official immunity in Texas

2024The complex policy judgment reflected by the doctrine of official immunity, if it is to mean anything, protects officers from suit even if they acted negligently.”). 98 See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57 . 30 III.

2024The complex policy judgment reflected by the doctrine of official immunity, if it is to mean anything, protects officers from suit even if they acted negligently.”). 98 See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57 . 30 III.

2023Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); Harris Cnty., 2014 WL 4219472 , at *3; see also Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 , 460–61 (Tex. 2002) (“Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties.”).

2022Because appellees’ response addressed only the Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception and did not respond to the City’s official immunity argument, the City was entitled to summary judgment.21 When official immunity is proven as a matter of law, the alternative defense of the emergency exception to the waiver of immunity need not be addressed.22 18 See Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). 19 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 581 . 20 Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 467 . 21 See Salinas, 2022 WL 947195 , at *4-5 (DPS proved immunity; plaintiff’s response addressed only recklessness and whether re

2025See id.; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 460-61 (Tex. 2002) ("Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties.") (citing Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994)).

2025See id.; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 , 460- 61 (Tex. 2002) ("Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties.") (citing Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994)).

2025See id.; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 460-61 (Tex. 2002) ("Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties.") (citing Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994)).

2025See id.; Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 , 460- 61 (Tex. 2002) ("Official immunity is an affirmative defense that shields governmental employees from personal liability so that they are encouraged to vigorously perform their official duties.") (citing Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1994)).

2023See id. at 537–38 (“Official immunity is an affirmative defense that inures to all governmental employees who perform discretionary functions in good faith and within their authority.” (cleaned up)).

2012See City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. 1995) (citing DeWitt v. Harris Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995), for the proposition that a city can rely on the official immunity of its employees and agents).

2022Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467 ). “[W]hen the summary-judgment record bears competent evidence of good faith, that element of the official-immunity defense is established unless the plaintiff shows that no reasonable person in the officer’s position could have thought the facts justified the officer’s actions.” Id. at 643 (citing City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 657 (Tex. 1994)).

2022Plaintiffs’ entire argument is based on the emergency exception.” And in their appellate briefing, appellees make no attempt to justify the trial court’s ruling as to the official immunity grounds and indeed do not mention the words “good faith.” 6 E.g., Riojas, 640 S.W.3d at 539; Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997); Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 655 . 2 Wadewitz.7 According to the majority, Officer Corral’s affidavit failed to adequately address the risk of his vehicle’s brakes failing just before the accident.

2025Official immunity is a common-law concept that recognizes “the necessity of public officials to act in the public interest with confidence and without the hesitation that could arise from having their judgment continually questioned by extended litigation.” Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2004).

2011Official immunity increases the efficiency of employees because they need not spend time defending frivolous charges. 887 S.W.2d at 8 (citations omitted); see also Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex.2004) (stating that official immunity’s purpose is to ensure public officials “act in the public interest with confidence and without the hesitation that could arise from having their judgment continually questioned by extended litigation”); Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94 , 102 n. 4 (Tex.1992) (observing that official immunity serves the following important p

2012"Official immunity," "qualified immunity,” "quasi-judicial immunity,” "discretionary immunity,” and "good faith immunity” are "all terms used interchangeably to refer to the same affirmative defense available to governmental employees sued in their individual capacities.” Baylor College of Med. v. Hernandez, 208 S.W.3d 4 , 11 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810 , 812 n. 1 (Tex.1993).

2009A Immunity @ as used in this section refers to A official immunity. @ City of Houston v. Kilburn , 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993); Baylor College of Medicine v. Hernandez , 208 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2012See City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. 1995) (citing DeWitt v. Harris Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995), for the proposition that a city can rely on the official immunity of its employees and agents).

2012See City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara , 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. 1995) (citing DeWitt v. Harris Cnty. , 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995), for the proposition that a city can rely on the official immunity of its employees and agents).

2005Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.1994); Perry v. Tex. A & I Univ., 737 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).

2005Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.1994); Perry v. Tex. A & I Univ., 737 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2020Official immunity serves the critical purpose of protecting police officers for split-second decisions made in the line of duty so that officers do not “flinch from acting because of fear of liability.” Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (quoting Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, writ denied)).

2011Official immunity increases the efficiency of employees because they need not spend time defending frivolous charges. 887 S.W.2d at 8 (citations omitted); see also Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex.2004) (stating that official immunity’s purpose is to ensure public officials “act in the public interest with confidence and without the hesitation that could arise from having their judgment continually questioned by extended litigation”); Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94 , 102 n. 4 (Tex.1992) (observing that official immunity serves the following important p

2009Public policy underlies the doctrine of official immunity: “If administrative officials are held liable for their negligence, ‘the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties.’” Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. App.–Waco 1986, no writ) (quoting Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2009Public policy underlies the doctrine of official immunity: “If administrative officials are held liable for their negligence, ‘the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties.’” Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. App.–Waco 1986, no writ) (quoting Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2009Public policy underlies the doctrine of official immunity: “If administrative officials are held liable for their negligence, ‘the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties.’” Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. App.–Waco 1986, no writ) (quoting Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2009Public policy underlies the doctrine of official immunity: “If administrative officials are held liable for their negligence, ‘the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties.’” Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. App.–Waco 1986, no writ) (quoting Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2008Official immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” McCartney, M.D., 50 S.W.3d at 605 , quoting City of Lancaster , 883 S.W.2d at 656 .

2008Official immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” McCartney, M.D., 50 S.W.3d at 605 , quoting City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 656 .

2023As a result, we consider the first two elements of the official immunity analysis as established and focus only on whether the officers acted in good faith. 9 Good faith “Good faith is a test of objective legal reasonableness.” Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 643 .

2023Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (“Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects a governmental employee from personal liability and, in doing so, preserves a governmental employer’s sovereign immunity from suit for vicarious liability.”). “[O]fficial immunity is designed to protect public officials from being forced to defend their decisions that were reasonable when made, but upon which hindsight has cast a negative light.” Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 463 (Tex. 2002).

2020Official immunity serves the critical purpose of protecting police officers for split-second decisions made in the line of duty so that officers do not “flinch from acting because of fear of liability.” Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (quoting Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, writ denied)).

1997Official immunity, also referred to as quasi-judicial or qualified immunity, "evolved out of a public policy that encourages public officers to carry out their duties without fear of personal liability." Dear v. City of Irving , 902 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ) (quoting Carpenter v. Barner , 797 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. App.--Waco 1990, writ denied)). 2.

2021In a suit such as this, an employee’s official immunity therefore becomes relevant to the liability of his employer: a governmental unit “is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees only to the extent its employees are not entitled to official immunity.” See K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. 1994).

2019An employee’s official immunity therefore becomes relevant to the liability of his employer: a governmental unit “is vicariously liable for the acts of its 4 employees only to the extent its employees are not entitled to official immunity.” See K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. 1994).

2018Official immunity is an affirmative defense, and as such, the defendant has the burden of establishing every element of the defense. 15 City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994); City of Pasadena v. Belle, 297 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2018In the official immunity context, “good faith” requires the movant to “prove that a reasonably prudent officer might have believed his actions were justified under the circumstances.” Belle, 297 S.W.3d at 530 .

2023“The objective good faith element of the official immunity defense requires the defendant official to prove that a reasonable official under the same or similar circumstances could have believed the defendant’s conduct was justified.” Rodriguez, 344 S.W.3d at 490 (citing Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656–57).

2019Although we do not condone the negative comments by [defendants], the objective standard of good faith does not permit an inquiry into what subjectively could have motivated the [defendants’] decision.”); Rodriguez, 344 S.W.3d at 489 n.2 (officers’ subjective feelings, “whether they demonstrate subjective good faith or bad faith, are not relevant” to the official immunity inquiry).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (2004) 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1058 V.T.C.A., Government Code Title 2, Subtitle G App. A, Art. 10, § 9, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 94 Cases that cite this headnote 1.02. [19] Municipal Corporations 3 Cases that cite this headnote Duties and liabilities Official immunity protected city council member [15] Attorney and Client from liability to his law firm's client if the Acting for party adversely interested actions of which the client complained were Law firm owed no duty to inform client of (1) dis

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (2004) 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1058 V.T.C.A., Government Code Title 2, Subtitle G App. A, Art. 10, § 9, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 94 Cases that cite this headnote 1.02. [19] Municipal Corporations 3 Cases that cite this headnote Duties and liabilities Official immunity protected city council member [15] Attorney and Client from liability to his law firm's client if the Acting for party adversely interested actions of which the client complained were Law firm owed no duty to inform client of (1) dis

2007See Tex. State Technical Coll. v. Cressman, 172 S.W.3d 61, 64-65 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied) (holding that the scope of its jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) was limited to review of the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on appellants’ official immunity defense and did not extend to their contention that appellees had failed to state a claim for illegal eavesdropping); City of Alamo v. Holton, 934 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (holding that its interlocutory jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) was limited to reviewing the *627 merits of the city’

2007Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2006). 21: See Tex. State Technical Coll. v. Cressman, 172 S.W.3d 61, 64-65 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (holding that the scope of its jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) was limited to review of the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on appellants’ official immunity defense and did not extend to their contention that appellees had failed to state a claim for illegal eavesdropping); City of Alamo v. Holton, 934 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (holding that its interlocutory jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5)

2025“Where a governmental employee has no liability because of official immunity, the [employer] governmental entity is not liable under section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Act for that employee’s negligence.” Daniels, 66 S.W.3d at 425 .

2018Id. at 424- 25.

2020“Official immunity . . . is an affirmative defense protecting public officials from individual liability.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 380 (Tex. 2009). “[U]nlike sovereign immunity from suit, which . . . may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction, official immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled 11 and proved by the party asserting it.” Brown, 461 S.W.3d at 128 (citing City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994)).

2020And, as we discuss, the Reduses acknowledge that the University benefits from the official immunity that the Education Code confers on private university peace officers. 71 Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 123 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011)). 72 Harris Cty.

2023The complex policy judgment reflected by the doctrine of official immunity, if it is to mean anything, protects officers from suit even if they acted negligently.”); Ross, 2021 WL 4304478 , at *5; Chapman v. Gonzales, 824 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

2023The complex policy judgment reflected by the doctrine of official immunity, if it is to mean anything, protects officers from suit even if they acted negligently.”); Ross, 2021 WL 4304478 , at *5; Chapman v. Gonzales, 824 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

2022Safety v. Salinas, No. 04-21-00178-CV, 2022 WL 947195 , at *4-5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Harris County v. Avila, No. 14-18-00182- CV, 2019 WL 1030332 , at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Jackson v. City of Baytown, No. 14-14-00231-CV, 2015 WL 2169509 , at *5 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Royal v. Harris County, No. 14-08-00551- CV, 2010 WL 610604 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Johnson, 142 S.W.3d at 596 . 6 The burden therefore shifted

2022Because appellees’ response addressed only the Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception and did not respond to the City’s official immunity argument, the City was entitled to summary judgment.21 When official immunity is proven as a matter of law, the alternative defense of the emergency exception to the waiver of immunity need not be addressed.22 18 See Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). 19 Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 581 . 20 Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 467 . 21 See Salinas, 2022 WL 947195 , at *4-5 (DPS proved immunity; plaintiff’s response addressed only recklessness and whether re

1995City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Eakle v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 815 S.W.2d 869, 876 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (“Because we affirm summary judgment in favor of the individual appellees based on the doctrine of official immunity, we do not reach the appellant’s contention that the commissioners are liable under the doctrine of re-spondeat superior.”).

1995City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Eakle v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 815 S.W.2d 869, 876 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (“Because we affirm summary judgment in favor of the individual appellees based on the doctrine of official immunity, we do not reach the appellant’s contention that the commissioners are liable under the doctrine of re-spondeat superior.”).

2015Trevino, 217 S.W.3d at 596 .

2009See Trevino, 217 S.W.3d at 591 .

2022Id. at 744–46.

2016Id.