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14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Horner v. NORTHERN PAC. ETC. HOSP., INC.green1 sentence2019In Horner, the Washington Supreme Court identified three situations where negligence could be inferred without affirmative proof, thereby satisfying the first element of the doctrine: (1) When the act causing the injury is so palpably negligent that it may be inferred as a matter of law, i.e., leaving foreign objects, sponges, scissors, etc., in the body, or amputation of a wrong member; (2) when the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence; and (3) when proof by experts in an esoteric field creates an inference that neglige | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Laplant
green
2 sentences2014State v. LaPlant, 157 Wn. 2014State v. LaPlant, 157 Wn. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Grimsby v. Samson
green
2 sentences2002Although the three elements are fact questions for the jury, this first element of the test goes to the jury only after the court "determine[s] if reasonable minds could differ on whether the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result in liability." Id. 2002Although the three elements are fact questions for the jury, this first element of the test goes to the jury only after the court “determine [s] if reasonable minds could differ on whether the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result in liability.” Id. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Robel v. Roundup Corp.
green
2 sentences2002Here, the trial court entered factual findings in Robel's favor on the three elements, CP at 1336-37 (Findings of Fact 51, 52, 57, 59, 60), but the Court of Appeals reversed, determining as a matter of law that "reasonable minds could not differ on whether the conduct was so extreme as to result in liability." Robel, 103 Wash.App. at 90 , 10 P.3d 1104 . *620 While the standard for an outrage claim is admittedly very high (by which we mean that the conduct supporting the claim must be appallingly low), we disagree with the Court of Appeals on the threshold legal question and conclude that reaso 2002Here, the trial court entered factual findings in Robel’s favor on the three elements, CP at 1336-37 (findings of fact 51, 52, 57, 59, 60), but the Court of Appeals reversed, determining as a matter of law that “reasonable minds could not differ on whether the conduct was so extreme as to result in liability.” Robel, 103 Wn. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Dicomes v. State
green
2 sentences2000Dicomes, 113 Wn.2d at 630 . 2000Dicomes, 113 Wash.2d at 630 , 782 P.2d 1002 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2017Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 28 Id. at 697 . 27 Id. at 688 . 28 Id. at 689 . 7 No. 76736-4-1/8 no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel's performance."29 But the defendant must show this or any other deficiency based on the record established in the proceedings below.33 Determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact.31 We review de novo whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counse1.32 In each challenge, Fisher fails to satisfy the first element of this test and thus we need not consider the second, regarding prejudice. 2017Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 28 Id. at 697 . 27 Id. at 688 . 28 Id. at 689 . 7 No. 76736-4-1/8 no conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel's performance."29 But the defendant must show this or any other deficiency based on the record established in the proceedings below.33 Determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact.31 We review de novo whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counse1.32 In each challenge, Fisher fails to satisfy the first element of this test and thus we need not consider the second, regarding prejudice. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Boswell
green
1 sentence2017State v. Boswell, 185 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co.
green
1 sentence2016Meisel. 97 Wn.2d at 410 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Levy
green
1 sentence2014He bases his argument primarily upon Becker and State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709 , 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Levy
green
1 sentence2014He bases his argument primarily upon Becker and State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709 , 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. GARY JE
neutral
1 sentence2012App. 258, 262 , 991 P.2d 1220 (2000). ¶31 The first element of the test is not met in this case. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Equipto Division Aurora Equipment Co. v. Yarmouth
green
1 sentence2011“Once dissolved, the corporation ‘continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under RCW 23B.14.050 and notify claimants under RCW 23B.14.060.’ ” Equipto, 134 Wn.2d at 362 (quoting former RCW 23B. 14.210(3) (1989)). ¶26 In analyzing RCW 23B.02.040, Equipto found the first element of a claim—that a defendant “ ‘purport [s] to act as or on behalf of a corporation’ ”—to be straightforward. 134 Wn.2d at 364. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Robel v. Roundup Corp.
green
1 sentence2002Here, the trial court entered factual findings in Robel's favor on the three elements, CP at 1336-37 (Findings of Fact 51, 52, 57, 59, 60), but the Court of Appeals reversed, determining as a matter of law that "reasonable minds could not differ on whether the conduct was so extreme as to result in liability." Robel, 103 Wash.App. at 90 , 10 P.3d 1104 . *620 While the standard for an outrage claim is admittedly very high (by which we mean that the conduct supporting the claim must be appallingly low), we disagree with the Court of Appeals on the threshold legal question and conclude that reaso | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Holland v. Niemi
green
2 sentences1970Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn.2d 85 , 345 P.2d 1106 (1959); Schock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.2d 599, 616 , 105 P.2d 838 (1940). 1970Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn.2d 85 , 345 P.2d 1106 (1959); Schock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.2d 599, 616 , 105 P.2d 838 (1940). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Schock v. Ringling Bros. Etc.
neutral
2 sentences1970Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn.2d 85 , 345 P.2d 1106 (1959); Schock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.2d 599, 616 , 105 P.2d 838 (1940). 1970Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn.2d 85 , 345 P.2d 1106 (1959); Schock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.2d 599, 616 , 105 P.2d 838 (1940). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.