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11 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anthony Haire v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Accordingly, even if it would have been clearer for the court to have done so, its failure to restate the burden in Instruction No. 25 was not contrary to law. [¶38] Ms. Widdison next argues that Instruction No. 26 was erroneous because it is identical to the pattern instruction rejected in Drennen , 2013 WY 118 , ¶ 37, 311 P.3d at 129 and in Haire , 2017 WY 48 , ¶¶ 35-36, 393 P.3d at 1313 . 4 We held in both cases *1218 that this instruction was "incorrect because it informed the jury that the defendant was required to retreat before using deadly force." Haire , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d at 1313 (intern 2018Accordingly, even if it would have been clearer for the court to have done so, its failure to restate the burden in Instruction No. 25 was not contrary to law. [¶38] Ms. Widdison next argues that Instruction No. 26 was erroneous because it is identical to the pattern instruction rejected in Drennen , 2013 WY 118 , ¶ 37, 311 P.3d at 129 and in Haire , 2017 WY 48 , ¶¶ 35-36, 393 P.3d at 1313 . 4 We held in both cases *1218 that this instruction was "incorrect because it informed the jury that the defendant was required to retreat before using deadly force." Haire , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d at 1313 (intern | 2 | 2 |
Gabriel R. Drennen v. The State of Wyominggreen2 sentences2018Accordingly, even if it would have been clearer for the court to have done so, its failure to restate the burden in Instruction No. 25 was not contrary to law. [¶38] Ms. Widdison next argues that Instruction No. 26 was erroneous because it is identical to the pattern instruction rejected in Drennen , 2013 WY 118 , ¶ 37, 311 P.3d at 129 and in Haire , 2017 WY 48 , ¶¶ 35-36, 393 P.3d at 1313 . 4 We held in both cases *1218 that this instruction was "incorrect because it informed the jury that the defendant was required to retreat before using deadly force." Haire , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d at 1313 (intern 2018Accordingly, even if it would have been clearer for the court to have done so, its failure to restate the burden in Instruction No. 25 was not contrary to law. [¶38] Ms. Widdison next argues that Instruction No. 26 was erroneous because it is identical to the pattern instruction rejected in Drennen , 2013 WY 118 , ¶ 37, 311 P.3d at 129 and in Haire , 2017 WY 48 , ¶¶ 35-36, 393 P.3d at 1313 . 4 We held in both cases *1218 that this instruction was "incorrect because it informed the jury that the defendant was required to retreat before using deadly force." Haire , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d at 1313 (intern | 1 | 2 |
Mullaney v. Wilburgreen2 sentences2017Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04 , 95 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis added). [¶33] The effect of the pattern instruction given here is perhaps more pernicious than that in Mullaney . 2017Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04 , 95 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis added). [¶33] The effect of the pattern instruction given here is perhaps more pernicious than that in Mullaney . | 1 | 1 |
Richard Cameron Wilkersongreen2 sentences2017The term “maliciously” means that the act constituting the offense was done intentionally but without premeditation, was reasonably likely to result in death and was done recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life, and was done without legal justification or excuse. .The instruction was modeled after the current pattern instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D2, which incorporates our recent holding in Wilkerson: “the jury must be instructed that “malice” means that the act constituting the offense was done recklessly under circumstances manifesting an 2017The term “maliciously” means that the act constituting the offense was done intentionally but without premeditation, was reasonably likely to result in death and was done recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life, and was done without legal justification or excuse. .The instruction was modeled after the current pattern instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D2, which incorporates our recent holding in Wilkerson: “the jury must be instructed that “malice” means that the act constituting the offense was done recklessly under circumstances manifesting an | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hargrovegreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., State v. Hargrove, 108 N.M. 233, 235 , 771 P.2d 166, 168 (1989), discussed infra, ¶ 14. 6 . 2013See, e.g., State v. Hargrove, 108 N.M. 233, 235 , 771 P.2d 166, 168 (1989), discussed infra, ¶ 14. 6 . | 1 | 1 |
Braley v. Stategreen1 sentence2003The “old” pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978), and the new pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), contain both concepts. 2 The problem is that the concepts are not identical, leaving considerable doubt as to exactly what it is the State has to prove in a given ease. 3 Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, the source note to the new pattern instruction directs attention to Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo.1987), where this Court, in a homicide case, said simply that “[mjalice has been defined as intentional killing without legal justification or excuse and u | 1 | 1 |
Nunez v. Stategreen1 sentence2003The “old” pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978), and the new pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), contain both concepts. 2 The problem is that the concepts are not identical, leaving considerable doubt as to exactly what it is the State has to prove in a given ease. 3 Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, the source note to the new pattern instruction directs attention to Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo.1987), where this Court, in a homicide case, said simply that “[mjalice has been defined as intentional killing without legal justification or excuse and u | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Stategreen1 sentence2003In Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Wyo.1992), we noted the confusion that can arise because of differing legal and common definitions of malice, yet we also cited Sorrentino with approval and noted that the passage of six decades had “failed to endow our language with suitable synonyms.” [¶23] In Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Wyo.1983), we considered the meaning of the word “maliciously” specifically within the context of the first-degree arson statute. | 1 | 1 |
Van Dean v. Stategreen1 sentence2003In Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Wyo.1992), we noted the confusion that can arise because of differing legal and common definitions of malice, yet we also cited Sorrentino with approval and noted that the passage of six decades had “failed to endow our language with suitable synonyms.” [¶23] In Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Wyo.1983), we considered the meaning of the word “maliciously” specifically within the context of the first-degree arson statute. | 1 | 1 |
Sodergren v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170, 181 (Wyo.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Regan v. State
green
2 sentences2020I can’t deal with it from South Dakota anyways, you know, once they put me in South Dakota incarceration, I’m f***ed.” Finally, Mr. Mitchell mentioned his criminal history, saying, “Yeah, and I had half a pound of weed before in my life, that’s it.” [¶15] Mr. Mitchell’s counsel offered a jury instruction drawn from language in Regan v. State, 2015 WY 62 , 350 P.3d 702 (Wyo. 2015), a felony possession case with similar facts, but the court rejected it, preferring the pattern instruction the State offered. 2020I can’t deal with it from South Dakota anyways, you know, once they put me in South Dakota incarceration, I’m f***ed.” Finally, Mr. Mitchell mentioned his criminal history, saying, “Yeah, and I had half a pound of weed before in my life, that’s it.” [¶15] Mr. Mitchell’s counsel offered a jury instruction drawn from language in Regan v. State, 2015 WY 62 , 350 P.3d 702 (Wyo. 2015), a felony possession case with similar facts, but the court rejected it, preferring the pattern instruction the State offered. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jessy Michael Dennis v. The State of Wyoming
green
1 sentence2019Id. (citations omitted). [¶25] Although Mr. Hopkins objected to the district court providing the pattern instruction defining general criminal intent, he has not demonstrated that the instruction was confusing, misleading, or an inaccurate statement of the law. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Forbes v. State
green
1 sentence2018The district court, in the context of deciding whether a probation violation occurred, is permitted to consider the attorneys' questions to the extent they supply meaning to the witnesses' answer ( see Jensen v. State , 2005 WY 85 , ¶ 19, 116 P.3d 1088 , 1095 (Wyo. 2005) ; Rubio v. State , 939 P.2d 238 , 245 (Wyo. 1997) ); make the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence ( see Miller , ¶ 11, 350 P.3d at 746 ); and exercise sound discretion in determining whether probation should be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence ( see Forbes , ¶¶ 6-7, 220 P.3d at 512-13 ; W.R.Cr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jensen v. State
green
2 sentences2018The district court, in the context of deciding whether a probation violation occurred, is permitted to consider the attorneys' questions to the extent they supply meaning to the witnesses' answer ( see Jensen v. State , 2005 WY 85 , ¶ 19, 116 P.3d 1088 , 1095 (Wyo. 2005) ; Rubio v. State , 939 P.2d 238 , 245 (Wyo. 1997) ); make the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence ( see Miller , ¶ 11, 350 P.3d at 746 ); and exercise sound discretion in determining whether probation should be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence ( see Forbes , ¶¶ 6-7, 220 P.3d at 512-13 ; W.R.Cr 2018The district court, in the context of deciding whether a probation violation occurred, is permitted to consider the attorneys' questions to the extent they supply meaning to the witnesses' answer ( see Jensen v. State , 2005 WY 85 , ¶ 19, 116 P.3d 1088 , 1095 (Wyo. 2005) ; Rubio v. State , 939 P.2d 238 , 245 (Wyo. 1997) ); make the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence ( see Miller , ¶ 11, 350 P.3d at 746 ); and exercise sound discretion in determining whether probation should be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence ( see Forbes , ¶¶ 6-7, 220 P.3d at 512-13 ; W.R.Cr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Miller v. State
green
1 sentence2018The district court, in the context of deciding whether a probation violation occurred, is permitted to consider the attorneys' questions to the extent they supply meaning to the witnesses' answer ( see Jensen v. State , 2005 WY 85 , ¶ 19, 116 P.3d 1088 , 1095 (Wyo. 2005) ; Rubio v. State , 939 P.2d 238 , 245 (Wyo. 1997) ); make the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence ( see Miller , ¶ 11, 350 P.3d at 746 ); and exercise sound discretion in determining whether probation should be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence ( see Forbes , ¶¶ 6-7, 220 P.3d at 512-13 ; W.R.Cr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rubio v. State
green
1 sentence2018The district court, in the context of deciding whether a probation violation occurred, is permitted to consider the attorneys' questions to the extent they supply meaning to the witnesses' answer ( see Jensen v. State , 2005 WY 85 , ¶ 19, 116 P.3d 1088 , 1095 (Wyo. 2005) ; Rubio v. State , 939 P.2d 238 , 245 (Wyo. 1997) ); make the necessary inferences and deductions from the evidence ( see Miller , ¶ 11, 350 P.3d at 746 ); and exercise sound discretion in determining whether probation should be revoked based on a preponderance of the evidence ( see Forbes , ¶¶ 6-7, 220 P.3d at 512-13 ; W.R.Cr | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Weaver v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2015And the record will show that the Court considered the pattern instruction, in particular the cited authority for the instruction Weaver versus Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brittain v. Booth
green
1 sentence1998Brittain, 601 P.2d at 534 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company
green
1 sentence1998She points out that the court gave a general duty of care instruction based on the pattern instruction and the comparative fault instruction, and contends that, considering the law from Clarke and Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company, 550 P.2d 500 (Wyo.1976), the jury was appropriately instructed. *687 In Wyoming, there is no distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk when raised as a defense to an established breach of duty. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.