official immunity in Georgia

2023See id. at 123 (1) (referring to “[t]he doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity”; Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (referring to “official or qualified immunity”). 3 official immunity, we construe the evidence in favor of Schantz to determine whether “a genuine issue of material fact remains” as to Deloach’s “actual intent to cause injury” to Schantz.

2023See id. at 123 (1) (referring to “[t]he doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity”; Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (referring to “official or qualified immunity”). 3 official immunity, we construe the evidence in favor of Schantz to determine whether “a genuine issue of material fact remains” as to Deloach’s “actual intent to cause injury” to Schantz.

2022Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665 , 668 (2) ( 811 SE2d 9 ) (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord Austin, 294 Ga. at 774 . 5 plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.”8 Importantly, the issue of immunity is “a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”9 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that the doctrine of official immunity—also known as qualified immunity10—“offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.”11 And this type of immunity derives from a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: Except as specifically prov

2022Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665 , 668 (2) ( 811 SE2d 9 ) (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord Austin, 294 Ga. at 774 . 5 plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.”8 Importantly, the issue of immunity is “a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”9 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that the doctrine of official immunity—also known as qualified immunity10—“offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.”11 And this type of immunity derives from a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: Except as specifically prov

2022“The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.” McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.” McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See also Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 619 ( 697 SE2d 775 ) (2010) (“The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal [or individual] capacity.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

2025See also Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 619 ( 697 SE2d 775 ) (2010) (“The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal [or individual] capacity.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

1999Official immunity “protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice or corruption.” Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga. App. 502 -503 (1) ( 439 SE2d 732 ) (1993), disapproved on separate grounds, Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) (452' SE2d 476) (1994).

1999Official immunity “protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice or corruption.” Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga. App. 502 -503 (1) ( 439 SE2d 732 ) (1993), disapproved on separate grounds, Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) (452' SE2d 476) (1994).

2016See, e.g., Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 ( 469 SE2d 268 ) (1996) (“[T]he general task imposed on teachers to monitor, supervise, and control students has . . . been held to be a discretionary action which is protected by the doctrine of official immunity”).

2016See, e.g., Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 ( 469 SE2d 268 ) (1996) (“[T]he general task imposed on teachers to monitor, supervise, and control students has . . . been held to be a discretionary action which is protected by the doctrine of official immunity”).

2019See also Lathrop v. Deal , 301 Ga. 408 , 425, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) ("[A]s our precedents make clear, a suit against a state officer in his official capacity amounts to a suit against the State itself, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the State to which the State has not consented." (citation omitted) ). 7 Sun States now asserts that it brought its surcharge claim against the Insurance Commissioner and his deputies in their **132 personal capacities, thereby invoking the official immunity provision in OCGA § 33-37-8.1 (b) along with its exception for "liability caused

2019See also Lathrop v. Deal , 301 Ga. 408 , 425, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) ("[A]s our precedents make clear, a suit against a state officer in his official capacity amounts to a suit against the State itself, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the State to which the State has not consented." (citation omitted) ). 7 Sun States now asserts that it brought its surcharge claim against the Insurance Commissioner and his deputies in their **132 personal capacities, thereby invoking the official immunity provision in OCGA § 33-37-8.1 (b) along with its exception for "liability caused

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”

2014Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835 (2) ( 476 SE2d 592 ) (1996) (emphasis supplied); accord Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219, 225 (2) ( 617 SE2d 575 ) (2005), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197 ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007); see also Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 285 (1) ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007) (“The determination of whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is to be made on a case-by-case basis.” (punctuation omitted)); Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 ( 469 SE2d

2014Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835 (2) ( 476 SE2d 592 ) (1996) (emphasis supplied); accord Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219, 225 (2) ( 617 SE2d 575 ) (2005), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197 ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007); see also Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 285 (1) ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007) (“The determination of whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is to be made on a case-by-case basis.” (punctuation omitted)); Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 ( 469 SE2d

2025The issue of a government employee’s official immunity must therefore be resolved as the threshold issue in a suit against the employee in his personal capacity.” Roberson v. McIntosh County School Dist., 326 Ga. App. 874, 876 (1) ( 755 SE2d 304 ) (2014).

2025The issue of a government employee’s official immunity must therefore be resolved as the threshold issue in a suit against the employee in his personal capacity.” Roberson v. McIntosh County School Dist., 326 Ga. App. 874, 876 (1) ( 755 SE2d 304 ) (2014).

2022Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665 , 668 (2) ( 811 SE2d 9 ) (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord Austin, 294 Ga. at 774 . 5 plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.”8 Importantly, the issue of immunity is “a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”9 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that the doctrine of official immunity—also known as qualified immunity10—“offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.”11 And this type of immunity derives from a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: Except as specifically prov

2022Dist., 344 Ga. App. 665 , 668 (2) ( 811 SE2d 9 ) (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord Austin, 294 Ga. at 774 . 5 plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.”8 Importantly, the issue of immunity is “a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”9 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that the doctrine of official immunity—also known as qualified immunity10—“offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity.”11 And this type of immunity derives from a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: Except as specifically prov

1996The scope of this official immunity was clearly established in Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 ( 264 SE2d 878 ) (1980), and Holloway v. Dougherty County School System, 157 Ga. App. 251, 252-253 ( 277 SE2d 251 ) (1981).

1996The scope of this official immunity was clearly established in Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 ( 264 SE2d 878 ) (1980), and Holloway v. Dougherty County School System, 157 Ga. App. 251, 252-253 ( 277 SE2d 251 ) (1981).

2017See also Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 752 (6) (“The doctrine of official immunity... provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority” (Citations omitted)); Nelson v. Spalding County, 249 Ga. 334, 337 (2) (b) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982) (“Although a public officer is liable for damages to those injured by his omissions in performing ministerial duties, he is only liable for errors in the exercise of discretionary duties

2017See also Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 752 (6) (“The doctrine of official immunity... provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority” (Citations omitted)); Nelson v. Spalding County, 249 Ga. 334, 337 (2) (b) ( 290 SE2d 915 ) (1982) (“Although a public officer is liable for damages to those injured by his omissions in performing ministerial duties, he is only liable for errors in the exercise of discretionary duties

2023“Official immunity is applicable to government officials and employees sued in their individual capacities.” Stone, supra at 888 (2) (citation omitted).

2023“Official immunity is applicable to government officials and employees sued in their individual capacities.” Stone v. Taylor, 233 Ga. App. 886, 888 (2) ( 506 SE2d 161 ) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[O]fficial . . . immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability.

2022Howell v. Willis, 317 Ga. App. 199, 200 ( 729 SE2d 643 ) (2012).

2022Howell v. Willis, 317 Ga. App. 199, 200 ( 729 SE2d 643 ) (2012).

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”

2017Likewise, in Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 54-55 (5) ( 360 SE2d 624 ) (1987), a majority of the Court of Appeals held that the official immunity of a staff psychiatrist at Georgia Regional Hospital was waived in a medical malpractice case because the psychiatrist was insured.

2017Likewise, in Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 54-55 (5) ( 360 SE2d 624 ) (1987), a majority of the Court of Appeals held that the official immunity of a staff psychiatrist at Georgia Regional Hospital was waived in a medical malpractice case because the psychiatrist was insured.

2015Wendelken v. JENK LLC, 291 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) ( 661 SE2d 152 ) (2008).

2015Wendelken v. JENK LLC, 291 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) ( 661 SE2d 152 ) (2008).

2013Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). against them in their personal capacities when they are sued for discretionary acts taken within the scope of their employment and without actual intent to injure.

2013Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). against them in their personal capacities when they are sued for discretionary acts taken within the scope of their employment and without actual intent to injure.

1998“We have . . . consistently held that the task of school officials to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” (Punctuation omitted.) Payne v. Twiggs County School Dist., 232 Ga. App. 175, 177 ( 501 SE2d 550 ) (1998).

1998“We have . . . consistently held that the task of school officials to monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” (Punctuation omitted.) Payne v. Twiggs County School Dist., 232 Ga. App. 175, 177 ( 501 SE2d 550 ) (1998).

2017Official immunity generally applies "to government officials and employees sued in their individual capacities." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Glass v. Gates , 311 Ga. App. 563 , 574 (2), 716 S.E.2d 611 (2011).

2017Official immunity generally applies "to government officials and employees sued in their individual capacities." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Glass v. Gates , 311 Ga. App. 563 , 574 (2), 716 S.E.2d 611 (2011).

2001And “the general task imposed on teachers to monitor, supervise, and control students has also been held to be a discretionary action which is protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2001And “the general task imposed on teachers to monitor, supervise, and control students has also been held to be a discretionary action which is protected by the doctrine of official immunity.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2026Under the doctrine of official immunity (also known as qualified immunity), public employees “may be held personally liable for negligence relating to their official duties only when performing ‘ministerial’ acts; ‘discretionary’ acts are only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 848 (II) ( 809 SE2d 813 ) (2018). “[T]he single overriding factor 5 [in an official immunity analysis] is whether the specific act from which liability arises is dicretionary or ministerial.” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 420 (

2026Under the doctrine of official immunity (also known as qualified immunity), public employees “may be held personally liable for negligence relating to their official duties only when performing ‘ministerial’ acts; ‘discretionary’ acts are only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 848 (II) ( 809 SE2d 813 ) (2018). “[T]he single overriding factor 5 [in an official immunity analysis] is whether the specific act from which liability arises is dicretionary or ministerial.” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 420 (

2026Under the doctrine of official immunity (also known as qualified immunity), public employees “may be held personally liable for negligence relating to their official duties only when performing ‘ministerial’ acts; ‘discretionary’ acts are only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 848 (II) ( 809 SE2d 813 ) (2018). “[T]he single overriding factor 5 [in an official immunity analysis] is whether the specific act from which liability arises is dicretionary or ministerial.” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 420 (

2026Under the doctrine of official immunity (also known as qualified immunity), public employees “may be held personally liable for negligence relating to their official duties only when performing ‘ministerial’ acts; ‘discretionary’ acts are only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845, 848 (II) ( 809 SE2d 813 ) (2018). “[T]he single overriding factor 5 [in an official immunity analysis] is whether the specific act from which liability arises is dicretionary or ministerial.” Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 420 (

2022“The doctrine of official immunity, developed primarily in Georgia through case law, provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Owens v. City of Greenville, 290 Ga. 557, 560-561 (3) (b) ( 722 SE2d 755 ) (2012). 11 In pursuing judgment on the pleadings, Harrison claimed entitlement to official immunity, relying on Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33, 34 ( 518 SE2d 124 ) (199

2022“The doctrine of official immunity, developed primarily in Georgia through case law, provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Owens v. City of Greenville, 290 Ga. 557, 560-561 (3) (b) ( 722 SE2d 755 ) (2012). 11 In pursuing judgment on the pleadings, Harrison claimed entitlement to official immunity, relying on Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33, 34 ( 518 SE2d 124 ) (199

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”

2018See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[BJinding precedents of our Court are clear that discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”) (on motionfor reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 ( 643 SE2d 814 ) (2007)); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring, supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine of official immunity.’ ”