first element analysis in Kansas

2025"The first element of this analysis ultimately affects the last one 'in that whether a party has preserved an issue for review will have an impact on the standard by which we determine whether an error is reversible.'" State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216 , 223, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) (quoting State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 377 , 353 P.3d 1108 [2015]).

2025"The first element of this analysis ultimately affects the last one 'in that whether a party has preserved an issue for review will have an impact on the standard by which we determine whether an error is reversible.'" State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216 , 223, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) (quoting State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 377 , 353 P.3d 1108 [2015]).

2025"The first element of this analysis ultimately affects the last one 'in that whether a party has preserved an issue for review will have an impact on the standard by which we determine whether an error is reversible.'" State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216 , 223, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) (quoting State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 377 , 353 P.3d 1108 [2015]).

2022"The first element of this analysis ultimately affects the last one 'in that whether a party has preserved an issue for review will have an impact on the standard by which we determine whether an error is reversible.'" State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216 , 223, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) (quoting State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 377 , 353 P.3d 1108 [2015]). 11 Hilyard argues that the failure to give her requested instruction was clearly erroneous, and the State has not disputed her ability to raise that claim for the first time on appeal.

2021Where a defendant preserves an objection, "any error is reversible only if this court determines that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record." State v. Stanley, 312 Kan. 557 , 562, 478 P.3d 324 (2020).

2020When reviewing jury instructions: "'(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine

2020When reviewing jury instructions: "'(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine

2019Rather, she argues that the Tran panel "unjustifiably extended the rationale and holding in Griffin , which merely upheld a lower standard of reasonableness than that of probable cause and did not endorse suspicionless searches of probationers by probation officers." But in Griffin , the United States Supreme *1112 Court was clear: "A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant an

2019Rather, she argues that the Tran panel "unjustifiably extended the rationale and holding in Griffin , which merely upheld a lower standard of reasonableness than that of probable cause and did not endorse suspicionless searches of probationers by probation officers." But in Griffin , the United States Supreme *1112 Court was clear: "A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant an

2019As for the first element of this exception, Hinnenkamp does not explicitly dispute that the statutory scheme controlling probationers has " 'special needs [that] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' " See Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2452 .