pattern instruction in California

2018We have previously held that these instructions provide the jury with sufficient guidance for the administration of the death penalty to meet constitutional standards, and we reject defendant's additional arguments that CALJIC No. 8.88 is constitutionally deficient. ( **212 People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1 , 78-79, 87, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 275 P.3d 496 .) First, the phrase "so substantial" is not impermissibly vague or ambiguous, as defendant contends; rather, "the pattern instruction 'properly instructs the jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process.' " (

2018We have previously held that these instructions provide the jury with sufficient guidance for the administration of the death penalty to meet constitutional standards, and we reject defendant's additional arguments that CALJIC No. 8.88 is constitutionally deficient. ( **212 People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1 , 78-79, 87, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 275 P.3d 496 .) First, the phrase "so substantial" is not impermissibly vague or ambiguous, as defendant contends; rather, "the pattern instruction 'properly instructs the jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process.' " (

2025Section 1127c and CALCRIM No. 372 describe a permissive inference, “which allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” (County Court of Ulster County v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 (Allen).) The first sentence of the pattern instruction describes the inference: “If the defendant fled immediately after a crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt.” “A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested concl

2025Section 1127c and CALCRIM No. 372 describe a permissive inference, “which allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” (County Court of Ulster County v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 (Allen).) The first sentence of the pattern instruction describes the inference: “If the defendant fled immediately after a crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt.” “A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested concl

2016The pattern instruction in question, former CALCRIM No. 549, came into being in 2006 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 193 (Cavitt), and it was withdrawn from CALCRIM in 2013 based on that court’s later decision in Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th 333 .

2016The pattern instruction in question, former CALCRIM No. 549, came into being in 2006 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 193 (Cavitt), and it was withdrawn from CALCRIM in 2013 based on that court’s later decision in Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th 333 .

2012(Ibid.) Indeed, we have held CALJIC No. 8.85, the pattern instruction that set forth the mitigating factors to be considered by the jury in making its penalty determination, to be “correct and adequate.” (People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 309.) “Moreover, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury that mitigating evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Avila II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 722.) There was no error. 8.

2009Defendant contends that this instruction is “vague and imprecise, fail[s] to adequately describe the weighing process the jury must apply in capital cases, and deprived [defendant] of the individualized consideration the Eighth Amendment requires.” We have held, however, that the pattern instruction “properly instructs the jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process.” (People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Defendant claims the instruction was misleading and improperly weighted the scale in favor of death, because it permitted the jury to impose the

2025(See, e.g., People v. Hernandez Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 [instruction does not lower prosecution’s burden of proof]; People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30-32 [instruction does not unconstitutionally presume a crime was committed].) 10 We note as a threshold matter that substantial evidence supported instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372.

2014(See, e.g., People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 1179- 1199; People v. Vang (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129-1131 ; People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 .) The same principle should apply to review of the bench notes to a pattern instruction.

2024First, defendant asserts that the pattern jury instruction corresponding to section 136.1(b)(2) — CALCRIM No. 2622 — supports his reading because it “clearly presents the offense as unified conduct.” Specifically, the pattern instruction states that the prosecution must prove that the defendant dissuaded a victim or witness “from cooperating or providing information so that a . . . complaint . . . could be sought and prosecuted, and from helping to prosecute that action.” (CALCRIM No. 2622, italics added.) “We have cautioned,” however, “that ‘jury instructions . . . are not themselves the law,

2021A. Due Process Defendant acknowledges that People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 , 871 approved the prior version of this pattern instruction, CALJIC No. 2.03,7 rejecting a claim that language allowing a jury to use the making of a false statement as “ ‘a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt’ ” (see People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 908, fn. 30 ) is akin to being allowed to treat the falsehood as a full confession to the crime charged.

2022(See Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1016 [we do not consider “parts of an instruction” in isolation]; Quinonez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 465 [a“ ‘jury instruction cannot be judged on the basis of one or two phrases plucked out of context’ ”].) Specifically, the pattern instruction’s definitions of force, duress, and fear convey that the act must be accomplished—not merely accompanied—by the defendant’s use of that aggravating conduct.

2022(People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 (Castillo).) Here, defendant’s claim that he requested CALCRIM No. 3426 is not borne out by the record.

2025The 1976 pattern instruction added to the definition of principals: “ ‘One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged.’ ” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 263 [quoting the 1976 CALJIC No. 300].) Significantly, here, the trial court added to the pattern instruction the requirement that the aider and abettor knowingly aid and share in the perpetrator’s intent.

2024(See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261, 263, fn. 5 .) The first mention of the doctrine in pattern jury instructions pertaining to accomplice liability was in a 1976 supplement (CALJIC No. 300 (3d ed. 1976 rev.), which suggested natural and probable consequences language as an optional addition to the pattern instruction defining principals.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Hernandez Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 [instruction does not lower prosecution’s burden of proof]; People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30-32 [instruction does not unconstitutionally presume a crime was committed].) 10 We note as a threshold matter that substantial evidence supported instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Hernandez Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 [instruction does not lower prosecution’s burden of proof]; People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30-32 [instruction does not unconstitutionally presume a crime was committed].) 10 We note as a threshold matter that substantial evidence supported instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372.

2025(Ibid., italics added.) The pattern instruction for rule 4.421(a)(1) tells jurors “[a]n act discloses callousness when it demonstrates a lack of sympathy for the suffering of, or harm to, the victim[s].” (CALCRIM No. 3224.) The instruction further explains that the conduct must have been “distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the crime[s].” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110 [“The essence of ‘aggravation’ relates to the effect of a particular fact in making the offense distinctively worse than the ordinary”].) The latter point is repeated at the end

2024(Cf. to CALCRIM No. 3234, citing People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110 [“The essence of ‘aggravation’ relates to the effect of a particular fact in making the offense distinctively worse than the ordinary”].) B.

2023(Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504 , 517–520; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 , 982–983.) As discussed above, the jury was instructed that attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.

2022(Ibid.; see, e.g., People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504 , 517–520.) In this case, the possibility that the jury may have relied on an imputed malice theory based on the “equally guilty” phrase is foreclosed by the entirety of the instructions, particularly CALJIC No. 3.01, that that an aider and abettor had to know the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, intend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of the crime, and by act or advice, aided or encouraged the commission of the crime.

2022(See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 [“[E]ven were we to conclude on this record that a pinpoint instruction should have been given explaining that legally adequate provocation can occur over a considerable period of time, the error would be harmless, as ‘nothing in [the standard instructions given] precluded the jury from finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occurring over a considerable period of time.’ ”].) Moreover, as discussed above, defendant’s own statements establish that he was not acting under the influence of 7 Defendant suggests the pattern instruct

2022(See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 [“[E]ven were we to conclude on this record that a pinpoint instruction should have been given explaining that legally adequate provocation can occur over a considerable period of time, the error would be harmless, as ‘nothing in [the standard instructions given] precluded the jury from finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occurring over a considerable period of time.’ ”].) Moreover, as discussed above, defendant’s own statements establish that he was not acting under the influence of 7 Defendant suggests the pattern instruct

2022We find no error in the court’s answer, which was appropriately based on People v. Cordero (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 275, 282 (Cordero). 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND On August 30, 2016, Yair C., a former Norteño gang member, was living in the Casa del Sol mobile home park.

2022Velazquez argues that the court’s use of language taken from Cordero, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 275 to formulate a response to the jury’s question “diminished the requirement that the prosecution prove that [Velazquez] carefully considered whether or not to kill and the consequences of his action.” We disagree.

2022When the defendant acted, he intended to distribute, show, or exchange the matter to someone else for money or other commercial benefit.”6 The trial court modified the fourth element with the following instruction: “Commercial benefit does not require proof that the defendant intended to profit financially from distribution of obscene matter. [Citation.] But that rule does not apply when . . . the trial court gives an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law.” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002 , 1011–1112.) That is the situation here. 6 CALCRIM No. 1141 is a pattern instruc

2016(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 188 .) Since he did not request that the pattern instruction be modified in that 14 respect, he has arguably forfeited that argument. ( Hudson, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1002 , 1011- 1012.) The same is true of his objection that the alternative language in this instruction erroneously allowed the jury to consider not only how he used the knife, but also its proper characterization.

2011Before evidence was presented at the penalty phase, and again following the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, concerning the factors it should consider, “if applicable.” 24 Defendant did not request any clarifying change to the pattern instruction. “ ‘Generally, a party. may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002,

2011Before evidence was presented at the penalty phase, and again following the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, concerning the factors it should consider, “if applicable.” 24 Defendant did not request any clarifying change to the pattern instruction. “ ‘Generally, a party. may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002,

2016Defendant also asks us to reconsider the holdings in People v. Rodriguez (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062 , 1066-1067 and People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 680-681 , which upheld the current and prior versions of the pattern instruction against constitutional claims that it impermissibly singles out a defendant’s testimony for this heightened scrutiny (Evid.

2015In People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 675, 678-681 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ] {Saddler), our Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of CALJIC No. 2.62, a pattern instruction similar in substance to CALCRIM No. 361. 5 More recently, in People v. Rodriguez, supra, *496 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1067-1068 (Rodriguez), Division Four of the Second District Court of Appeal rejected a constitutional challenge to CALCRIM No. 361.

2021A. Due Process Defendant acknowledges that People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 , 871 approved the prior version of this pattern instruction, CALJIC No. 2.03,7 rejecting a claim that language allowing a jury to use the making of a false statement as “ ‘a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt’ ” (see People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 908, fn. 30 ) is akin to being allowed to treat the falsehood as a full confession to the crime charged.

2015(CALCRIM No. 362, italics added; People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1028 ; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871 [both cases holding that the phrase is reasonably interpreted only as permitting an inference that a defendant is conscious of some wrongdoing, not the specific mental elements of the particular offense at issue].) The Supreme Court has indicated, in People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000 , that it gives short shrift to this claim. “[D]efendant contends that consciousness of guilt instructions like CALJIC No. 2.52 (and see . . .

2020(Ibrahim, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696 ; Kozlowski, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 871 .) CALCRIM No. 1202 omits the phrase “from another person.” Harper argues, “By omitting the requirement of a secondary victim, CALCRIM [No.] 1202 relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving the element that the kidnapper intended to use the kidnapping victim to exact some kind of consideration from a third party or secondary victim.” We agree that CALCRIM No. 1202’s description of the fourth type of aggravated kidnapping is incomplete, and we urge the Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions t

2020(Ibrahim, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696 ; Kozlowski, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 871 .) CALCRIM No. 1202 omits the phrase “from another person.” Harper argues, “By omitting the requirement of a secondary victim, CALCRIM [No.] 1202 relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving the element that the kidnapper intended to use the kidnapping victim to exact some kind of consideration from a third party or secondary victim.” We agree that CALCRIM No. 1202’s description of the fourth type of aggravated kidnapping is incomplete, and we urge the Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions t