pattern instruction in Colorado

2024See CJI-Civ. 30:10; see also Wolven v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶ 43 (concluding that trial court acted within its discretion by tendering an instruction that matched a pattern instruction); People v. Jackson, 2018 COA 79, ¶ 64 (explaining instructions that accurately track pattern instructions generally are sufficient), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 75 .

2024See CJI-Civ. 30:10; see also Wolven v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶ 43 (concluding that trial court acted within its discretion by tendering an instruction that matched a pattern instruction); People v. Jackson, 2018 COA 79, ¶ 64 (explaining instructions that accurately track pattern instructions generally are sufficient), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 75 .

2015See 941 P.2d at 253–54 & n.10.

2010While Bogdanov held the pattern instruction "should" be modified to include this requirement explicitly, it declined to reverse a conviction on that ground. 941 P.2d at 253-55 .

2024See CJI-Civ. 30:10; see also Wolven v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶ 43 (concluding that trial court acted within its discretion by tendering an instruction that matched a pattern instruction); People v. Jackson, 2018 COA 79, ¶ 64 (explaining instructions that accurately track pattern instructions generally are sufficient), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 75 .

2024See CJI-Civ. 30:10; see also Wolven v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶ 43 (concluding that trial court acted within its discretion by tendering an instruction that matched a pattern instruction); People v. Jackson, 2018 COA 79, ¶ 64 (explaining instructions that accurately track pattern instructions generally are sufficient), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 75 .

2015In People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 276 (Colo. 1996), we actually found giving the pattern instruction to have been error, although harmless in that case.

2015In People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 276 (Colo. 1996), we actually found giving the pattern instruction to have been error, although harmless in that case.

2015More than a year before completion of the 1983 jury instructions project, this court concluded in People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892, 894 (Colo. 1981), that because complicity is not itself a separate crime, the word “intent” appearing in the statutory phrase “with intent to promote or facilitate” could not refer to the culpable mental state of “‘[i]ntentionally’ or ‘with intent’” defined at section 18-1-501(5), C.R.S. (2015).

2015Finally, rather than requiring that "having the requisite knowledge," the defendant "did aid, abet or encourage the principal in the commission of the erime," as had been required by prior case law, see Thompson, 655 P.2d at 418 , the new pattern instruction substituted instead the condition that the "defendant did intentionally aid, abet, advise, or encourage the other person in the commission or planning of the crime," COL-JI-Crim. 6:04 (1983) (emphasis added). 3 {13 Although the jury instructions committee entirely omitted the key statutory phrase "with the intent to promote or facilitate t

2015In an apparent attempt to account for prior case law approving accessory instructions in prosecutions for aggravated robbery involving evidence sufficient to find that one person held the victim at bay while another actually took the thing of value, see, e.g., Reed v. People, 467 P.2d 809 , 811–13 (Colo. 1970), the pattern instruction altered these requirements in several significant ways.

2015In an apparent attempt to account for prior case law approving accessory instructions in prosecutions for aggravated robbery involving evidence sufficient to find that one person held the victim at bay while another actually took the thing of value, see, eg., Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809, 811-13 (1970), the pattern instruction altered these requirements in several significant ways.

2010Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247 , 253-54 & n. 10 (Colo.), modified, 955 P.2d 997 (Colo.1997), disapproved of on other grounds by Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo.2001).

2001Bogdanov v. People, supra, 941 P.2d at 254 n. 10, 955 P.2d at 997.

2026Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶ 8 . ¶ 15 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 23 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 1 In the pattern instruction, this paragraph precedes the previous one.

2026Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶ 8 . ¶ 15 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 23 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 1 In the pattern instruction, this paragraph precedes the previous one.

2025Similarly, the pattern instruction on the elements of liability for a false imprisonment or arrest claim state that “legal justification is treated as a matter of affirmative defense.” CJI-Civ. 21:1 source and authority (2025) (citing Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 51 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Colo. 1935)); accord Goodboe v. Gabriella, 663 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Colo. App. 1983) (noting that legal justification is treated as an affirmative defense). 11 ¶ 21 We disagree.

2025Similarly, the pattern instruction on the elements of liability for a false imprisonment or arrest claim state that “legal justification is treated as a matter of affirmative defense.” CJI-Civ. 21:1 source and authority (2025) (citing Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 51 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Colo. 1935)); accord Goodboe v. Gabriella, 663 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Colo. App. 1983) (noting that legal justification is treated as an affirmative defense). 11 ¶ 21 We disagree.

2024See Bear Valley Church of Christ, 928 P.2d at 1329-30 (declining to review instructional error raised for the first time in motion for new trial 16 where motion was denied “in part because . . . the defendants did not adequately preserve the issue”). ¶ 35 The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Simon’s motion for a new trial, and because the issue was not preserved, we decline to review the propriety of the instruction.6 III.

2022First, by stating that the established pattern instruction on reasonable doubt was "a little inadequate," the court undermined the very instruction that it later advised the jurors that they were to follow, making it far more likely that the jurors would rely instead on the court's birthday example as the standard for reasonable doubt Second, the birthday example was confusing at best and is arguably the type of commonplace example that Justices of the Supreme Court and courts in this jurisdiction have repeatedly warned are not proper substitutes for the legal definition of reasonable doubt Se

2022First, by stating that the established pattern instruction on reasonable doubt was "a little inadequate," the court undermined the very instruction that it later advised the jurors that they were to follow, making it far more likely that the jurors would rely instead on the court's birthday example as the standard for reasonable doubt Second, the birthday example was confusing at best and is arguably the type of commonplace example that Justices of the Supreme Court and courts in this jurisdiction have repeatedly warned are not proper substitutes for the legal definition of reasonable doubt Se

2022See COLJI-Crim. 4-5:03 (2021); People v. Gallegos, 260 P.3d 15, 26 (Colo. App. 2010) (explaining that instructions that accurately track pattern instructions generally are sufficient).

2019See People v. Tweedy, 126 P.3d 303, 307 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding that a court may refuse an instruction that states principles already encompassed elsewhere in the court’s instructions). b.

2018See People v. Martinez, 780 P.2d 560, 561 (Colo. 1989) (“‘[P]ossession’ is ‘a common term which is to be given its generally accepted meaning’ [and it means] ‘the actual or physical control of a firearm.’” (quoting People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 554 , 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979))).

2018See People v. Martinez, 780 P.2d 560, 561 (Colo. 1989) (“‘[P]ossession’ is ‘a common term which is to be given its generally accepted meaning’ [and it means] ‘the actual or physical control of a firearm.’” (quoting People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 554 , 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979))).

2018See People v. Martinez, 780 P.2d 560, 561 (Colo. 1989) (“‘[P]ossession’ is ‘a common term which is to be given its generally accepted meaning’ [and it means] ‘the actual or physical control of a firearm.’” (quoting People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 554 , 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979))).

2018Rather, it is well established that “[a] district court has substantial discretion in formulating the jury instructions, so long as they are correct statements of the law and fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.” People v. Romero, 197 P.3d 302, 309 (Colo. App. 2008). ¶ 100 Here, the instruction given by the court was legally correct and adequately informed the jury to apply a subjective standard rather than an objective standard.