official immunity in Vermont

1989That there is a distinction between sovereign immunity— which protects the state — and the doctrine of official immunity, which protects state employees in certain circumstances, was recognized in the recent case of Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 983 (1987).

1989That there is a distinction between sovereign immunity— which protects the state — and the doctrine of official immunity, which protects state employees in certain circumstances, was recognized in the recent case of Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 983 (1987).

2017See, e.g., Davis v. Strong, 31 Vt. 332 (1858); Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480 (1869); Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203…(1891); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309…(1942); Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173…(1972).… We recognize that the use of the doctrine may, at times, produce harsh results.

1989See, e.g., Davis v. Strong, 31 Vt. 332 (1858); Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480 (1869); Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203 , 23 A. 585 ; Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309 , 24 A.2d 352 ; Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173 , 287 A.2d 841 .

2024Indeed, “a prosecutor . . . must be afforded reasonable means to reach the decision to prosecute without fear of legal retaliation.” Id. at 194 n.7; see also Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1104 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Forsyth v. Decision on State’s Motion to Dismiss Page 8 of 10 23-CV-05407 Allen Pigeon v. The State of Vermont, et al Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 , 1215 (3d Cir. 1979) (“ ‘To grant a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity over his decision to initiate a prosecution while subjecting him to liability for securing the information necessary to make that decision would only foster uninform

2012Two years after Libercent , we addressed the official-immunity doctrine again in Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178 , 559 A.2d 1073 (1989), a case that remains in many respects the most comprehensive ruling of this Court on the subject.

2017See, e.g., Davis v. Strong, 31 Vt. 332 (1858); Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480 (1869); Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203…(1891); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309…(1942); Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173…(1972).… We recognize that the use of the doctrine may, at times, produce harsh results.

1989See, e.g., Davis v. Strong, 31 Vt. 332 (1858); Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480 (1869); Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203 , 23 A. 585 ; Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309 , 24 A.2d 352 ; Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173 , 287 A.2d 841 .

2024Indeed, “a prosecutor . . . must be afforded reasonable means to reach the decision to prosecute without fear of legal retaliation.” Id. at 194 n.7; see also Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1104 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Forsyth v. Decision on State’s Motion to Dismiss Page 8 of 10 23-CV-05407 Allen Pigeon v. The State of Vermont, et al Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 , 1215 (3d Cir. 1979) (“ ‘To grant a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity over his decision to initiate a prosecution while subjecting him to liability for securing the information necessary to make that decision would only foster uninform

2024Indeed, “a prosecutor . . . must be afforded reasonable means to reach the decision to prosecute without fear of legal retaliation.” Id. at 194 n.7; see also Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1104 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Forsyth v. Decision on State’s Motion to Dismiss Page 8 of 10 23-CV-05407 Allen Pigeon v. The State of Vermont, et al Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 , 1215 (3d Cir. 1979) (“ ‘To grant a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity over his decision to initiate a prosecution while subjecting him to liability for securing the information necessary to make that decision would only foster uninform

2017Section 5602(a) thus is a matter of pleading, as “under Vermont law, claims based on the actions of a state employee must generally lie against the state, not the individual employee who allegedly committed the harm.” Colby, 2008 VT 20, ¶ 6 ; see Tucker v. Decker, No. 16-1018, 2017 WL 1041809 , at *3 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2017) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s tort claims against state trooper defendant on grounds that “[t]ort claims may be brought against the individual employee instead of the state only for the employee’s ‘gross negligence or willful misconduct.’” (citing

2013See, e.g., Reader’s Digest, supra, 662 F.2d at 967 (absence of “good faith” where “the Digest nonetheless proceeded to complete its promotional campaign” after the FTC had explicitly warned it that the marketing devices were deceptive and probably unlawful); cf., e.g., People ex rel.

1997In granting judgment for defendant in this matter, the trial court held that defendant was protected from suit by the doctrine of official immunity. 4 Official immunity “is available in some circumstances to shield public officials from lawsuits against them based on their activities.” Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 183 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279 , 583 A.2d 82 (1990).

1997In granting judgment for defendant in this matter, the trial court held that defendant was protected from suit by the doctrine of official immunity. 4 Official immunity “is available in some circumstances to shield public officials from lawsuits against them based on their activities.” Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 183 , 559 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279 , 583 A.2d 82 (1990).

1990Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 81 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987) (“a discretionary duty ... requirfes] the exercise of judgment[;]... a ministerial duty [is] one where ‘nothing is left to discretion — a simple and definite duty . . . arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist.’”) (quoting State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14 , 74 A. 392, 395 (1909)).

1990Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 81 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987) (“a discretionary duty ... requirfes] the exercise of judgment[;]... a ministerial duty [is] one where ‘nothing is left to discretion — a simple and definite duty . . . arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist.’”) (quoting State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14 , 74 A. 392, 395 (1909)).

1989As the trial court noted in *184 its decision, the best articulation of the balance between the goals of redressing the evils done by public officials and promoting healthy decision-making by these officials was stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949): It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confin

1989In Libercent , we explicitly overruled that part of Cronin v. State, 148 Vt. 252, 257 , 531 A.2d 929, 932-33 (1987), which held that 12 V.S.A. § 5602’s sovereign immunity extended to state employees.

1989In Libercent , we explicitly overruled that part of Cronin v. State, 148 Vt. 252, 257 , 531 A.2d 929, 932-33 (1987), which held that 12 V.S.A. § 5602’s sovereign immunity extended to state employees.

1989“This Court may sustain the ruling of a trial court upon any legal ground even though the trial court may have based its ruling upon another ground.” State v. Greenia, 147 Vt. 596, 597 , 522 A.2d 242, 243 (1987).

1989“This Court may sustain the ruling of a trial court upon any legal ground even though the trial court may have based its ruling upon another ground.” State v. Greenia, 147 Vt. 596, 597 , 522 A.2d 242, 243 (1987).

1987Id. at 297 , 493 A.2d at 444 ; see DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So. 2d 391 (Ala. 1981); Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567 , 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984); Larson v. Independent School District, 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979); Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485 , 475 P.2d 78 (1970); Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525 , 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977); W.

1987See Marshall v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 424 , 160 A.2d 762, 769 (1960) (immunity of municipality does not attach to its employees); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 313 , 24 A.2d 352, 355 (1942); Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 246 , 164 A. 886, 887 (1933) (municipal officer is personally *81 liable for injuries caused by his negligence when the breached duty was ministerial).

1987See Marshall v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 424 , 160 A.2d 762, 769 (1960) (immunity of municipality does not attach to its employees); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 313 , 24 A.2d 352, 355 (1942); Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 246 , 164 A. 886, 887 (1933) (municipal officer is personally *81 liable for injuries caused by his negligence when the breached duty was ministerial).

1987See Marshall v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 424 , 160 A.2d 762, 769 (1960) (immunity of municipality does not attach to its employees); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 313 , 24 A.2d 352, 355 (1942); Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 246 , 164 A. 886, 887 (1933) (municipal officer is personally *81 liable for injuries caused by his negligence when the breached duty was ministerial).

1987See Marshall v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 424 , 160 A.2d 762, 769 (1960) (immunity of municipality does not attach to its employees); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 313 , 24 A.2d 352, 355 (1942); Ferraro v. Earle, 105 Vt. 243, 246 , 164 A. 886, 887 (1933) (municipal officer is personally *81 liable for injuries caused by his negligence when the breached duty was ministerial).