers to the superior court’s factual findings in these cases absent “clear error”). ¶74 The superior court also permissibly excused Traverso’s delay in filing the IAC claim.

2023See id. at 438–39 ¶ 21 (noting this court defers to the superior court’s factual findings in these cases absent “clear error”). ¶74 The superior court also permissibly excused Traverso’s delay in filing the IAC claim.

2020Id.; see State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392 , 397–98 (1985) (adopting the Strickland test). ¶13 Estling has not alleged facts giving rise to a colorable claim, and thus, he fails to establish an abuse of the superior court’s discretion.

2020Id.; see State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392 , 397–98 (1985) (adopting the Strickland test). ¶13 Estling has not alleged facts giving rise to a colorable claim, and thus, he fails to establish an abuse of the superior court’s discretion.

2020See State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988) (recognizing a PCR petitioner must present a colorable claim to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing). ¶13 Finally, regarding the 2017 Case, Nye cryptically asserts, “the ineffective assistance . . . in the [2015 Case], cascaded into the [2017 Case].” Because whatever claim Nye refers to in the 2017 Case is apparently contingent on the viability of his IAC claim in the 2015 Case—a claim we have found is not colorable—Nye’s claim related to the 2017 Case necessarily fails.

2018See State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988) (noting a defendant who presents a colorable claim is entitled to an evidentiary hearing). ¶7 Finally, to the extent Mendoza contends he was entitled to appointment of Rule 32 counsel, he is incorrect.

2017State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 578 (App. 1991). ¶13 Even if the issues had been properly presented, Briseno would not be entitled to relief.3 Briseno failed to demonstrate prejudice on the IAC claim.

2017State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 578 (App. 1991). ¶13 Even if the issues had been properly presented, Briseno would not be entitled to relief.3 Briseno failed to demonstrate prejudice on the IAC claim.

2017See, e.g., State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 585 , 691 P.2d 673, 676 (1984) (finding, in the context of an IAC claim, no sufficient factual basis to support an allegation based on the self-serving affidavit of the defendant); see also Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s self-serving affidavit regarding a plea offer was not sufficient alone to show prejudice), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Bejarano, 751 F.3d 280 , 287 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014).

2017See, e.g., State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 585 , 691 P.2d 673, 676 (1984) (finding, in the context of an IAC claim, no sufficient factual basis to support an allegation based on the self-serving affidavit of the defendant); see also Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s self-serving affidavit regarding a plea offer was not sufficient alone to show prejudice), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Bejarano, 751 F.3d 280 , 287 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014).

2007It is undisputed that Swoopes raised a claim of IAC in his first post-conviction petition in 1990. 5 In general, when “ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.” State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002); see also State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 14 , 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (same); Mata, 185 Ariz. at 334 , 916 P.2d at 1050 (rejecting approach that would permit “a *398 never-ending tunnel” of post-eonviction p

2007It is undisputed that Swoopes raised a claim of IAC in his first post-conviction petition in 1990. 5 In general, when “ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.” State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002); see also State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 14 , 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (same); Mata, 185 Ariz. at 334 , 916 P.2d at 1050 (rejecting approach that would permit “a *398 never-ending tunnel” of post-eonviction p

2024To determine whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we ask “whether he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶17 To prove an IAC claim, a defendant must show that “counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Id. at 407 ¶ 8 (citing Amaral, 239 Ariz. at 220 ¶ 11).

2024To determine whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we ask “whether he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶17 To prove an IAC claim, a defendant must show that “counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Id. at 407 ¶ 8 (citing Amaral, 239 Ariz. at 220 ¶ 11).

2024The standard of reasonableness is linked to the “practice[s] and expectations of the legal 3 STATE v. RIEPE Decision of the Court community,” id. at 273 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 ), and examines “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ). ¶10 In resolving an IAC claim, a court must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and the defendant must overcome a presumption that the conduct could be a sound trial strategy.

2024The standard of reasonableness is linked to the “practice[s] and expectations of the legal 3 STATE v. RIEPE Decision of the Court community,” id. at 273 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 ), and examines “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ). ¶10 In resolving an IAC claim, a court must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s representation was within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and the defendant must overcome a presumption that the conduct could be a sound trial strategy.

2024See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). ¶24 In Diaz, this Court determined “unusual circumstances” compelled the conclusion that a petitioner had not waived his IAC claim, despite previous PCR petitions raising IAC claims. 236 Ariz. at 363 ¶ 10.

2017WOOD • Clerk of the Court FILED: AA 2 To the extent Alvarez argues the superior court erred in determining that Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), did not reflect a significant change in law that would have permitted him to untimely seek relief on his IAC claim, we disagree.

2026State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180, ¶ 4 (2017). ¶7 On review, Lawrence reasserts his IAC claim.1 “By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the validity of [his] plea.” State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 527, ¶ 18 (App. 2017) (citation modified).