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9 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1885–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois Ex Rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty.green2 sentences1986Oregon has adopted the philosophy that “ * * Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with the accepted habits of our people.’ ” Eugene Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, supra, 276 Or at 1014 , (quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203, 256 , 67 S Ct 461 , 92 L Ed 649 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting)). 1986Oregon has adopted the philosophy that “ * * Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with the accepted habits of our people.’ ” Eugene Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, supra, 276 Or at 1014 , (quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203, 256 , 67 S Ct 461 , 92 L Ed 649 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting)). | 1 | 2 |
Day v. Salemgreen2 sentences1999See also Day, 65 Or. at 122 , 131 P. 1028 , in which this court, quoting other authorities, described the policy supporting the nullum tempus rule: "`The real ground is a great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to whose care they are confided.'" (Emphasis added.) If any doubt lingers about the applicability of the two pertinent common-law rules to public entities other than the state, Chizek resolves the doubt in Shasta View's favor. 1999See also Day, 65 Or at 122 , in which this court, quoting other authorities, described the policy supporting the nullum tempus rule: “ ‘The real ground is a great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to whose care they are confided.’ ” (Emphasis added.) If any doubt lingers about the applicability of the two pertinent common-law rules to public entities other than the state, then Chizek resolves the doubt in Shasta View’s favor. | 1 | 1 |
Lovelace v. Dwyergreen1 sentence1999See also Day, 65 Or. at 122 , 131 P. 1028 , in which this court, quoting other authorities, described the policy supporting the nullum tempus rule: "`The real ground is a great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to whose care they are confided.'" (Emphasis added.) If any doubt lingers about the applicability of the two pertinent common-law rules to public entities other than the state, Chizek resolves the doubt in Shasta View's favor. | 1 | 1 |
Knighton v. Burnsgreen2 sentences1992That decision noted the understanding of the distinction of obligations that a state could not impair, as follows: “[A] broad and well defined distinction was made between the contract and the remedy for the enforcement of that contract; and the court held that while the remedy to enforce the obligation of a contract might be modified as the wisdom of the legislature should direct, yet the constitution intended to restore and preserve public confidence completely, by establishing the great principle that the obligation of contracts should be inviolable.” Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or 549, 551 (Appe 1992That decision noted the understanding of the distinction of obligations that a state could not impair, as follows: "[A] broad and well defined distinction was made between the contract and the remedy for the enforcement of that contract; and the court held that while the remedy to enforce the obligation of a contract might be modified as the wisdom of the legislature should direct, yet the constitution intended to restore and preserve public confidence completely, by establishing the great principle that the obligation of contracts should be inviolable." Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or. 549, 551 (App | 1 | 1 |
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1976A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: `God save the United States and this Honorable Court.'" To the same effect, as stated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 , 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1412 , 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970): "* * * [T]here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Also, as stated in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 256 , 68 S.Ct. 461, 487 , 92 L.Ed. 648 (1948): "* * * Devotion to th 1976A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: `God save the United States and this Honorable Court.'" To the same effect, as stated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 , 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1412 , 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970): "* * * [T]here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Also, as stated in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 256 , 68 S.Ct. 461, 487 , 92 L.Ed. 648 (1948): "* * * Devotion to th | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences1968Thus, in United States v. Wade, 388 US 218 at 261 , 87 S Ct 1926 , 18 L ed2d 1149 at 1176-77 (1966), Mr. Justice Portas said: “This great privilege is not merely a shield for the accused. 1968Thus, in United States v. Wade, 388 US 218 at 261 , 87 S Ct 1926 , 18 L ed2d 1149 at 1176-77 (1966), Mr. Justice Portas said: “This great privilege is not merely a shield for the accused. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chizek v. Port of Newport
green
2 sentences1999In Chizek , a county's grantees brought a suit to quiet title to a lot claimed by the defendant Port of Newport. 252 Or. at 571 , 450 P.2d 749 . 1999In Chizek , a county’s grantees brought a suit to quiet title to a lot claimed by the defendant Port of Newport. 252 Or at 571 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Green v. Biddle
green
2 sentences1992In Knighton v. Burns, supra, 10 Or at 551 , the Oregon Territorial Supreme Court recognized that “any deviation from the terms of a contract impaired it, and that the objection to a law, on the ground of its impairing the obligation of a contract, could never depend upon the extent of the change which the law affects in it.” (Emphasis in original.) For this proposition, that court cited Green v. Biddle, 21 US (8 Wheat) 1, 5 L Ed 547 (1823) (invalidating, as an impairment of the obligation of contracts, a Kentucky statute that diminished the remedies of land owners against adverse possessors, w 1992In Knighton v. Burns, supra, 10 Or. at 551 , the Oregon Territorial Supreme Court recognized that "any deviation from the terms of a contract impaired it, and that the objection to a law, on the ground of its impairing the obligation of a contract, could never depend upon the extent of the change which the law affects in it." (Emphasis in original.) For this proposition, that court cited Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823) (invalidating, as an impairment of the obligation of contracts, a Kentucky statute that diminished the remedies of land owners against adverse possessor | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene
green
2 sentences1986Oregon has adopted the philosophy that “ * * Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with the accepted habits of our people.’ ” Eugene Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, supra, 276 Or at 1014 , (quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203, 256 , 67 S Ct 461 , 92 L Ed 649 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting)). 1986Oregon has adopted the philosophy that "`* * * Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with the accepted habits of our people.'" Eugene Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, supra, 276 Or. at 1014 , 558 P.2d at 338 , (quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 256 , 68 S.Ct. 461, 487 , 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Knight
green
2 sentences1952The court quoted from United States v. Knight, 39 US 301 , 10 L ed 465, in which it was said respecting the maxim nullum tempus: "The real ground is a great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to whose care they are confided," and that when a statute "which proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding in suits, does not divest the public of any right, does not violate any principle of public policy; but on the contrary, makes provisions in accordance with the policy which 1952The court quoted from United States v. Knight, 39 US 301 , 10 L ed 465, in which it was said respecting the maxim nullum tempus: “The real ground is a great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers, to whose care they are confided,” and that when a statute “which proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding in suits, does not divest the public of any right, does not violate any principle of public policy; but on the contrary, makes provisions in accordance with the policy which | 1 | 1952–1952 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1925App. 258 , it was said: "But the general rule is salutary and departure from it is perilous, and hence courts are reluctant to extend the exception to the rule beyond well-established lines." Further, in State v. Smith , 103 Wn. 267 ( 174 P. 9 ), Mr. Justice MACKINTOSH declares: *Page 460 "There is no more insidious and dangerous testimony than that which attempts to convict a defendant by producing evidence of crimes other than the one for which he is on trial, and such testimony should only be admitted when clearly necessary to establish the essential elements of the charge which is being pr 1925App. 258 , it was said: "But the general rule is salutary and departure from it is perilous, and hence courts are reluctant to extend the exception to the rule beyond well-established lines." Further, in State v. Smith , 103 Wn. 267 ( 174 P. 9 ), Mr. Justice MACKINTOSH declares: *Page 460 "There is no more insidious and dangerous testimony than that which attempts to convict a defendant by producing evidence of crimes other than the one for which he is on trial, and such testimony should only be admitted when clearly necessary to establish the essential elements of the charge which is being pr | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Towne v. People
neutral
2 sentences1925On the contrary, as said in Underhill's Work on Criminal Evidence, Section 87, cited with approval by Mr. Justice MOORE in State v. O'Donnell , 36 Or. 222 ( 61 P. 892 ): "These exceptions are carefully limited and guarded by the courts, and their number should not be increased." In Commonwealth v. Shepard , 1 Allen (Mass.), 575, in speaking of evidence of other criminal acts, Mr. Chief Justice BIGELOW wrote: "It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also becau 1925On the contrary, as said in Underhill’s Work on Criminal Evidence, Section 87, cited with approval by Mr. Justice Moore in State v. O’Donnell, 36 Or. 222 ( 61 Pac. 892 ): “These exceptions are carefully limited and guarded by the courts, and their number should not be increased.” In Commonwealth v. Shepard, 1 Allen (Mass.), 575, in speaking of evidence of other criminal acts, Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow wrote: “It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also becau | 1 | 1925–1925 |
State v. O'Donnell
green
2 sentences1925On the contrary, as said in Underhill's Work on Criminal Evidence, Section 87, cited with approval by Mr. Justice MOORE in State v. O'Donnell , 36 Or. 222 ( 61 P. 892 ): "These exceptions are carefully limited and guarded by the courts, and their number should not be increased." In Commonwealth v. Shepard , 1 Allen (Mass.), 575, in speaking of evidence of other criminal acts, Mr. Chief Justice BIGELOW wrote: "It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also becau 1925On the contrary, as said in Underhill's Work on Criminal Evidence, Section 87, cited with approval by Mr. Justice MOORE in State v. O'Donnell , 36 Or. 222 ( 61 P. 892 ): "These exceptions are carefully limited and guarded by the courts, and their number should not be increased." In Commonwealth v. Shepard , 1 Allen (Mass.), 575, in speaking of evidence of other criminal acts, Mr. Chief Justice BIGELOW wrote: "It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also becau | 1 | 1925–1925 |
State v. City of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences1913In State v. City of Milwaukee, 145 Wis. 131 ( 129 N. W. 1101 , 22 Ann. 1913In State v. City of Milwaukee, 145 Wis. 131 ( 129 N. W. 1101 , 22 Ann. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Hipp v. Babin
green
1 sentence1885It is in vindication of this great principle, and as declaratory of the common law, that the Judiciary Act of 1789, in its sixteenth section, declares ‘that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.’” (Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 375 ; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 ; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271 -278; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake etc. Co. 2 Black, 550, 551 .) As a result of this doctrine, stated in its broadest terms, the general principle deducible from the authorities and te | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Insurance Co. v. Bailey
green
1 sentence1885It is in vindication of this great principle, and as declaratory of the common law, that the Judiciary Act of 1789, in its sixteenth section, declares ‘that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.’” (Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 375 ; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 ; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271 -278; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake etc. Co. 2 Black, 550, 551 .) As a result of this doctrine, stated in its broadest terms, the general principle deducible from the authorities and te | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.