first element doctrine in New Jersey

2026The first element of the doctrine is satisfied if NJM establishes "that it is more probable than not that . . . [JCP&L 's] negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap." Ibid. (quoting Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 291-92 (1984)).

2024Rather, expert testimony can satisfy the first element of the doctrine when the "medical community recognizes that an event does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence." Ibid. (quoting Buckelew, 87 N.J. at 527 ).

2026The first element of the doctrine is satisfied if plaintiff establishes "that it is more probable than not that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap." Jerista 185 N.J. at 192 (quoting Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 291-92 (1984)).

2024The first element of the doctrine is satisfied if plaintiff establishes "that it is more probable than not that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap." Jerista, 185 N.J. at 192 (quoting Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 291-92 (1984)).

2024The judge explained she was "not moved" by defendant's submissions regarding "her history of involvement with counselors and therapists" and found defendant's requests for relief "could have been submitted earlier." The judge also found plaintiff had been prejudiced by her delay, indicating he could not "go back and ask . . . if there's coverage." Considering the first element of the doctrine of laches, whether there was a "failure to assert a right within a reasonable time," Clarke, 359 N.J.

2015Ed. 2d at 689 ; Ellerth, supra, 524 U.S. at 765 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 , 141 L.

2015Ed. 2d at 689 ; Ellerth, supra, 524 U.S. at 765 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 , 141 L.

2015Ed. 2d at 655.] The Supreme Court further commented that [w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. [Faragher, supra, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2293 , 141 L.

1999For that reason, in Erickson we found it necessary to modify the first element of the test in order to accommodate a claim of reverse gender-based discrimination. 117 N.J. at 551 , 569 A.2d 793 .

1999For that reason, in Erickson we found it necessary to modify the first element of the test in order to accommodate a claim of reverse gender-based discrimination. 117 N.J. at 551 , 569 A.2d 793 .

1999In Erickson, we noted that the rationale underlying the first element of a prima facie case “reflects ‘[congressional efforts to address this nation’s history of discrimination against racial minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched that we presume acts, otherwise unexplained, embody its effect.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 , 67 (6th *214 Cir.1985)).