IAC claim in Texas

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2018Consistent with that approach, Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1911 (2017), an IAC claim based on the attorney’s failure to object to a closed courtroom, required a reasonable probability of a different outcome Miller–Page 7 in the trial the defendant had or a showing that the trial he had was fundamentally unfair; Weaver did not demand proof that a better outcome would have resulted from a hypothetical trial that was not had.

2018Consistent with that approach, Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1911 (2017), an IAC claim based on the attorney’s failure to object to a closed courtroom, required a reasonable probability of a different outcome Miller–Page 7 in the trial the defendant had or a showing that the trial he had was fundamentally unfair; Weaver did not demand proof that a better outcome would have resulted from a hypothetical trial that was not had.

2024To rebut that presumption, an IAC claim must be “‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2024To rebut that presumption, an IAC claim must be “‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2024To rebut that presumption, an IAC claim must be “‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2024To rebut that presumption, an IAC claim must be “‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2024As set forth above, Watson averred in his affidavit that he had been practicing criminal law 13 See Arreola v. State, 207 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (a “defendant’s uncorroborated testimony that he was misinformed by counsel is not sufficient to show that his plea was involuntary”) (citing Fimberg v. State, 922 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d)); see also Paschal v. State, No. 02-20-00073-CR, 2021 WL 3795955 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant’s uncorroborat

2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ex parte Bowman, 533 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ex parte Bowman, 533 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2024As set forth above, Watson averred in his affidavit that he had been practicing criminal law 13 See Arreola v. State, 207 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (a “defendant’s uncorroborated testimony that he was misinformed by counsel is not sufficient to show that his plea was involuntary”) (citing Fimberg v. State, 922 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d)); see also Paschal v. State, No. 02-20-00073-CR, 2021 WL 3795955 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant’s uncorroborat

2021Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2021Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2019To defeat this presumption, an IAC claim “must be firmly founded in the record and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

2019To defeat this presumption, an IAC claim “must be firmly founded in the record and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

2015Strickland. 466 U.S. failed to considerate cumulative weight of [wa]s justified:" /d. (quoting Sfafe v. Brewer, at 697 (holding a court deciding an IAC claim the mitigating evidence.presented, we see Number one, the defendant had a no probability that Hurtes would have 170 Ariz. 486 , 826 P.2d 783, 797 (Ariz. - need not address both components of the deprivedchildhoodand was raised in a 1992)).

2015Strickland. 466 U.S. failed to considerate cumulative weight of [wa]s justified:" /d. (quoting Sfafe v. Brewer, at 697 (holding a court deciding an IAC claim the mitigating evidence.presented, we see Number one, the defendant had a no probability that Hurtes would have 170 Ariz. 486 , 826 P.2d 783, 797 (Ariz. - need not address both components of the deprivedchildhoodand was raised in a 1992)).

2015Regardless of whether this Court agrees that Mr. Lizcano’s Atkins claim is procedurally barred, it must nonetheless consider the additional evidence of intellectual disability for purposes of assessing prejudice on his IAC claim, an analysis that—at least with respect to new evidence of adaptive deficits—the trial court did not undertake. 10 previous decision and granting relief because original conviction was subsequently held to be void) and Ex parte Stuart, 653 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. Crim.

2015Regardless of whether this Court agrees that Mr. Lizcano’s Atkins claim is procedurally barred, it must nonetheless consider the additional evidence of intellectual disability for purposes of assessing prejudice on his IAC claim, an analysis that—at least with respect to new evidence of adaptive deficits—the trial court did not undertake. 10 previous decision and granting relief because original conviction was subsequently held to be void) and Ex parte Stuart, 653 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. Crim.