official immunity in Missouri

2024“Missouri has long-applied the doctrine of official immunity.” Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008) (citing Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22 (1854)).

2024“Missouri has long-applied the doctrine of official immunity.” Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008) (citing Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22 (1854)).

2020“Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to construe it ‘too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation.’” Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836 ).

2020“Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to construe it ‘too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation.’” Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836 ).

1997It is well-settled law that public officers are not responsible for acts of subordinate officials, if such subordinates are themselves employees of the government, where there is no negligence on the part of such public officials in employing them, *299 unless the superior officer has directed or encouraged or ratified such acts, or has personally co-operated therein- Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 46 (Mo.App.

1982Official immunity protects “public officials from tort liability for damages arising from discretionary acts or functions in the performance of their official duties.” Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo.App.1979).

2023“Absent these allegations, the pleadings are insufficient to state a claim which is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.” Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 445 . 5 Here, both parties agree the employees are public officials and their actions were within the scope of their duties as medical caregivers.

2019Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 2000) (“Under the doctrine of official immunity, a public official is not liable to members of the public for negligence that is strictly related to the performance of discretionary duties.”) (citing Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865 ). 7 “A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 447 (quotation marks omitted). 5 Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to cons

2019Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 2000) (“Under the doctrine of official immunity, a public official is not liable to members of the public for negligence that is strictly related to the performance of discretionary duties.”) (citing Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865 ). 7 “A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 447 (quotation marks omitted). 5 Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to cons

2019Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 2000) (“Under the doctrine of official immunity, a public official is not liable to members of the public for negligence that is strictly related to the performance of discretionary duties.”) (citing Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865 ). 7 “A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 447 (quotation marks omitted). 5 Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to cons

2016Louis Int'l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. banc 2006)); Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 619 (Mo. banc 2008) (“Officer Ratliff's conduct was in the course of his official duties and involved the kind of discretionary decisions that require professional expertise and judgment that the official immunity doctrine is intended to protect.

2016Louis Int’l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. banc 2006)). -“Official immunity is intended to provide protection for individual government actors who, despite limited resources and imperfect information, must exercise judgment in the performance of their duties.” Ware, 471 S.W.3d at 391 (quoting Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 611 ).

2025In Love, our Supreme Court recently summarized official immunity as it applies to protect employees of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission from suit in their individual capacities: “Missouri has long-applied the doctrine of official immunity.” Southers[,] 263 S.W.3d [at] 610 [] (citing Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22 (1854)).

2025In Love, our Supreme Court recently summarized official immunity as it applies to protect employees of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission from suit in their individual capacities: “Missouri has long-applied the doctrine of official immunity.” Southers[,] 263 S.W.3d [at] 610 [] (citing Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22 (1854)).

2000See Bachmann, 860 S.W.2d at 33 (under the official immunity doctrine, officers are not personally liable in tort for injuries resulting from negligent performance of their discretionary acts or omissions).

1997E.D.1993), the court said: Official immunity exists because “fear of personal liability should not hang over public officials as they make judgments affecting the public safety and welfare.” Without this immunity, the public interest “will inevitably suffer from the too complacent attitude thus engendered.” Id. at 33 (citations omitted).

2017A police officer’s conduct in pursuing a fleeing suspect “involve[s] the kind of discretionary decisions that require professional expertise and judgment that the official immunity doctrine is intended to protect.” Id. at 619 (citing Brown v. Tate, 888 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994)).

1998“The doctrine of official immunity shields a [public official] from liability for negligence in the performance of [her] discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, duties.” Brown v. Tate, 888 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo.App.

2023Additionally, as with the doctrine of official immunity, the public duty doctrine does not protect public employees from acts done “in bad faith or with malice.” Id. at 612 (quoting Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)) (abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 612-14 , 614 n.13). 12 2.

2023Additionally, as with the doctrine of official immunity, the public duty doctrine does not protect public employees from acts done “in bad faith or with malice.” Id. at 612 (quoting Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)) (abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 612-14 , 614 n.13). 12 2.

2022In Nguyen, this Court held official immunity did not apply where the respondent’s motion to dismiss “relied entirely” upon the petitioner’s failure to specifically cite the source of the claimed statutory or regulatory duty. 353 S.W.3d at 732 .

2021Dist., 353 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (“[A]bsent allegations that a state official violated either a statutory or 9 departmentally-mandated duty, a petition’s pleadings are insufficient to state a claim which is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.”) (internal quotations omitted).

2019Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 614 n.13; Charron v. Thompson, 939 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Mo. banc 1996). 9 This focus on whether a duty is ministerial dominates many areas of law, not just the doctrine of official immunity.

2019Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 614 n.13; Charron v. Thompson, 939 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Mo. banc 1996). 9 This focus on whether a duty is ministerial dominates many areas of law, not just the doctrine of official immunity.

1997Charron v. Thompson, No. 78783 shp op. at 3, 1997 WL 78517 at * 1 (Mo. banc Dec. 17, 1996); Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985); Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Mo. banc 1984).

1997Charron v. Thompson, No. 78783 shp op. at 3, 1997 WL 78517 at * 1 (Mo. banc Dec. 17, 1996); Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985); Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Mo. banc 1984).

2014First, Stephens fails to cite any statute in the petition providing a statutorily required duty to be performed by Sheriff Dunn, Sheriff Merritt, and Wells, see Brummitt v. Springer, 918 S.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Mo.App.S.D.1996), nor does Stephens aver a breach of a statutory or departmentally-mandated obligation, either ministerial or discretionary.

2014First, Stephens fails to cite any statute in the petition providing a statutorily required duty to be performed by Sheriff Dunn, Sheriff Merritt, and Wells, see Brummitt v. Springer, 918 S.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Mo.App.

2016“Official immunity protects public officials from liability for alleged acts of ordinary negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Woods v. Ware, 471 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Lambert– St.

2016“Official immunity protects public officials from liability for alleged acts of ordinary negligence committed during the course of their official duties for .the performance of discretionary acts.” Woods v. Ware, 471 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Mo.App.W.D. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Lamberb-St.

2024Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Mo. App. 2017) (affirming summary judgment for defendants) (“The mere assertion of recklessness as a separate cause of action from negligence is insufficient to implicate the bad faith exception to application of the official immunity doctrine.”); McCormack v. Douglas, 328 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Mo. App. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for defendants) (“Appellants claim that Respondent’s violation of the District’s internal ‘Intersection Crossing Policy’ in driving through a stop sign without stopping was willfully wrong, in bad faith, or with malice.

2024The most oft-cited definition of malice in the official immunity context has two components: Malice exists where one wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another. 5 McCormack, 328 S.W.3d at 450 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020Hence, the court concluded only the discretionary decisions “which are a manifest exercise of the sovereign’s power [are] those decisions which ‘go to the essence of governing.’” Id. at 765 (quoting Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. banc 1977)).

1979The doctrine of official immunity appears to have been kept alive in Jones v. State Highway Commission, supra, the case which sounded the death knell for the doctrine of sovereign immunity in this state, as reflected by the following excerpt from 557 S.W.2d page 230 of the opinion: “We hold that the liability is for torts committed in the execution of activity decided upon, not for the decision itself in matters which go to the essence of governing; that our decision is not meant to impose liability upon the state or any of its agencies for acts or omissions constituting the exercise of a legi

2023Id. at 612 ; Throneberry, 526 S.W.3d at 206 ; see also Fowler, 504 S.W.3d at 109-10 . a.

2017Id. at 610-11 n.8 (recognizing that some jurisdictions recognize an exception to official immunity for acts of recklessness or gross negligence, but noting that “[o]f course, Missouri does not recognize gross negligence”); see Fowler v. Phillips, 504 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (“Recklessness is an aggravated form of negligence.”).

2022Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 2000). ("Under the doctrine of official immunity, a public official is not liable to members of the public for negligence that is strictly related to the performance of discretionary duties.") (citing Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865).

2022Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. banc 2000). ("Under the doctrine of official immunity, a public official is not liable to members of the public for negligence that is strictly related to the performance of discretionary duties.") (citing Green, 738 S.W.2d at 865).

2016The court in Southers pointed out that “the doctrine of official immunity will not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption.” Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Mo. banc 2008); see also, e.g., Blue v. Harrah's North Kansas City, LLC, 170 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (“[O]fficial immunity does not apply to discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice.”); Stephens v. Dunn, 453 S.W.3d 241, 250 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (same); Conway v. St.

2016The court in Southers pointed out that “the doctrine of official immunity will not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption.” Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Mo. banc 2008); see also, e.g., Blue v. Harrah's North Kansas City, LLC, 170 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (“[O]fficial immunity does not apply to discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice.”); Stephens v. Dunn, 453 S.W.3d 241, 250 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (same); Conway v. St.

2015“Official immunity is only available to a public official when he exercises legitimate authority in a discretionary manner.” Id. at 731 (citing State v. Edwards, 337 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Mo.App.E.D.2011)).

2011“Whether an act can be characterized as discretionary depends on the degree of reason and judgment required.” Id. “[Official immunity is only available to a public official when he exercises legitimate authority in a discretionary manner.” State v. Edwards, 337 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Mo.App.

2016Absent allegations averring the existence of a statutory or departmentally-mandated duty and a breach of that duty, a petition fails “to state a claim that is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.” Boever, 296 S.W.3d at 492, quoting State ex rel.

2014However, in cases alleging tort against a government employee, the Missouri Supreme Court has further declared that absent allegations that a government employee violated “either a statutory or departmentally-mandated duty,” a plaintiffs petition is “insufficient to state a claim which is not barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law.” Adolf, 706 S.W.2d at 445 ; Boever, 296 S.W.3d at 492 ; see also Vaughn, 323 S.W.3d at 456 (holding for a petition alleging government employee liability to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the plaintiff must plead s

1997In Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo.banc 1983), the court cautioned the courts not to construe the term “discretionary” too narrowly in applying the doctrine of official immunity.

1997In Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo.banc 1983), the court cautioned the courts not to construe the term “discretionary” too narrowly in applying the doctrine of official immunity.

2019Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 614 n.13; Charron v. Thompson, 939 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Mo. banc 1996). 9 This focus on whether a duty is ministerial dominates many areas of law, not just the doctrine of official immunity.

2019Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 614 n.13; Charron v. Thompson, 939 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Mo. banc 1996). 9 This focus on whether a duty is ministerial dominates many areas of law, not just the doctrine of official immunity.

1997E.D.1994); and Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.App.1992)), and under the official immunity doctrine.

1993While they fully acknowledge that the public duty doctrine is still accepted in Missouri, plaintiffs contend “that the public duty doctrine is simply not applicable for common law torts brought under § 537.600(1).” 4 However, “[t]he abrogation of sovereign immunity [pursuant to § 537.600] in no way impliedly abrogated the public duty doctrine.” Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Mo.App.1992).

1996Sanders, 756 S.W.2d at 538 ; Bachmann v. Welby, 860 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo.App.1993).

1993Barthelette v. Sanders, 756 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Mo. banc 1988) (quoting Kanagawa v. State By and *587 Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 881 , 835 (Mo. banc 1985)).

2024Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Mo. App. 2017) (affirming summary judgment for defendants) (“The mere assertion of recklessness as a separate cause of action from negligence is insufficient to implicate the bad faith exception to application of the official immunity doctrine.”); McCormack v. Douglas, 328 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Mo. App. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for defendants) (“Appellants claim that Respondent’s violation of the District’s internal ‘Intersection Crossing Policy’ in driving through a stop sign without stopping was willfully wrong, in bad faith, or with malice.

2023Id. at 612 ; Throneberry, 526 S.W.3d at 206 ; see also Fowler, 504 S.W.3d at 109-10 . a.

2022A.F., 491 S.W.3d at 631 ; Kemp v. McReynolds, 621 S.W.3d 644 , 653 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021), transfer denied (June 1, 2021) (citing Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191).

2020Dist., 491 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Mo.App. 2016).

2016Conversely, “in a non- emergency situation, the operation of a vehicle does not require a public official to exercise policymaking or the exercise of professional expertise or judgment.” Id. (internal citations omitted); Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 619 (“The official immunity doctrine does not apply to police officers responding to non-emergencies, but it does apply if the officers are responding to an emergency.”); Thomas v. Brandt, 325 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (“When publicly- employed emergency medical personnel are treating patients, their negligent acts are protected by official i

2015Rhea v. Sapp, 463 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Mo.App.2015) (court rejected appellant’s argument that a departmental policy removed a fireman’s discretion or otherwise rendered the fireman’s activity ministerial).