IAC claim in North Carolina

2025State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ) (“An IAC claim must establish both that the professional assistance defendant received was unreasonable and that the trial would have had a different outcome in the absence of such assistance.”).

2025State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ) (“An IAC claim must establish both that the professional assistance defendant received was unreasonable and that the trial would have had a different outcome in the absence of such assistance.”).

2026To successfully bring an IAC claim, Defendant must show both that (1) his counsel’s deficient performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); accord State v. - 11 - STATE V.

2026To successfully bring an IAC claim, Defendant must show both that (1) his counsel’s deficient performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); accord State v. - 11 - STATE V.

2026A defendant bringing an IAC claim must show both that (1) “defense counsel’s performance was deficient” and that (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

2019(Emphasis added)." State v. Braswell , 312 N.C. 553 , 562, 324 S.E.2d 241 , 248 (1985) (citation omitted). *535 However, it is rare that this Court will be in a position to decide a defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal: "Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be considered through a motion for appropriate relief before the trial court in post-conviction proceedings and not on direct appeal." State v. Allen , --- N.C.

2026See, e.g., State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001) (“Accordingly, should the reviewing court determine that IAC claims have been prematurely asserted on direct appeal, it shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.”); see also State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 106 , 331 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985) (“We cannot properly determine this issue on this direct appeal because an evidentiary hearing on this question has not been held.

2026See, e.g., State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001) (“Accordingly, should the reviewing court determine that IAC claims have been prematurely asserted on direct appeal, it shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.”); see also State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 106 , 331 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985) (“We cannot properly determine this issue on this direct appeal because an evidentiary hearing on this question has not been held.

2018When our Court reviews an IAC claim, "[c]ounsel is given wide latitude in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel's performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for defendant to bear." State v. Fletcher , 354 N.C. 455 , 482, 555 S.E.2d 534 , 551 (2001).

2018When our Court reviews an IAC claim, "[c]ounsel is given wide latitude in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel's performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for defendant to bear." State v. Fletcher , 354 N.C. 455 , 482, 555 S.E.2d 534 , 551 (2001).

2026See State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103 , 130–31 (2011) (rejecting IAC claim where the argument sought was contrary to settled evidentiary law).

2022See State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 122 (2011) (concluding that it was appropriate to assess a defendant’s IAC claim by applying Strickland because “the facts do not make it impractical to determine whether defendant suffered prejudice”).

2021Id. at 385, 817 S.E.2d at 171 . ¶ 123 The distinction between this case and Hyman is rooted in a basic difference between an impermissible shackling claim and an IAC claim.

2021Id. at 385, 817 S.E.2d at 171 . ¶ 123 The distinction between this case and Hyman is rooted in a basic difference between an impermissible shackling claim and an IAC claim.

2023McNeil, 371 N.C. at 216-17 , 813 S.E.2d at 811 . 2.

2023McNeil, 371 N.C. at 216-17 , 813 S.E.2d at 811 . 2.

2022See also, State v. Buckner, 351 N.C. 401 (2000) (holding that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) permitted only the discovery of privileged information relevant to the specific IAC claim being litigated). ¶ 42 In this case, Mr. Farook’s pro se IAC filing was a legal nullity and never litigated.

2022See also, State v. Buckner, 351 N.C. 401 (2000) (holding that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) permitted only the discovery of privileged information relevant to the specific IAC claim being litigated). ¶ 42 In this case, Mr. Farook’s pro se IAC filing was a legal nullity and never litigated.

2024For example, a defendant rarely is able to bring an IAC claim on direct appeal because the claim is not “apparent on the face of the record” and thus requires “further development of the facts.” See State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316 (2006).

2024For example, a defendant rarely is able to bring an IAC claim on direct appeal because the claim is not “apparent on the face of the record” and thus requires “further development of the facts.” See State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316 (2006).

2025When reviewing an IAC claim, “this Court engages in a presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280 , 595 S.E.2d 381, 406 (2004).

2025When reviewing an IAC claim, “this Court engages in a presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280 , 595 S.E.2d 381, 406 (2004).

2022See United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The benchmark for judging any such claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. produced a just result.”).

2022See United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The benchmark for judging any such claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. produced a just result.”).

2022Stat. § 15A-1354(a) so long as doing so does not otherwise conflict with the provisions of the Miller-fix statutes.”). ¶ 20 Naturally, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a) significantly influenced its assessment of the strength of Oglesby’s IAC claim: when determining whether an attorney’s decision not to raise an argument during a proceeding was “a matter of reasonable trial strategy,” Fair, 354 N.C. at 167 , it matters whether the argument the attorney chose to forego was plausible or fanciful, see, e.g., State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 54 (2009) (concluding that cou

2022Stat. § 15A-1354(a) so long as doing so does not otherwise conflict with the provisions of the Miller-fix statutes.”). ¶ 20 Naturally, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a) significantly influenced its assessment of the strength of Oglesby’s IAC claim: when determining whether an attorney’s decision not to raise an argument during a proceeding was “a matter of reasonable trial strategy,” Fair, 354 N.C. at 167 , it matters whether the argument the attorney chose to forego was plausible or fanciful, see, e.g., State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 54 (2009) (concluding that cou

2022Because “[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair [proceeding],” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972), it is perverse to deny a party’s IAC claim on the basis of a retrospective review of a record and set of facts produced in a set of proceedings where counsel’s performance was wholly deficient. ¶ 52 Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that it is routine and, indeed, preferable to resolve IAC claims by presuming that the representation was ineffective and jumping right to the question of whether there was a sufficient showing of prejudice disser

2022Because “[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair [proceeding],” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972), it is perverse to deny a party’s IAC claim on the basis of a retrospective review of a record and set of facts produced in a set of proceedings where counsel’s performance was wholly deficient. ¶ 52 Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that it is routine and, indeed, preferable to resolve IAC claims by presuming that the representation was ineffective and jumping right to the question of whether there was a sufficient showing of prejudice disser

2022App. 280, 290 , 563 S.E.2d 72, 79 (2002) (supporting the trial court’s summary denial of Defendant’s MAR and rejecting defendant’s IAC claim, based partly on his attorney’s alleged failure to contact various defense witnesses, where “defendant failed to file any affidavits or other evidence to support his assertions that counsel was ineffective”) (emphasis added)). ¶ 30 For reasons elaborated below, we hold that the trial court erred by not granting an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s IAC claims.

2022App. 280, 290 , 563 S.E.2d 72, 79 (2002) (supporting the trial court’s summary denial of Defendant’s MAR and rejecting defendant’s IAC claim, based partly on his attorney’s alleged failure to contact various defense witnesses, where “defendant failed to file any affidavits or other evidence to support his assertions that counsel was ineffective”) (emphasis added)). ¶ 30 For reasons elaborated below, we hold that the trial court erred by not granting an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s IAC claims.

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021Thus, “because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal.” State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001). ¶ 125 When presented with a “prematurely asserted” IAC claim, the court “shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id.; see also State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 668 , 566 S.E.2d 61, 78 (2002) (dismissing without prejudice IAC claim that is “suggested by the record but [is] insufficiently developed for review”);

2021Thus, “because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal.” State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001). ¶ 125 When presented with a “prematurely asserted” IAC claim, the court “shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id.; see also State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 668 , 566 S.E.2d 61, 78 (2002) (dismissing without prejudice IAC claim that is “suggested by the record but [is] insufficiently developed for review”);

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021Any purported remedy may well be asserted in an IAC claim against trial counsel, as opposed to puffing up and asserting blame on the trial court or the State for Defendant’s lack of the transcript from the prior trial. ¶ 15 The State asserts this Court’s opinion in State v. McKeithan, 140 N.C.

2021Any purported remedy may well be asserted in an IAC claim against trial counsel, as opposed to puffing up and asserting blame on the trial court or the State for Defendant’s lack of the transcript from the prior trial. ¶ 15 The State asserts this Court’s opinion in State v. McKeithan, 140 N.C.

2021Thus, “because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal.” State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001). ¶ 125 When presented with a “prematurely asserted” IAC claim, the court “shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id.; see also State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 668 , 566 S.E.2d 61, 78 (2002) (dismissing without prejudice IAC claim that is “suggested by the record but [is] insufficiently developed for review”);

2021Thus, “because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal.” State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 , 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001). ¶ 125 When presented with a “prematurely asserted” IAC claim, the court “shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id.; see also State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 668 , 566 S.E.2d 61, 78 (2002) (dismissing without prejudice IAC claim that is “suggested by the record but [is] insufficiently developed for review”);

2021See, e.g., Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a capital defendant’s counsel was deficient under Strickland because “not only did counsel fail to object to [the defendant’s] shackling, he also failed to ensure that [the defendant’s] shackles would not be visible to the jury while [the defendant] was sitting at counsel’s table during the entire trial”); Jackson v. Washington, 270 Va. 269, 280 (2005) (concluding that “counsel’s failure to object to [the defendant] being compelled to stand trial before the jury in jail clothes” rendered IAC).

2021See, e.g., Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a capital defendant’s counsel was deficient under Strickland because “not only did counsel fail to object to [the defendant’s] shackling, he also failed to ensure that [the defendant’s] shackles would not be visible to the jury while [the defendant] was sitting at counsel’s table during the entire trial”); Jackson v. Washington, 270 Va. 269, 280 (2005) (concluding that “counsel’s failure to object to [the defendant] being compelled to stand trial before the jury in jail clothes” rendered IAC).

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In making this showing [of prejudice], a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland’s test.”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since [the defendant’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions, all his allegations of ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[E]ven where, as here,

2021He has presented evidence supporting his contentions that (1) counsel were aware of the importance of the crime scene evidence before trial but unreasonably failed to follow up on these “red flags,” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005); (2) counsel did not perform an STATE V.

2021He has presented evidence supporting his contentions that (1) counsel were aware of the importance of the crime scene evidence before trial but unreasonably failed to follow up on these “red flags,” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005); (2) counsel did not perform an STATE V.

2026Id. at 177–78, 337 S.E.2d at 506 .

2026Id. at 177–78, 337 S.E.2d at 506 .