first element test in Texas

2003Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88 ; Hernandez , 726 S.W.2d at 55; Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2003Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88 ; Hernandez , 726 S.W.2d at 55; Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

1999To satisfy the first element of the test, appellant must show that the record establishes that trial counsel failed to provide “reasonably effective assistance.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

1999To satisfy the first element of the test, appellant must show that the record establishes that trial counsel failed to provide “reasonably effective assistance.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

1995"The first element of this test requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have delayed or denied the claimant's benefits." Id.

1995“The first element of this test requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have delayed or denied the claimant’s benefits.” Id.

1999See id. at 687-88 ; Hernandez , 926 S.W.2d at 55; Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

1998See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88 ; Hernandez , 926 S.W.2d at 55; Wilkerson v. State , 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) (“A fiduciary relationship exists between attorney and client.”).

2010See Willis v. Maverick , 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) ("A fiduciary relationship exists between attorney and client.").

2007See Jordan v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc. , 89 S.W.3d 737 , 742–43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding plaintiff failed to show existence of wrongful act); Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop.

2007See Jordan v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742-43 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (holding plaintiff failed to show existence of wrongful act); Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop.

2007See Prime Products, 97 S.W.3d at 636 . 2.

2007See Prime Products , 97 S.W.3d at 636 . 2.

2025See, e.g., Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191 , 199 (Tex. 2022) (“Texas law has long recognized an exception to this particularity requirement for taxpayers seeking to ‘enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds.’” (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 ) (emphasis added)); Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179 (“Taxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, and need not demonstrate a particularized injury.”) (emphasis added); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 (“a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without showing a distin

2025See, e.g., Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191 , 199 (Tex. 2022) (“Texas law has long recognized an exception to this particularity requirement for taxpayers seeking to ‘enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds.’” (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 ) (emphasis added)); Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179 (“Taxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, and need not demonstrate a particularized injury.”) (emphasis added); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 (“a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without showing a distin

2025See, e.g., Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191 , 199 (Tex. 2022) (“Texas law has long recognized an exception to this particularity requirement for taxpayers seeking to ‘enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds.’” (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 ) (emphasis added)); Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179 (“Taxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, and need not demonstrate a particularized injury.”) (emphasis added); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 (“a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without showing a distin

2023See id. § 417.001(a); see also Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex., Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983) (providing that employee may seek recovery from third party whose negligence contributed to injury); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985) (“The [Act] is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries with the exception of intentional injury.”); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996) (holding injured employee may recover workers’ compensation benefits in addition to seeking liability against co-worker for intentional tort). 4 Whether Gonzalez was an “em

2023See id. § 417.001(a); see also Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex., Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983) (providing that employee may seek recovery from third party whose negligence contributed to injury); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985) (“The [Act] is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries with the exception of intentional injury.”); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996) (holding injured employee may recover workers’ compensation benefits in addition to seeking liability against co-worker for intentional tort). 4 Whether Gonzalez was an “em

2023See id. § 417.001(a); see also Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex., Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983) (providing that employee may seek recovery from third party whose negligence contributed to injury); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985) (“The [Act] is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries with the exception of intentional injury.”); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996) (holding injured employee may recover workers’ compensation benefits in addition to seeking liability against co-worker for intentional tort). 4 Whether Gonzalez was an “em

2022Bank–Houston v. Stevens, 781 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied). –7– foreclosure claim to the jury and in refusing to submit appellants’ proposed question on the first element of the claim only, and recognizing appellants do not address the second and third elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim, it is not necessary for us to determine whether the evidence conclusively established there were defects in the foreclosure process.

2021See Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at 439 .

2020Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (noting that, for constitutional reasons, a defendant who establishes that it did not receive notice of the trial setting is not required to prove a meritorious defense); Midland Funding LLC v. Gonzales, No. 11-16-00044-CV, 2017 WL 4440198 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Eastland Sept. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A person who is not notified of a trial setting and consequently suffers a default judgment need not establish a meritorious defense or lack of prejudice to the opposing party to be entitled to a new trial.”).

2020See id.

2019See Duradril, 516 S.W.3d at 169 .

2017See Rutherford Invs., Inc., 25 S.W.3d at 849 .

2015See Casiano v. AT & T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.2000); Bartkowiak v. Quantum Chem.