official immunity in Minnesota

2024“The official immunity doctrine provides that a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of [their] judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless [they are] guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted).

2009The doctrine of official immunity establishes that “a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted).

1999The official immunity doctrine ensures that “ ‘a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.’ ” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1999The official immunity doctrine ensures that “ ‘a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.’ ” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

2016“Official immunity involves the kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than a policymaking level, and it requires something more than the performance of ‘ministerial’ duties.” Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1992).

2017“In the official immunity context, wilful and malicious are synonymous.” Id.

2017But willful or malicious conduct in the official immunity context “contemplates something more.” Rico, 472 N.W.2d at 107 .

2006Official immunity protects a government employee “from fear of personal liability that might deter independent action.” Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 552 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1996) (citation omitted).

2004Official immunity protects a government employee “from fear of personal liability that might deter independent action.” Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 552 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1996) (citations omitted).

2016Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 415 (Minn.1996) (“Official immunity protects employees or agents of the government entity.”). 8 We first recognized common law official immunity for judicial actors.

1998Official immunity protects public officials acting in their official capacity from suit, whereas vicarious official immunity protects the governmental entity from suit when " ‘the threat of potential liability [would] unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officials in 'the discharge of their duties.’ ” Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn.1996) (quoting Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn.1991)).

2009Ministerial duties have been defined as “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224 , 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61 , 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (dismantling an abandoned house a ministerial duty).

2009Ministerial duties have been defined as “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224 , 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61 , 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (dismantling an abandoned house a ministerial duty).

2015Official immunity is meant to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 655 (quotation omitted).

2014Official immunity can apply to any act that involves an exercise of independent judgment, even at the “operational level.” Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 657 .

2009Ministerial duties have been defined as “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224 , 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61 , 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (dismantling an abandoned house a ministerial duty).

2009Ministerial duties have been defined as “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224 , 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 61 , 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (dismantling an abandoned house a ministerial duty).

2025Id.; see also Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to emergencies on the grounds that emergency conditions offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information.” (quotations omitted)).

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

2016A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)).

2016A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)).

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

1993Official immunity The "official immunity" doctrine provides that "a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong." Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671 , 677 (Minn.1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)); see also Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990).

1993Official immunity The “official immunity” doctrine provides that “a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671 , 677 (Minn.1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)); see also Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990).

2005“Official immunity is a common law doctrine that protects government officials from suit for discretionary actions taken by them in the course of their official duties.” Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn.2004).

2005"Official immunity is a common law doctrine that protects government officials from suit for discretionary actions taken by them in the course of their official duties." Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn.2004).

2004State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn.1994).

1997Beaulieu, 518 N.W.2d at 570 .

2016Official immunity is a common-law doctrine which, in the absence of a willful or malicious wrong, protects a public official who is “charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion.” Olson v. Ramsey County 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993). “‘Discretion’ has a broader meaning in the context of official immunity 14 than in the context of statutory immunity.” In re Alexandria Acc. of Feb. 8, 1994, 561 N.W.2d 543, 548-49 (Minn. App. 1997).

1998Cf. In re Alexandria Accident of Feb. 8,199I, *17 561 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn.App.1997) (holding that the application of official immunity was proper where snow plow operator, in implementing the state’s snow removal policy, had to make discretionary decisions such as the speed to travel and the type of equipment to use), review denied (Minn. June 26, 1997).

2015Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.1998) (citations and quotátion omitted).

2014Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1998).

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

2016“Official immunity does not apply: (1) when a ministerial duty is either not performed or is performed negligently, or (2) when a willful or malicious wrong is committed.” Id.

2017“Official immunity enables public employees to perform their duties effectively, without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment.” Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted).

2015Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490 (Minn. 2006).

2015The law concerning a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not hospitable to the doctrine of official immunity. “[A] defendant relying upon an immunity bears the burden of proving he or she fits within the scope of the immunity.” Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1997).

2015The law concerning a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not hospitable to the doctrine of official immunity. “[A] defendant relying upon an immunity bears the burden of proving he or she fits within the scope of the immunity.” Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1997).

2004Official immunity exists “to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” S.L.D. v. Kranz, 498 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.App.1993) (quoting Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988)) (citation omitted).

1994Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 42 ; S.L.D. v. Kranz, 498 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Minn.App.1993).

1998Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn.1996).

1998Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn.1996).

1998Davis v. Hennepin County, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.App.1997), review denied, (Minn. May 20, 1997).

1997See Davis v. Hennepin County, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.App.1997) (applying two-step process), review denied (Minn. May 20,1997).

2025Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 231 (“[I]n determining whether particular conduct is protected, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on the purpose underlying the exception.”). 12 It is worth contrasting the scope and purpose of the discretionary-function exception with the scope and purpose of the distinct common-law doctrine of official immunity, a doctrine that is not at issue in this appeal.

2006Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 233 n. 1; Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 41 ("Official immunity involves the kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than a policy making level * * *.").

2016A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)).

2016A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)).

2014“Official immunity protects a public official charged by law with duties that call for the exercise of judgment or discretion unless the official is guilty of a wilful or malicious wrong.” Gleason, 582 N.W.2d at 220 (quotation omitted).

2006In order to determine whether the conflicting accounts of the officers’ conduct raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the officers’ official immunity, we first must determine “ ‘the precise governmental conduct at issue.’ ” Gleason, 582 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Watson v. Metro.

2024“Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values [because] these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 282 (quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506 (determining road grader’s decision to grade against traffic was discretionary because they acted “according to an established [county

2015“In an official immunity analysis, notwithstanding the difference between negligence and nuisance, the focus is on the kind of discretion which is exercised for immunity to be available....” Id. at 305 .

2014See Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 657 (stating that Larson “mistakenly relied on statutory immunity standards in an official immunity analysis”); S.W., 580 N.W.2d at 22-24 (rejecting claim of statutory immunity because school district did not adopt a safety policy but remanding for separate analysis of common-law official immunity).

2014Official immunity is broader than the statutory immunity addressed in both of those cases, protecting “discretion exercised at the operational level rather than at the policy-making level.” S.W., 580 N.W.2d at 23 .