great principle in New York

1976Wood v Lacombe ( 99 NY 43, 49 ), the Court of Appeals stated: "In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances.

1962Wood v. Lacombe ( 99 N. Y. 43 ) it was said: “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances.

1965Co. ( 103 N. Y. 58 ) the court denied specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, saying, per Akdkews, J. (pp. 73-74): “ But we are of opinion that the contract of September 14, 1875, is repugnant to the great rule of law which invalidates all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he is personally interested, at the election of the party he represents.

1927Co. ( 103 N. Y. 58, 73 ), where the court speaks of “ the great rule of law which invalidates all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he is personally interested, at the election of the party he represents.” Moreover, by the terms of the written contract the payment of $500 was deferred for five days and it was provided that said contract should be “ null and void unless the first party offers performance thereof on his part on or before January 19th, 1924,” although plaintiff when he made the contract had in his possession the purchaser’s check for $500 and might have delivered

1853Bank of Poughkeepsie, 24 Wend. 479 ; 4 Barb. 118 .) The object of the enactment of 1852 was, as appears on its face, to prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage by an early judgment, procured either by his greater diligence or through the favoritism of the' officers of the corporation, and also to take away the right of a creditor to sue the stockholder, on his liability for the debts of the corporation.It was the intention of the statute to apply the great principle of the court of chancery, that equality is equity, to the whole class of insolvent manufacturing corporations in the count

1853Bank of Poughkeepsie, 24 Wend. 479 ; 4 Barb. 118 .) The object of the enactment of 1852 was, as appears on its face, to prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage by an early judgment, procured either by his greater diligence or through the favoritism of the' officers of the corporation, and also to take away the right of a creditor to sue the stockholder, on his liability for the debts of the corporation.It was the intention of the statute to apply the great principle of the court of chancery, that equality is equity, to the whole class of insolvent manufacturing corporations in the count

1973The trial court found that this was a distinction without legal significance ( 69 Misc 2d 445 ) but the Appellate Division disagreed and reversed the order dismissing the indictments (39 A D 2d 389).

1971It is just as devastating for a litigant to be made bankrupt or poverty stricken by litigation cost as to be unable to pay for the litigation in the first instance because indigent. “ Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. * * * Where money determines not merely ‘ the kind of trial a man gets, ’ Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 19 , but whether he gets into court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a mockery. ’ ’ (Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at pp. 388-389 [Brennan, J.]).

1949To paraphrase an observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, the general purpose is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down (United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143 ; see, also, Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235 ). “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances. * * * It is the spirit and p

1949To paraphrase an observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, the general purpose is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down (United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143 ; see, also, Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235 ). “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances. * * * It is the spirit and p

1949To paraphrase an observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, the general purpose is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down (United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143 ; see, also, Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235 ). “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances. * * * It is the spirit and p

1949To paraphrase an observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, the general purpose is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down (United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143 ; see, also, Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235 ). “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances. * * * It is the spirit and p

1949To paraphrase an observation of Mr. Justice Holmes, the general purpose is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down (United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143 ; see, also, Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235 ). “ ‘ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances. * * * It is the spirit and p

1942(People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 389 .) *242 Through many generations, common law practice in criminal cases has been governed by certain fundamental rules, namely: “ The jury is the final arbiter of every question of fact.” (People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 240 .) “ The court’s charge is of supreme importance to the accused.

1942(People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 389 .) *242 Through many generations, common law practice in criminal cases has been governed by certain fundamental rules, namely: “ The jury is the final arbiter of every question of fact.” (People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 240 .) “ The court’s charge is of supreme importance to the accused.

1941In the recent case of Moriarty v. Butler Grocery Co. ( 261 App. Div. 20 ; affd., 286 N. Y. 687 ), where the majority stockholder was accused of having improper dealings with the corporation and charging excessive prices by which he enriched himself, it was held that the burden of proof rested upon the minority stockholders to support the derivative action.

1941In the recent case of Moriarty v. Butler Grocery Co. ( 261 App. Div. 20 ; affd., 286 N. Y. 687 ), where the majority stockholder was accused of having improper dealings with the corporation and charging excessive prices by which he enriched himself, it was held that the burden of proof rested upon the minority stockholders to support the derivative action.

1925Co. ( 224 N. Y. 483 ): “ ‘ The great rule of law ’ * * * which holds a trustee to the duty of constant and unqualified fidelity is not a thing of forms and phrases.” So far as they permitted George to dominate the management of the estate, all the trustees assumed responsibility for his acts.

1923In the case of Ridgely v. Taylor & Co. ( 126 App. Div. 303, 304 ) this court (Woodward, J., writing), after noting that the appeal then written in was the third appeal before the court in the same case, said: “ Section 2 of article 1 of the State Constitution provides that the ‘ trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever,’ language which could hardly be made stronger, and yet, if verdicts founded on sufficient evidence may be continually set aside because the trial justice, or those who pass in review upon the record, happen to differ with th

1920In White v. Flynn, 24 Ind. 46 , the court held that it was not competent for the legislature to make a tax deed conclusive evidence of the validity of prior proceedings.

1917Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49 .) “The statute must be construed with reference to the objects it had in view, the evils intended to be remedied and the benefits expected to be derived from it.” (Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310, 312 .) As Chancellor Kent has stated, it is the duty of judges “to make such a construction as should repress the mischief and advance the remedy.” (Kent Com. 464.) The mischief that the Bulk Sales Law was intended to suppress was the sale, by persons who were pecuniarily involved, of the entire or a substantial portion of their stock of merchandise witho

1917Cas. 89, 90 ; Smith v. Moffat, 1 Barb. 65, 67 .) “ In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the Legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute, as well as other circumstances.” (People ex rel.

1915Co. v. Commissioners of Taxes, 95 N. Y. 554, 559 .) “In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the Legislature in passing the same, which intention is to be ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances.

1913Two rules of construction are well settled: First. ‘ ‘ Every interpretation that leads to an absurdity should be rejected.” (Kent’s Com. 462; Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, p. 128; Matter of Folsom, 56 N. Y. 60, 66 .) Second. *319 “'In the interpretation of statutes, the great principle which is to control is the intention of the legislature in passing the same, which intention is to he ascertained from the cause or necessity of making the statute as well as other circumstances.

1911That provision was considered- by the Supreme Court of Colorado, and its mischief pointed out in an able opinion by Chief Justice Helm. ( 12 Colo. 466 .) It is impossible to foresee all the evils likely to result from the. indulgence of that tendency, or' to what it might lead, and it is certain. that it has not been indulged in this State by the framers of it's successive Constitutions, which have all carefully preserved the great principle of the independence of -the three branches of government.