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28 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s | 14 | 19 |
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s | 10 | 10 |
Albury v. Stategreen2 sentences2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason 2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason | 7 | 7 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason 2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason | 4 | 4 |
Alston v. Stategreen2 sentences2019(Dillard failed to demonstrate “that his is a substantial IAC claim . . . [n]or has he adequately pled any specific exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel”). 19 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Alston v. State, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3 (Del. 2019(Dillard failed to demonstrate “that his is a substantial IAC claim . . . [n]or has he adequately pled any specific exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel”). 19 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Alston v. State, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3 (Del. | 4 | 4 |
Ploof v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Withdraw at 13. 17 accepted a plea.116 To prevail on his IAC claim, White must show that Trial Counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and, but for Trial Counsel’s conduct, the result would have been different.117 There is no need to address the Strickland objective unreasonableness prong if there was no prejudice to the defendant. 118 The defendant must make “concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”119 If the defendant is unable to show prejudice, his IAC claim will be denied.120 To establish prejudice in a case 2024Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Withdraw at 13. 17 accepted a plea.116 To prevail on his IAC claim, White must show that Trial Counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and, but for Trial Counsel’s conduct, the result would have been different.117 There is no need to address the Strickland objective unreasonableness prong if there was no prejudice to the defendant. 118 The defendant must make “concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”119 If the defendant is unable to show prejudice, his IAC claim will be denied.120 To establish prejudice in a case | 3 | 3 |
Whittle v. Stategreen2 sentences2024May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 187- 188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. 2024May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 187- 188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. | 3 | 3 |
Outten v. Stategreen2 sentences2024To prevail on an IAC claim, a defendant must “substantiate his concrete allegations of actual prejudice or else risk summary dismissal.” Outten, 720 A.2d at 557 (quoting Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 , at *1 (Del. 2024Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Withdraw at 13. 17 accepted a plea.116 To prevail on his IAC claim, White must show that Trial Counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and, but for Trial Counsel’s conduct, the result would have been different.117 There is no need to address the Strickland objective unreasonableness prong if there was no prejudice to the defendant. 118 The defendant must make “concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”119 If the defendant is unable to show prejudice, his IAC claim will be denied.120 To establish prejudice in a case | 2 | 3 |
Younger v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To succeed under an IAC claim, a defendant must meet the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington.61 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,62 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”63 The Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonably professional assista 2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To succeed under an IAC claim, a defendant must meet the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington.61 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,62 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”63 The Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonably professional assista | 1 | 3 |
Dawson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with reliable results.43 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.44 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 45 Conclusory and unsupported claims of prejudice are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; a defendant mu 2026To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with reliable results.43 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.44 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 45 Conclusory and unsupported claims of prejudice are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; a defendant mu | 1 | 1 |
Harrington v. Richtergreen1 sentence2024Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel A successful IAC claim must satisfy the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington.60 Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) if trial counsel was deficient, there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”61 The Strickland standard carries a strong presumption that counsel conducted himself in a professionally reasonable manner.62 Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Aug. 4, 2021) (affirming dismissal of postconviction relief where defendant’s claims of new evidence, e.g., that the prosecution’s ballistics expert pleaded guilty to providing false activity sheets to the police and was paid for work not performed, did not give rise to any inference of actual innocence warranting new trial). 57 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014) (“If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’”): Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013) (“It s | 1 | 1 |
Hoskins v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Aug. 4, 2021) (affirming dismissal of postconviction relief where defendant’s claims of new evidence, e.g., that the prosecution’s ballistics expert pleaded guilty to providing false activity sheets to the police and was paid for work not performed, did not give rise to any inference of actual innocence warranting new trial). 57 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014) (“If an attorney makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’”): Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013) (“It s | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Ryangreen2 sentences2016R. 61(e)(2) (emphasis added). 26 Id. 27 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 , __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (articulating the standard for overcoming a procedural default and obtaining federal review of an IAC claim: “a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit”). -8- he would not have pleaded guilty and instead proceeded to trial. 2016R. 61(e)(2) (emphasis added). 26 Id. 27 See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 , __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (articulating the standard for overcoming a procedural default and obtaining federal review of an IAC claim: “a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit”). -8- he would not have pleaded guilty and instead proceeded to trial. | 1 | 1 |
The Honorable Karen Weldin Stewart, CIR-ML, Insurance Commissioner v. Wilmington Trust SP Services, Inc.green1 sentence2016Trust SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 293-94 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
iac/interactivecorp v. O'Brien
green
2 sentences2026Jan. 20, 2026) (citing IAC, 26 A.3d at 178 ). 39 That summary accurately describes the events in IAC and in Levey, a later case in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that the plaintiff met the IAC test.92 The Estate contends that “extraordinary circumstances” exist because “the Estate was ‘actively misled’ into litigating solely against the [Insurance] Trust in the Superior Court Action.”93 According to the Estate, it “reasonably believed—and had no reason to question—that the [Insurance] Trust either still had the liquidity to pay its legal fees between March 2020 and January 2024, or was 2016Ch. 2015) (using IAC test and declining to apply statute of limitations to fiduciary duty, contract, and negligence claims seeking damages) ("Nevertheless, in cases where ‘unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after a longer period than that fixed by the statute,’ this Court has the power to set aside the statutory limitation period and analyze whether the claim was untimely based on laches principles.”) (quoting IAC, 26 A.3d at 177-78 ), aff’d, 126 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2015) (TABLE). 49 | 2 | 2016–2026 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025Mayfield’s first IAC claim against appellate counsel is that he failed to raise a meritorious issue on appeal by failing to appeal this Court’s denial of his request 131 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 132 State’s Resp. at 54, D.I. 109. 133 Id. at 58 . 134 Id. at 57 . 20 for lesser included offenses. 2025Mayfield’s first IAC claim against appellate counsel is that he failed to raise a meritorious issue on appeal by failing to appeal this Court’s denial of his request 131 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 132 State’s Resp. at 54, D.I. 109. 133 Id. at 58 . 134 Id. at 57 . 20 for lesser included offenses. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dahl v. State
green
2 sentences2024In support of his argument, Smith states that had he gone to trial and been found guilty of every offense, he would have received the exact same life imprisonment without parole that he received through his guilty plea.121 He further points out that he received more time on his sentence because the State violated him on the probation he was serving, thus demonstrating that he received no benefit from the plea.122 The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 120 See State’s Respo 2024In support of his argument, Smith states that had he gone to trial and been found guilty of every offense, he would have received the exact same life imprisonment without parole that he received through his guilty plea.121 He further points out that he received more time on his sentence because the State violated him on the probation he was serving, thus demonstrating that he received no benefit from the plea.122 The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 120 See State’s Respo | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Somerville v. State
green
1 sentence2024R. 61(e)(3). 63 Id. 15 the Court found that DeStafney’s claims are procedurally barred and he did not substantiate his IAC claim, the Discovery Motion is moot. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cruz-Webster v. State
neutral
2 sentences2020Cruz-Webster v. State, 155 A.3d 833 , 2017 WL 464536 , at *4—5 (Del. 2020Cruz-Webster v. State, 155 A.3d 833 , 2017 WL 464536 , at *4—5 (Del. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Levey v. Brownstone Asset Management, LP
green
1 sentence2018July 17, 1998). 84 IAC, 26 A.3d at 177–78. 85 Id. at 174, 178. 86 Levey, 76 A.3d at 771–72 (“The fifth and final IAC inquiry is whether there is a ‘bona fide dispute’ as to the validity of Levey's claim in Delaware. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.