great principle in North Carolina

1912Cr., 269; Buffalow v. Buffalow , 22 N.C. 241 ; Mullins v. McCandless , 57 N.C. 425 ; Futrill v. Futrill , 58 N.C. 64 , and s. c. , 59 N.C. 337 ; Franklin v. Ridenhour , 58 N.C. 421 .

1912By their verdict the jury have found these facts, and others disclosed by the evidence, which show weakness and dependence on the one side and shrewdness and unfettered domination on the other.. ' “It is an established doctrine, founded on a great principle of public policy, that a conveyance obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the grantor, without proof of actual fraud, shall not stand at all, if without consideration, and that where there has been a partial or inadequate consideration, it shall stand only as a security for the sum paid or advanced.” Bellamy v. An

1912Cr., 269; Buffalow v. Buffalow , 22 N.C. 241 ; Mullins v. McCandless , 57 N.C. 425 ; Futrill v. Futrill , 58 N.C. 64 , and s. c. , 59 N.C. 337 ; Franklin v. Ridenhour , 58 N.C. 421 .

1912By their verdict the jury have found these facts, and others disclosed by the evidence, which show weakness and dependence on the one side and shrewdness and unfettered domination on the other.. ' “It is an established doctrine, founded on a great principle of public policy, that a conveyance obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the grantor, without proof of actual fraud, shall not stand at all, if without consideration, and that where there has been a partial or inadequate consideration, it shall stand only as a security for the sum paid or advanced.” Bellamy v. An

1912"It is an established doctrine, founded on a great principle of public policy, that a conveyance obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the grantor, without proof of actual fraud, shall not stand at all, if without consideration, and that where there has been a partial or inadequate consideration, it shall stand only as a security for the sum paid or advanced." Bellamy v. Andrews , 151 N.C. 256 , citing the following cases: Huguenin v. Basely , 14 Vesey, Jr., 273; Harvey v. Mount , 8 Beavan, 437; Dent v. Burnett , 4 Myl.

1912By their verdict the jury have found these facts, and others disclosed by the evidence, which show weakness and dependence on the one side and shrewdness and unfettered domination on the other.. ' “It is an established doctrine, founded on a great principle of public policy, that a conveyance obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the grantor, without proof of actual fraud, shall not stand at all, if without consideration, and that where there has been a partial or inadequate consideration, it shall stand only as a security for the sum paid or advanced.” Bellamy v. An

1912Cr., 269; Buffalow v. Buffalow , 22 N.C. 241 ; Mullins v. McCandless , 57 N.C. 425 ; Futrill v. Futrill , 58 N.C. 64 , and s. c. , 59 N.C. 337 ; Franklin v. Ridenhour , 58 N.C. 421 .

1912By their verdict the jury have found these facts, and others disclosed by the evidence, which show weakness and dependence on the one side and shrewdness and unfettered domination on the other.. ' “It is an established doctrine, founded on a great principle of public policy, that a conveyance obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the grantor, without proof of actual fraud, shall not stand at all, if without consideration, and that where there has been a partial or inadequate consideration, it shall stand only as a security for the sum paid or advanced.” Bellamy v. An

1948J., of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, characterizes “evidence of another act of embezzlement by *501 defendant” as “a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him, and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another.” And in S. v. Smith (Wash.),. 114 Pac., 9 , the Supreme Court of Washington says: “There is no more insidious and dangerous testimony than that which

1944As was said by the present Chief Justice in S. v. Wingler, 184 N. C., 747 , “There is no error appearing in the record, except the great error of the defendant in murdering his wife; but this is a mistake which itf beyond our province or power to correct.” The defendants have been represented by able counsel who have presented their cause throughout with unflagging zeal; but the jury has accepted the State’s evidence as true and found the defendants guilty of a most serious crime.

1932In this, the courts have acted upon the same principle and for the same reason as that assigned for declining to define the term ‘fraud.’ The relation may exist under a variety of circumstances; it exists in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.” Butler v. Fertilizer Works, 193 N. C., 632 .

1912It has been said that a deed will be set aside on the ground of undue influence, which is a species of legal and moral fraud, only where the influence is such that the grantor has no free will, but stands in vmculis (Conley v. Nailor, 118 U. S., 127), and this rule, if applied to the facts of the case, would equally condemn the transactions assailed by the plaintiffs.

1899The burden of proof lies upon the carrier, and nothing short of clear proof, leaving no reasonable doubt for controversy, should be permitted to discharge him from duties which the law has annexed to his employment.” In Clark v. Barnwell, 12 Howard, 272 , the Court held, quoting from the syllabi, that: “Where goods are shipped, and the usual bill of lading given, promising to ‘deliver them in good order, the dangers of the sea excepted/ and they are found to be damaged, the onus probandi is upon the owners of the vessel, to show that the injury was occasioned by one of the excepted causes.” Bu

1899Co. , 21 Wall., 230, 233 , the Court says: "It (244) is insisted that the loss occurred through a peril of navigation, which was one of the exceptions contained in the bill of lading, and that, therefore, the carrier was excused from a delivery of the wheat.

1890It seems to be conceded that the cause of State v. McCauless, 9 Ired., 375 , is not in harmony with the principle announced in the opinion of the Court in this case, and it cannot be denied that the case of State v. Williams, 9 Ired., 150 , is equally irreconcilable with the construction now given by the Court to the case of State v. Stroud, 95 N. C., 626 .