IAC claim in Montana

2023Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 . ¶18 Under some circumstances, it is not necessary to ask “why” counsel was deficient if there is “no plausible justification” for what defense counsel did.

2023Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10 , 343 Mont. 90 , 183 P.3d 861 . ¶18 Under some circumstances, it is not necessary to ask “why” counsel was deficient if there is “no plausible justification” for what defense counsel did.

2026Sawyer, ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2009 MT 170, ¶ 29 , 350 Mont. 493 , 208 P.3d 851 ).

2026Sawyer, ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2009 MT 170, ¶ 29 , 350 Mont. 493 , 208 P.3d 851 ).

2024Whitlow, ¶ 9; State v. Turner, 2000 MT 270, ¶ 47 , 302 Mont. 69 , 12 P.3d 934 . ¶9 First, any claim or related assertions that the sentencing court relied on or any counsel provided, argued, or failed to object to “misinformation” regarding the statutes previously at issue on direct appeal, supra Opinion, ¶ 3 n.1, were raised by Marsh’s appellate counsel and considered by this Court in Marsh, ¶¶ 5-8 and 10-17, and are thus procedurally barred here.3 See § 46-21-105(2), MCA (“[w]hen a petitioner has been afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal of the petitioner’s conviction, grounds for re

2024Whitlow, ¶ 9; State v. Turner, 2000 MT 270, ¶ 47 , 302 Mont. 69 , 12 P.3d 934 . ¶9 First, any claim or related assertions that the sentencing court relied on or any counsel provided, argued, or failed to object to “misinformation” regarding the statutes previously at issue on direct appeal, supra Opinion, ¶ 3 n.1, were raised by Marsh’s appellate counsel and considered by this Court in Marsh, ¶¶ 5-8 and 10-17, and are thus procedurally barred here.3 See § 46-21-105(2), MCA (“[w]hen a petitioner has been afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal of the petitioner’s conviction, grounds for re

2023State v. Savage, 2011 MT 23, ¶ 23 , 359 Mont. 207 , 248 P.3d 308 .

2023State v. Savage, 2011 MT 23, ¶ 23 , 359 Mont. 207 , 248 P.3d 308 .

2023Sartain v. State, 2012 MT 164 , ¶¶ 9 and 11, 365 Mont. 483 , 285 P.3d 407 ; Whitlow, ¶¶ 10-14. ¶12 Under the first element, the performance of counsel is presumed constitutionally effective based on discretionary trial strategy within a broad range of reasonable professional conduct.

2023Sartain v. State, 2012 MT 164 , ¶¶ 9 and 11, 365 Mont. 483 , 285 P.3d 407 ; Whitlow, ¶¶ 10-14. ¶12 Under the first element, the performance of counsel is presumed constitutionally effective based on discretionary trial strategy within a broad range of reasonable professional conduct.

2017State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶27 To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2017State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶27 To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2017State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶27 To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2017State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14 , 323 Mont. 6 , 97 P.3d 1095 . ¶27 To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Rose v. State, 2013 MT 161, ¶ 15 , 370 Mont. 398 , 304 P.3d 387 .

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Rose v. State, 2013 MT 161, ¶ 15 , 370 Mont. 398 , 304 P.3d 387 .

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2018Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8 , 365 Mont. 474 , 285 P.3d 396 ; Miller v. State, 2012 MT 131, ¶ 13 , 365 Mont. 264 , 280 P.3d 272 ; State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 15 , 320 Mont. 122 , 86 P.3d 20 . ¶4 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence that Beauchman walked uninvited into the apartment of 39-year-old H.

2017State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, ¶ 70 , 357 Mont. 142 , 237 P.3d 74 .

2017State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, ¶ 70 , 357 Mont. 142 , 237 P.3d 74 .

2013Baca v. State, 2008 MT 371, ¶ 16 , 346 Mont. 474 , 197 P.3d 948 ; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2013Baca v. State, 2008 MT 371, ¶ 16 , 346 Mont. 474 , 197 P.3d 948 ; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2026Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25, 104 S. Ct. at 2047; Strickland, 644 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067 (citing Cronic). 9 ¶19 The inherent structural error contemplated in Cronic is therefore distinct from an “actual” performance-based IAC claim under Strickland.

2026When an IAC claim is raised on direct appeal, we first consider whether it is based on a trial record that “adequately document[s] a challenged act or omission of defense counsel.” Sawyer, ¶ 13 (quoting Soraich v. State, 2002 MT 187, ¶ 21 , 311 Mont. 90 , 53 P.3d 878 ).

2026When an IAC claim is raised on direct appeal, we first consider whether it is based on a trial record that “adequately document[s] a challenged act or omission of defense counsel.” Sawyer, ¶ 13 (quoting Soraich v. State, 2002 MT 187, ¶ 21 , 311 Mont. 90 , 53 P.3d 878 ).

2026State v. Wittal, 2019 MT 210, ¶ 13 , 397 Mont. 155 , 447 P.3d 1039 . ¶18 Steffens acknowledges that the trial record does not explain defense counsel’s failure to object or propose an alternate to the sexual contact instruction, but he argues that his counsel’s inaction lacks any plausible justification.

2026State v. Wittal, 2019 MT 210, ¶ 13 , 397 Mont. 155 , 447 P.3d 1039 . ¶18 Steffens acknowledges that the trial record does not explain defense counsel’s failure to object or propose an alternate to the sexual contact instruction, but he argues that his counsel’s inaction lacks any plausible justification.

2026Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to allow Hyslop to testify. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 3 It is noted that in Hyslop’s initial PCR petition he asserted trial counsel to be ineffective by failing to offer text message evidence for the purpose of impeaching the State’s primary witness, Kendall Hyslop, and in his amended PCR petition, he added an IAC claim for failure to pursue the production of discovery related to an ongoing drug investigation regarding methamphetamine use at the house where October was injured.

2026Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to allow Hyslop to testify. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 3 It is noted that in Hyslop’s initial PCR petition he asserted trial counsel to be ineffective by failing to offer text message evidence for the purpose of impeaching the State’s primary witness, Kendall Hyslop, and in his amended PCR petition, he added an IAC claim for failure to pursue the production of discovery related to an ongoing drug investigation regarding methamphetamine use at the house where October was injured.

2026Doolin, 198 P.3d at 34-43 . ¶32 Though Briggs claims that the flat-fee advance payment incentivized counsel to undermine his defense and seek withdrawal under false pretenses, the record does not support that assertion.

2025Trujillo, ¶ 6 (citing State v. Mitchell, 2012 MT 227, ¶ 10 , 366 Mont. 379 , 286 P.3d 1196 ). ¶22 Given the clear lack of prejudice the erroneous jury instruction inserted into the proceedings, as discussed above for purposes of the IAC claim, and the overwhelming evidence the jury relied upon to find Green guilty of SIWOC, which established the requisite conduct-based mental state, Green has not “firmly convinced this Court” that the 13 inclusion of the incorrect result-based jury instruction implicated a fundamental right whereby plain error review became “necessary to avoid a manifest misca

2025Trujillo, ¶ 6 (citing State v. Mitchell, 2012 MT 227, ¶ 10 , 366 Mont. 379 , 286 P.3d 1196 ). ¶22 Given the clear lack of prejudice the erroneous jury instruction inserted into the proceedings, as discussed above for purposes of the IAC claim, and the overwhelming evidence the jury relied upon to find Green guilty of SIWOC, which established the requisite conduct-based mental state, Green has not “firmly convinced this Court” that the 13 inclusion of the incorrect result-based jury instruction implicated a fundamental right whereby plain error review became “necessary to avoid a manifest misca

2025“Failure of either prong is fatal to an IAC claim.” State v. Edwards, 2011 MT 210, ¶ 22 , 361 Mont. 478 , 260 P.3d 396 .

2025“Failure of either prong is fatal to an IAC claim.” State v. Edwards, 2011 MT 210, ¶ 22 , 361 Mont. 478 , 260 P.3d 396 .

2025State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315 , ¶ 29, 419 Mont. 490 , 560 P.3d 1270 (citing Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43, ¶ 37 , 411 Mont. 250 , 525 P.3d 1214 ).

2025State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315 , ¶ 29, 419 Mont. 490 , 560 P.3d 1270 (citing Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43, ¶ 37 , 411 Mont. 250 , 525 P.3d 1214 ).

2023To establish a record-based IAC claim, an appellant “must ground his or her proof of facts within the record and not on conclusory allegations.” State v. Turnsplenty, 2003 MT 159, ¶ 14 , 316 Mont. 275 , 70 P.3d 1234 . ¶18 K.B. testified to years-long abuse that included an incident that occurred during a hunting trip where Buchanan and K.B. shared a hotel room near White Sulphur Springs in Meagher County.

2023To establish a record-based IAC claim, an appellant “must ground his or her proof of facts within the record and not on conclusory allegations.” State v. Turnsplenty, 2003 MT 159, ¶ 14 , 316 Mont. 275 , 70 P.3d 1234 . ¶18 K.B. testified to years-long abuse that included an incident that occurred during a hunting trip where Buchanan and K.B. shared a hotel room near White Sulphur Springs in Meagher County.

2023In my view, the transcript does not appear to capture that nuance. 16 State v. Chase, 2006 MT 13, ¶ 19 , 331 Mont. 1 , 127 P.3d 1038 (overruled in-part on other grounds). ¶31 However, when the totality of the current record here is considered, I agree the IAC claim would need to be examined in a postconviction relief proceeding. /S/ JIM RICE 17

2023In my view, the transcript does not appear to capture that nuance. 16 State v. Chase, 2006 MT 13, ¶ 19 , 331 Mont. 1 , 127 P.3d 1038 (overruled in-part on other grounds). ¶31 However, when the totality of the current record here is considered, I agree the IAC claim would need to be examined in a postconviction relief proceeding. /S/ JIM RICE 17

2023Hamilton v. State, 2010 MT 25, ¶ 16 , 355 Mont. 133 , 266 P.3d 588 .

2023Hamilton v. State, 2010 MT 25, ¶ 16 , 355 Mont. 133 , 266 P.3d 588 .

2023Because we cannot ascertain from the record “why” Doubek’s counsel did not submit or offer a “mere presence” instruction, we cannot review her IAC claim on direct appeal. ¶20 This case is distinguishable from State v. Chafee, 2014 MT 226 , 376 Mont. 267 , 332 P.3d 240 , upon which Doubek relies.

2023Because we cannot ascertain from the record “why” Doubek’s counsel did not submit or offer a “mere presence” instruction, we cannot review her IAC claim on direct appeal. ¶20 This case is distinguishable from State v. Chafee, 2014 MT 226 , 376 Mont. 267 , 332 P.3d 240 , upon which Doubek relies.

2023A successful IAC claim “requires that the defendant show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Avery v. Batista, 2014 MT 266, ¶ 26 , 376 Mont. 404 , 336 P.3d 924 .

2023A successful IAC claim “requires that the defendant show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Avery v. Batista, 2014 MT 266, ¶ 26 , 376 Mont. 404 , 336 P.3d 924 .

2022A successful IAC claim depends on overcoming the “strong presumption that counsel provided reasonable professional assistance,” and when the record is silent on the reasons behind an attorney’s decisions, “[w]e refuse to speculate on counsel’s errors.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 335 Mont. 331 , 151 P.3d 883 (citing State v. Daniels, 2003 MT 247, ¶ 41 , 317 Mont. 331 , 77 P.3d 224 ).

2022A successful IAC claim depends on overcoming the “strong presumption that counsel provided reasonable professional assistance,” and when the record is silent on the reasons behind an attorney’s decisions, “[w]e refuse to speculate on counsel’s errors.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 335 Mont. 331 , 151 P.3d 883 (citing State v. Daniels, 2003 MT 247, ¶ 41 , 317 Mont. 331 , 77 P.3d 224 ).