14 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Arnettgreen2 sentences2023The practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”); State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d) (“The rig 2022Unlike common occupations that are not regulated, the practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”);State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. A | 2 | 3 |
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of NMgreen2 sentences2023The practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”); State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d) (“The rig 2022Unlike common occupations that are not regulated, the practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”);State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. A | 2 | 2 |
Hankamer v. Templin, Clk.green2 sentences2023The practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”); State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d) (“The rig 2022Unlike common occupations that are not regulated, the practice of law is a profession and a privilege that the United States Supreme Court has identified as one for which a state “can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar.” See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Hankamer v. Templin, 187 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1945) (“[T]he right to practice law is not a personal right, but a franchise, or privilege[.]”);State v. Arnett, 385 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex. A | 2 | 2 |
Love v. the State Bar of Texasgreen2 sentences2020See Love v. State Bar of Tex., 982 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citation omitted) (“[T]he right to practice law is a very great privilege. 2020See Love v. State Bar of Tex., 982 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citation omitted) (“[T]he right to practice law is a very great privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Caingreen1 sentence2016See Timberwalk Apartments, 972 S.W.2d at 753 ; see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948) (“In the conduct of one’s business or in the use and exploitation of one’s property, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the property of others.”); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 307 (1863) (“The great principle which seems to control all the modern cases is, that men must so use their own as not to injure the rights of others, or to incommode others; they must not endanger health or comfort, or produce i | 1 | 1 |
Rhodes v. Whiteheadgreen1 sentence2016See Timberwalk Apartments, 972 S.W.2d at 753 ; see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948) (“In the conduct of one’s business or in the use and exploitation of one’s property, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the property of others.”); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 307 (1863) (“The great principle which seems to control all the modern cases is, that men must so use their own as not to injure the rights of others, or to incommode others; they must not endanger health or comfort, or produce i | 1 | 1 |
Elliff v. Texon Drilling. Co.green2 sentences2016See Timberwalk Apartments, 972 S.W.2d at 753 ; see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948) (“In the conduct of one’s business or in the use and exploitation of one’s property, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the property of others.”); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 307 (1863) (“The great principle which seems to control all the modern cases is, that men must so use their own as not to injure the rights of others, or to incommode others; they must not endanger health or comfort, or produce i 2016See Timberwalk Apartments, 972 S.W.2d at 753 ; see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948) (“In the conduct of one’s business or in the use and exploitation of one’s property, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the property of others.”); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 307 (1863) (“The great principle which seems to control all the modern cases is, that men must so use their own as not to injure the rights of others, or to incommode others; they must not endanger health or comfort, or produce i | 1 | 1 |
State v. $435,000.00green1 sentence2007State v. $435,000.00 , 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
In Re State Bar of Texasgreen1 sentence2004“That a party must have ‘no other adequate remedy by law’ is a ‘fundamental tenet’ of mandamus practice.” In re State Bar, 113 S.W.3d 730, 734 ( Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 839 ); accord In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 300 ( Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (juvenile delinquency). | 1 | 1 |
Winters v. Presiding Judge of the Criminal District Court Number Three of Tarrant Countygreen1 sentence2004The other great requirement for mandamus relief is that a court may issue a writ of mandamus only if the relator demonstrates that he or she has “no adequate legal remedy.” De Leon , 127 S.W.3d at 5 ; accord Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re DASgreen1 sentence2004“That a party must have ‘no other adequate remedy by law’ is a ‘fundamental tenet’ of mandamus practice.” In re State Bar, 113 S.W.3d 730, 734 ( Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 839 ); accord In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 300 ( Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (juvenile delinquency). | 1 | 1 |
Frazier v. Stategreen2 sentences1985Frazier v. State, 600 S.W. 2d 271, 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1985Frazier v. State, 600 S.W. 2d 271, 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick
green
1 sentence2015Id. within that system. “[T]he right to practice law is a very The guiding rules and principles to determine the appropriate great privilege. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rushmore Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Frey
green
1 sentence2014Advisors, Inc. v. Frey, 231 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); Brocail, 132 S.W.3d 552 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brocail v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2014Advisors, Inc. v. Frey, 231 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); Brocail, 132 S.W.3d 552 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Walker v. Packer
green
1 sentence2004“That a party must have ‘no other adequate remedy by law’ is a ‘fundamental tenet’ of mandamus practice.” In re State Bar, 113 S.W.3d 730, 734 ( Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 839 ); accord In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 300 ( Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (juvenile delinquency). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
De Leon v. Aguilar
green
1 sentence2004The other great requirement for mandamus relief is that a court may issue a writ of mandamus only if the relator demonstrates that he or she has “no adequate legal remedy.” De Leon , 127 S.W.3d at 5 ; accord Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Moore v. State Bar of Texas
green
1 sentence1998With this privilege comes an equal dose of responsibility.” State Bar of Texas v. Moore, 932 S.W.2d 132 , 138 n. 4 (Tex.App.—El Paso), vacated, 938 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State Bar of Texas v. Moore
neutral
1 sentence1998With this privilege comes an equal dose of responsibility.” State Bar of Texas v. Moore, 932 S.W.2d 132 , 138 n. 4 (Tex.App.—El Paso), vacated, 938 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Sanders v. Sanders
green
1 sentence1974Sanders v. Sanders, 469 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, error dism’d). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Ex Parte George Tucker
green
2 sentences1923Only in this way can freedom of speech be preserved, for freedom of speech will necessarily end when supervision by a court of equity of the expressions and sentiments of the individual is allowed to begin. *827 Our Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Phillips in Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335 , 220 S. W. 75 , very aptly says: “It has never been the theory of free institutions that the citizen could say only what courts or Legislatures might license him to say, or that his sentiments on any subject or concerning any person should be supervised before' he could utter them. 1923Only in this way can freedom of speech be preserved, for freedom of speech will necessarily end when supervision by a court of equity of the expressions and sentiments of the individual is allowed to begin. *827 Our Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Phillips in Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335 , 220 S. W. 75 , very aptly says: “It has never been the theory of free institutions that the citizen could say only what courts or Legislatures might license him to say, or that his sentiments on any subject or concerning any person should be supervised before' he could utter them. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Slater v. Emerson
green
2 sentences1922The great rule is to ascertain the intent of the parties from the language used." Slater v. Emerson, 19 How. 224 , 15 L.Ed. 631 ; 15 C.J. 1221, § 20. 1922The great rule is to ascertain the intent of the parties- from the language used.” Slater v. Emerson, 19 How. 224 , 15 L. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Smith v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1912The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding.’ This great principle is that the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.” Continuing, the court says: “And particularly apposite is the repetition of that principle in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 -473 [8 Sup. 1912The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary, notwithstanding.’ This great principle is that the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.” Continuing, the court says: “And particularly apposite is the repetition of that principle in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 -473 [8 Sup. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.