IAC claim in California

2025Under the second component of the IAC test, a defendant must prove prejudice “that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’ [Citations.] Prejudice requires ‘a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted …, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241 .) “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693–694, italics added; see Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 112

2025Under the second component of the IAC test, a defendant must prove prejudice “that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’ [Citations.] Prejudice requires ‘a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted …, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241 .) “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693–694, italics added; see Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 112

2016In order to establish a claim of IAC, defendant must demonstrate, “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. [Citations.] A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is enough to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 540-541 , citing, among other cases, Strickland v.

2016In order to establish a claim of IAC, defendant must demonstrate, “(1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. [Citations.] A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is enough to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 540-541 , citing, among other cases, Strickland v.

2013Defendant also was no stranger to plea proceedings and advisements, having pleaded guilty and been advised by the court and counsel in at least two prior cases about the immigration consequences of any such plea. “[B]inding precedent holds that constitutional violations, such as violations of a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, are not properly presented in a petition for writ of error coram nobis. [Citation.]” ( Mbaabu, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) Defendant’s motion below, which was in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, was an improper vehicle by which to

2013Defendant also was no stranger to plea proceedings and advisements, having pleaded guilty and been advised by the court and counsel in at least two prior cases about the immigration consequences of any such plea. “[B]inding precedent holds that constitutional violations, such as violations of a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, are not properly presented in a petition for writ of error coram nobis. [Citation.]” ( Mbaabu, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) Defendant’s motion below, which was in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, was an improper vehicle by which to

2025Under the second component of the IAC test, a defendant must prove prejudice “that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’ [Citations.] Prejudice requires ‘a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted …, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241 .) “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693–694, italics added; see Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 112

2025Under the second component of the IAC test, a defendant must prove prejudice “that is a ‘ “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’ [Citations.] Prejudice requires ‘a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted …, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241 .) “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693–694, italics added; see Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 112

2024IAC Turning to defendant’s related IAC claim, to prevail, a defendant “‘must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that [he] was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the deficient performance.’” (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736 (Woodruff), quoting People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 888 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) “‘[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.’ (Harrington v. Richter (

2021(See Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 266 ; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 442 [reversal on direct appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel possible when “the record on appeal demonstrates there could be no rational tactical purpose for counsel’s omissions”].) 43 Based on the circumstances and counsel’s representations to the court, we are compelled to conclude that Smothers’s trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

2022Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 958 ; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) We can reject an IAC claim if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2022Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 958 ; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) We can reject an IAC claim if the defendant fails to establish either element of the Strickland standard.

2013(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 214-215 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 , and In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 , Accord, People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) Hence, an IAC claim has two components: deficient performance and prejudice.

2013(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 214-215 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 , and In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721 , Accord, People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) Hence, an IAC claim has two components: deficient performance and prejudice.

2024(See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266- 267.) Moreover, prejudice is an essential element of an IAC claim.

2024(See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266- 267.) Moreover, prejudice is an essential element of an IAC claim.

2026To prevail on an IAC claim, “the defendant must first show counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of  Banke, Acting P. J., Langhorne Wilson, J. and Smiley, J. participated in the decision. 1 reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) Here, as Sheriff acknowledges, the statutory scheme sets forth “[f]our categories of conduct [that] establish a violation if proved by a preponderance of the evidence,” (§ 745, subd. (a)), but “a victim’s references to a defendant’s race in a victim impact statement

2026To prevail on an IAC claim, “the defendant must first show counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of  Banke, Acting P. J., Langhorne Wilson, J. and Smiley, J. participated in the decision. 1 reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) Here, as Sheriff acknowledges, the statutory scheme sets forth “[f]our categories of conduct [that] establish a violation if proved by a preponderance of the evidence,” (§ 745, subd. (a)), but “a victim’s references to a defendant’s race in a victim impact statement

2026(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 ; accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979-980 ; see People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) A “‘“reasonable probability”’” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

2026(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 ; accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979-980 ; see People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) A “‘“reasonable probability”’” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

2025“If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” the claim “must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189 .) Defendant’s first IAC claim rests on the assumption the trial court ruled to allow, without restrictions, questioning the victim about currently hearing voices in her head.

2021(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189 [“If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,” an IAC claim is more suitably raised in a habeas corpus proceeding].) 2.

2024(See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”]; Brown, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 109 [an IAC claim requires a showing of a “ ‘ “a reasonable probability” ’ ” the defendant suffered prejudice].) As noted above, the claim fails on the merits.

2024(See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”]; Brown, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 109 [an IAC claim requires a showing of a “ ‘ “a reasonable probability” ’ ” the defendant suffered prejudice].) As noted above, the claim fails on the merits.

2023(Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 936 [An IAC claim “must be rejected” when the record on appeal sheds no light on counsel’s actions.]; see Mendoza Tello, at p. 266.) 2.

2023(Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 936 [An IAC claim “must be rejected” when the record on appeal sheds no light on counsel’s actions.]; see Mendoza Tello, at p. 266.) 2.

2022Standard of Review and Other Legal Principles As discussed, ante, we use the Taylor mixed-standard of review when evaluating a trial court’s denial of a new trial motion alleging an IAC claim. ( Taylor, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 724–725.) In Kurtzman, the California Supreme Court held “that a court may ‘restrict [] a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense before acquitting on a greater offense’ but may not ‘preclude [it] from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations.’ (Italics in original.) We thereby impliedly rejected a ‘strict acquittal-first rule under wh

2022Standard of Review and Other Legal Principles As discussed, ante, we use the Taylor mixed-standard of review when evaluating a trial court’s denial of a new trial motion alleging an IAC claim. ( Taylor, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 724–725.) In Kurtzman, the California Supreme Court held “that a court may ‘restrict [] a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense before acquitting on a greater offense’ but may not ‘preclude [it] from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations.’ (Italics in original.) We thereby impliedly rejected a ‘strict acquittal-first rule under wh

2025Such proof must satisfy two distinct but equally crucial components: “A [defendant] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521 (Wiggins), italics added; Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100 , 118 (Buck); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) Both components of this test “are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059 , 1073 (Gay).) As to the first component, the test is not satisfied by asserting formulaic or conc

2025Such proof must satisfy two distinct but equally crucial components: “A [defendant] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521 (Wiggins), italics added; Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100 , 118 (Buck); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) Both components of this test “are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059 , 1073 (Gay).) As to the first component, the test is not satisfied by asserting formulaic or conc

2025Such proof must satisfy two distinct but equally crucial components: “A [defendant] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521 (Wiggins), italics added; Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100, 118 (Buck); see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) Both components of the test “are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1073 (Gay); In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 774 (Long).) As to the first component, the const

2024IAC Turning to defendant’s related IAC claim, to prevail, a defendant “‘must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that [he] was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the deficient performance.’” (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736 (Woodruff), quoting People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 888 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) “‘[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.’ (Harrington v. Richter (

2024(See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”]; Brown, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 109 [an IAC claim requires a showing of a “ ‘ “a reasonable probability” ’ ” the defendant suffered prejudice].) As noted above, the claim fails on the merits.

2024(See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”]; Brown, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 109 [an IAC claim requires a showing of a “ ‘ “a reasonable probability” ’ ” the defendant suffered prejudice].) As noted above, the claim fails on the merits.

2025(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 ; see Buck, supra, 580 U.S. at p. 118 and People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 .) Thus, because Rodriguez has failed to satisfy either prong of the IAC test, his claim must be rejected. that was never made, regarding the admission of evidence that was never proffered, let alone excluded.

2025(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 ; see Buck, supra, 580 U.S. at p. 118 and People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 .) Thus, because Rodriguez has failed to satisfy either prong of the IAC test, his claim must be rejected. that was never made, regarding the admission of evidence that was never proffered, let alone excluded.

2025Such proof must satisfy two distinct but equally crucial components: “A [defendant] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521 (Wiggins), italics added; Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100 , 118 (Buck); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) Both components of this test “are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059 , 1073 (Gay).) As to the first component, the test is not satisfied by asserting formulaic or conc

2025Such proof must satisfy two distinct but equally crucial components: “A [defendant] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521 (Wiggins), italics added; Buck v. Davis (2017) 580 U.S. 100 , 118 (Buck); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) Both components of this test “are mixed questions of law and fact subject to our independent review.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059 , 1073 (Gay).) As to the first component, the test is not satisfied by asserting formulaic or conc

2024IAC Turning to defendant’s related IAC claim, to prevail, a defendant “‘must satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that [he] was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different were it not for the deficient performance.’” (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736 (Woodruff), quoting People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 888 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) “‘[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.’ (Harrington v. Richter (

2024(Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 739 ; see Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 112 [“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”].) Accordingly, defendant’s IAC claim is foreclosed.

2023(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 ; 9 accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979-980 ; see People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) “[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 .) If the record sheds no light on counsel’s actions, the claim must be rejected unless no satisfactory explanation exists or counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one.

2023(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 ; 9 accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979-980 ; see People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 .) “[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 .) If the record sheds no light on counsel’s actions, the claim must be rejected unless no satisfactory explanation exists or counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one.