pattern instruction in Maryland

2024See MPJI-Cv 19:10 (5th ed. 2020 Repl.) (“5th edition instruction”). 34 33 Although the use of pattern jury instructions is not required, “they are the product of consensus of experienced practitioners and judges, and [the Supreme Court] has, on occasion, encouraged their use.” Armacost v. Davis, 462 Md. 504 , 516 n.5 (2019) (citing Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355, 373 (2006)). 34 The trial court changed “reasonably foreseeable” in the first sentence of the pattern instruction to “reasonable and foreseeable.” In the pattern instruction, the second and third paragraphs are bracketed, to be used whe

2019See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355, 373 (2006). 6 The pattern instruction on foreseeability in the current edition of the civil pattern instructions differs slightly from the version used by the trial court in 2016, although the changes appear to be of form rather than substance. 7 The trial court followed those two instructions with the general pattern instruction on causation and then gave a pattern instruction that specifically addresses negligence of a health care provider (MPJI-Cv 27:1).7 The latter instruction particularized the standard that the jury should apply to the benchmark o

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2025“When,” as in this case, “the evidence generates an issue that is not covered by a pattern instruction, we must count on the court to incorporate relevant and valid legal principles gleaned from the case law.” Green v. State, 119 Md.

2016On appeal, Green argued that the pattern instruction was not sufficient because there was evidence that he “reasonably believed he had implied permission to enter McDougald’s residence, which constituted a defense to the charge under Warfield.” Id. at 557, 705 A.2d 133 .

2012Yet the strong message we sent in Ruffin and in other cases before it approving the language of the pattern instruction, see Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 383-84 , 620 A.2d 295, 301-02 (1993); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432, 438 (1997), implies satisfaction with the constitutional sufficiency of the pattern instruction.

2012Yet the strong message we sent in Ruffin and in other cases before it approving the language of the pattern instruction, see Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 383-84 , 620 A.2d 295, 301-02 (1993); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432, 438 (1997), implies satisfaction with the constitutional sufficiency of the pattern instruction.

2025For example, in Thompson v. State, 371 Md. 473, 486 (2002), the Court held that the circuit court erred in giving an Allen charge that deviated substantially from the pattern instruction and from the American Bar Association standards.

2013In Thompson v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in giving what the trial judge referred to as an “attitude of jurors” instruction. 371 Md. at 478-79 , 810 A.2d 435 .

2012Yet the strong message we sent in Ruffin and in other cases before it approving the language of the pattern instruction, see Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 383-84 , 620 A.2d 295, 301-02 (1993); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432, 438 (1997), implies satisfaction with the constitutional sufficiency of the pattern instruction.

2012Yet the strong message we sent in Ruffin and in other cases before it approving the language of the pattern instruction, see Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 383-84 , 620 A.2d 295, 301-02 (1993); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404 , 697 A.2d 432, 438 (1997), implies satisfaction with the constitutional sufficiency of the pattern instruction.

2006See, e.g., Miller v. State, supra, 380 Md. 1 , 843 A.2d 803 ; Merzbacher v. State, supra, 346 Md. 391 , 697 A.2d 432 ; Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. 370 , 620 A.2d 295 ; Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35 , 585 A.2d 209 (1991); Robertson v. State, 295 Md. 688 , 457 A.2d 826 (1983); State v. McClellan, ___ Md.App. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2006 WL 1805976 (2006); Graham v. State, 151 Md.App. 466 , 827 A.2d 874 (2003); Himple v. State, supra, 101 Md.App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 ; Joyner-Pitts v. State, 101 Md.App. 429 , 647 A.2d 116 (1994).

2006See, e.g., Miller v. State, supra, 380 Md. 1 , 843 A.2d 803 ; Merzbacher v. State, supra, 346 Md. 391 , 697 A.2d 432 ; Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. 370 , 620 A.2d 295 ; Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35 , 585 A.2d 209 (1991); Robertson v. State, 295 Md. 688 , 457 A.2d 826 (1983); State v. McClellan, ___ Md.App. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2006 WL 1805976 (2006); Graham v. State, 151 Md.App. 466 , 827 A.2d 874 (2003); Himple v. State, supra, 101 Md.App. 579 , 647 A.2d 1240 ; Joyner-Pitts v. State, 101 Md.App. 429 , 647 A.2d 116 (1994).

2025In addition to the language quoted from the pattern instruction, the City requested the following sentence, based on language from Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 225 Md. 196, 200-01 (1961): “The mere aggravation of a disease not occupational in character is insufficient to establish an occupational disease.” Mr. Johnson opposed the City’s request for jury instructions concerning occupational diseases.

2025In addition to the language quoted from the pattern instruction, the City requested the following sentence, based on language from Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 225 Md. 196, 200-01 (1961): “The mere aggravation of a disease not occupational in character is insufficient to establish an occupational disease.” Mr. Johnson opposed the City’s request for jury instructions concerning occupational diseases.

2025App. at 562 ; accord Janey v. State, 166 Md.

2025See Mumford v. State, 19 Md.

2021Although it would have been preferable to omit the reference to “a defendant” from the heading as the trial court provided it to the jury, the trial court’s formulation was a better fit for this case than the Pattern Instructions’ article- less “defendant,” which could be interpreted as meaning “the defendant.” Going forward, we encourage trial courts in cases where the evidence generates a flight instruction, but where the defendant disputes that they were the person who fled, to refer to the pattern instruction simply as “Flight or Concealment” if the court wishes to provide the jury with a

2021Appx. 147 , 148 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Brown, 658 Fed.

2019McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 348-49 (2012) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).1 To generate this defense, a defendant must meet the “relatively low threshold” of showing “some evidence” of duress. 428 Md. at 355 . 1 In its opinion in this case, the Court of Special Appeals used a pattern instruction developed by a committee of the Maryland State Bar Association (“MSBA”), as it was worded at the time of Mr. Howell’s trial, as a reference on the elements of the duress defense: 2 The duress defense serves the public policy that “the law ought to promote the achievemen

2019McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 348-49 (2012) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).1 To generate this defense, a defendant must meet the “relatively low threshold” of showing “some evidence” of duress. 428 Md. at 355 . 1 In its opinion in this case, the Court of Special Appeals used a pattern instruction developed by a committee of the Maryland State Bar Association (“MSBA”), as it was worded at the time of Mr. Howell’s trial, as a reference on the elements of the duress defense: 2 The duress defense serves the public policy that “the law ought to promote the achievemen

2014Indeed, we have repeatedly “recommended that trial judges use the pattern instructions.” Id. (citing Minger v. State, 157 Md.App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 (2004) (“Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions”); Green v. State, 127 Md.App. 758, 771 , 736 A.2d 450 (1999) (recommending that trial judges give pattern jury instructions)).

2014Indeed, we have repeatedly “recommended that trial judges use the pattern instructions.” Id. (citing Minger v. State, 157 Md.App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 (2004) (“Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions”); Green v. State, 127 Md.App. 758, 771 , 736 A.2d 450 (1999) (recommending that trial judges give pattern jury instructions)).