Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1889–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whittington v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Price, 622 N.E.2d 954 (holding that defendant’s overall complaint, which included her statement that she had not done anything after being threatened with arrest, constituted political speech); see also Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 (discussing its earlier decision and stating: “In Price, the State conceded that Colleen Price was protesting police treatment of another citizen before an officer warned her to be quiet. 622 N.E.2d at 956-57 . 2004Although in that case a law enforcement officer was the individual giving the admo *430 nition to the defendant, the Whittington court couched the requirement in terms of an "official warning." See Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 ("[A] conviction for disorderly conduct requires proof of 'unreasonable noise' both before and after an official warning.") (emphasis supplied). | 2 | 2 |
Price v. Stategreen2 sentences2020After the warning, her expression did shift to a defense of her own conduct, id. at 957 , but a conviction for disorderly conduct requires proof of “unreasonable noise” both before and after an official warning. 1996After the warning, her expression did shift to a defense of her own conduct, id. at 957 , but a conviction for disorderly conduct requires proof of "unreasonable noise" both before and after an official warning. | 1 | 2 |
Pletan v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2014It is important to note, however, that the Georgia court reached its decision using the discretionary/ministerial act analysis expressly rejected by our supreme court in Peavler. 15 Finally, the School District cites Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn. 1992), where the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the school district’s district-wide bus-boarding policy entitled the school district to discretionary function immunity. 2014It is important to note, however, that the Georgia court reached its decision using the discretionary/ministerial act analysis expressly rejected by our supreme court in Peavler. 15 Finally, the School District cites Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn. 1992), where the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the school district’s district-wide bus-boarding policy entitled the school district to discretionary function immunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kelly v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2014The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, noting that “ ‘making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school children is a discretionary function of a school principal,’ ” and that “the teachers’ task to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga.App. 502, 506 , 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993)). 2014The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, noting that “ ‘making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school children is a discretionary function of a school principal,’ ” and that “the teachers’ task to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga.App. 502, 506 , 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Guthrie v. Irons
green
2 sentences2014The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, noting that “ ‘making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school children is a discretionary function of a school principal,’ ” and that “the teachers’ task to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga.App. 502, 506 , 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993)). 2014The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, noting that “ ‘making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school children is a discretionary function of a school principal,’ ” and that “the teachers’ task to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga.App. 502, 506 , 439 S.E.2d 732 (1993)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Radford v. State
green
1 sentence2000Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Muhler v. Hedekin
neutral
2 sentences1982In so holding the Court stated: “We are not, however, aware of any case in which it has been held that a court of chancery might entertain a bill to enjoin the removal ■ of a municipal officer against whom charges of misconduct in office had been preferred; on the contrary, the authorities uniformly hold that proceedings in the nature of an official inquiry concerning the conduct of an officer, by a common council or other body having cognizance of the subject, the possible end being the removal of the officer, are wholly beyond the control of a court of equity.” Id. at 485 , 20 N.E. at 701 . 1982In so holding the Court stated: “We are not, however, aware of any case in which it has been held that a court of chancery might entertain a bill to enjoin the removal ■ of a municipal officer against whom charges of misconduct in office had been preferred; on the contrary, the authorities uniformly hold that proceedings in the nature of an official inquiry concerning the conduct of an officer, by a common council or other body having cognizance of the subject, the possible end being the removal of the officer, are wholly beyond the control of a court of equity.” Id. at 485 , 20 N.E. at 701 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In Re Sawyer
green
1 sentence1889Thus, in In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 , as is correctly stated in the head-note, it was held that the circuit court of the United States had no jurisdiction or authority to entertain a bill in equity to restrain the mayor and committee of a city in Nebraska from removing a city officer upon charges filed against him for malfeasance in office, and an injunction issued on such a bill, as well as an order committing the defendants for contempt in disregarding the injunction, was absolutely void. | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.