pattern instruction in Kansas

2022However, absent such need, PIK instructions and recommendations should be followed.'" State v. Bernhardt, 304 Kan. 460, 470 , 372 P.3d 1161 (2016) (quoting State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46 , Syl. ¶ 1, 209 P.3d 675 [2009]).

2022However, absent such need, PIK instructions and recommendations should be followed.'" State v. Bernhardt, 304 Kan. 460, 470 , 372 P.3d 1161 (2016) (quoting State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46 , Syl. ¶ 1, 209 P.3d 675 [2009]).

2021And they may modify a pattern instruction to fit the circumstances of a particular case. 304 Kan. at 470 .

2021Although the Kansas Supreme Court "'strongly recommend[s]'" the use of PIK instructions, it has also recognized that a trial court should not hesitate to modify or add to pattern instructions where "'the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK.'" State v. Bernhardt, 304 Kan. 460, 470 , 372 P.3d 1161 (2016).

2006However, “[i]f the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.” State v. Dunn, 249 Kan. 488, 492 , 820 P.2d 412 (1991).

2006However, “[i]f the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.” State v. Dunn, 249 Kan. 488, 492 , 820 P.2d 412 (1991).

2015However, our Supreme Court also has stated that if “ ‘the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.’ ” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1061 , 221 P.3d 525 (2009).

2014On numerous occasions, this court has strongly urged trial courts to instruct the jury by using Kansas’ pattern instructions as written, modifying them only “[i]f die particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK.” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017 , Syl. ¶ 20, 221 P.3d 525 (2009); see State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 57 , 298 P.3d 303 (2013).

2015However, our Supreme Court also has stated that if “ ‘the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.’ ” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1061 , 221 P.3d 525 (2009).

2014On numerous occasions, this court has strongly urged trial courts to instruct the jury by using Kansas’ pattern instructions as written, modifying them only “[i]f die particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK.” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017 , Syl. ¶ 20, 221 P.3d 525 (2009); see State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 57 , 298 P.3d 303 (2013).

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2014In the final step of our analysis, we “must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).” Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2003While we have often stated that PIK instructions should be used where they are appropriate, we have also stated that “[i]f the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.” State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49, 58-59 , 785 P.2d 963 (1990).

2003While we have often stated that PIK instructions should be used where they are appropriate, we have also stated that “[i]f the particular facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattern instruction or the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the trial court should not hesitate to make such modification or addition.” State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49, 58-59 , 785 P.2d 963 (1990).

2001In tracking the change in the PIK instruction to determine when the removal of "or other state of mind" occurred, Ludlow referenced the pattern instruction approved in State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), noting that "the most obvious change [in the voluntary intoxication instruction] is in the lead-in declaration—voluntary intoxication changes from not being a defense to possibly being a defense." 256 Kan. at 145.

2001In tracking the change in the PIK instruction to determine when the removal of "or other state of mind" occurred, Ludlow referenced the pattern instruction approved in State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), noting that "the most obvious change [in the voluntary intoxication instruction] is in the lead-in declaration—voluntary intoxication changes from not being a defense to possibly being a defense." 256 Kan. at 145.

2026However, absent such need, PIK instructions and recommendations should be followed.'" State v. Dias, 263 Kan. 331, 335 , 949 P.2d 1093 (1997) (quoting State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58 , Syl. ¶ 5, 936 P.2d 727 [1997]).

2026However, absent such need, PIK instructions and recommendations should be followed.'" State v. Dias, 263 Kan. 331, 335 , 949 P.2d 1093 (1997) (quoting State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58 , Syl. ¶ 5, 936 P.2d 727 [1997]).

2021The second paragraph of the instruction is identical to the pattern instruction and stems from this court's approval of this language in State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 253 , 311 P.3d 399 (2013).

2021The second paragraph of the instruction is identical to the pattern instruction and stems from this court's approval of this language in State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 253 , 311 P.3d 399 (2013).

2014We, therefore, disapprove of the statement in Alexander that "[b]ecause Young [the victim] was not on 10 trial, Instruction No. 14 [the pattern defense of dwelling instruction] should not have been given." Alexander, 268 Kan. at 613 .

2014We, therefore, disapprove of the statement in Alexander that “[b]ecause Young [the victim] was not on trial, Instruction No. 14 [the pattern defense of dwelling instruction] should not have been given.” Alexander, 268 Kan. at 613 .

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2013The amendment was in response to the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Beck, 32 Kan.

2005“The Pattern Instructions for Kansas were developed by a knowledgeable committee to bring accuracy, clarity, and uniformity to jury instructions, and while they are not required, they are strongly recommended for use by Kansas trial courts.” State v. Beck, 32 Kan.

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2013See Edwards, 291 Kan. at 552 ; State v. Pink, 270 Kan. 728, 738-39 , 20 P.3d 31 (2001), overruled on other grounds State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624 , 88 P.3d 218 (2004); State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2008Holt acknowledges that per the official Comment to PIK Crim 3d 54.05, the trial court may properly refuse to add the “mere presence or association” language because the pattern instruction “clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.” State v. Pink, 270 Kan. at 738-39 ; State v. Jackson, 270 Kan. 755, 760-61 , 19 P.3d 121 (2001); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 46 , 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, 361 , 827 P.2d 733 (1992); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987).

2011The next year, 1983, this court decided Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983), in which we stated: “[Tjhe plaintiff, to present a prima facie strict liability case, must produce proof of three elements: (1) the injury resulted from a condition of the product; (2) the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed at the time it left the defendant’s control.” These elements were to come to be included in the pattern instruction on strict liability.

2011The next year, 1983, this court decided Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 54 , 661 P.2d 348 (1983), in which we stated: “[Tjhe plaintiff, to present a prima facie strict liability case, must produce proof of three elements: (1) the injury resulted from a condition of the product; (2) the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed at the time it left the defendant’s control.” These elements were to come to be included in the pattern instruction on strict liability.