period bar in Alabama

1985The defendant cited to the trial court the case of Papastefan v. B & L Construction Company, 385 So.2d 966 (Ala.1980), as authority for the ground of its objection.

1983Where the statute of limitations is raised as a defense in such a case, it is "incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that [his] cause of action accrued within the period of the bar." Papastefan, supra at 967 .

1988The Association's contention is that the interest conveyed by its royalty deed does not vest within the period of the rule because it "is contingent both upon the production of oil, gas or other minerals on the lands and upon the execution of future leases [1] covering said land, neither of which is required to occur within the time limit." This argument derives from two Kansas cases: Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419 , 227 P.2d 136 (1951), and Cosgrove v. Young, 230 Kan. 705 , 642 P.2d 75 (1982).

1988The Association's contention is that the interest conveyed by its royalty deed does not vest within the period of the rule because it "is contingent both upon the production of oil, gas or other minerals on the lands and upon the execution of future leases [1] covering said land, neither of which is required to occur within the time limit." This argument derives from two Kansas cases: Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419 , 227 P.2d 136 (1951), and Cosgrove v. Young, 230 Kan. 705 , 642 P.2d 75 (1982).

1988The Association's contention is that the interest conveyed by its royalty deed does not vest within the period of the rule because it "is contingent both upon the production of oil, gas or other minerals on the lands and upon the execution of future leases [1] covering said land, neither of which is required to occur within the time limit." This argument derives from two Kansas cases: Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419 , 227 P.2d 136 (1951), and Cosgrove v. Young, 230 Kan. 705 , 642 P.2d 75 (1982).

1988The Association's contention is that the interest conveyed by its royalty deed does not vest within the period of the rule because it "is contingent both upon the production of oil, gas or other minerals on the lands and upon the execution of future leases [1] covering said land, neither of which is required to occur within the time limit." This argument derives from two Kansas cases: Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419 , 227 P.2d 136 (1951), and Cosgrove v. Young, 230 Kan. 705 , 642 P.2d 75 (1982).

1978Hatch v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 253 Ala. 495 , 45 So.2d 291 (1950).

1978Hatch v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 253 Ala. 495 , 45 So.2d 291 (1950).

1977Co., 139 Me. 388 , 34 A.2d 682 (1943). “ . . .By reference to the textbooks and cases, it seems to be the settled rule, both in England and this country, that seven years is the period at which the presumption of continued life ceases; but this period may be shortened by the proof of such facts and circumstances connected with the person whose life is the subject of inquiry, as, when submitted to the test of reason and experience, would force the conviction of death within a shorter period.

1977Co., 139 Me. 388 , 34 A.2d 682 (1943). “ . . .By reference to the textbooks and cases, it seems to be the settled rule, both in England and this country, that seven years is the period at which the presumption of continued life ceases; but this period may be shortened by the proof of such facts and circumstances connected with the person whose life is the subject of inquiry, as, when submitted to the test of reason and experience, would force the conviction of death within a shorter period.

1926(Italics ours.) True, counsel for appellee insist that the quotations above from the Henry v. McNamara Case are dicta, but, even so, if they afford information as to the views of the Supreme Court on the question under consideration, which seems not heretofore to have been directly decided in this state, it would be the plain statutory duty of this court to follow them. *582 But we think the even later case of First National Bank v. Dimmick, 177 Ala. 571 , 58 So. 658 , is ample authority for the holding we shall presently announce.

1926(Italics ours.) True, counsel for appellee insist that the quotations above from the Henry v. McNamara Case are dicta, but, even so, if they afford information as to the views of the Supreme Court on the question under consideration, which seems not heretofore to have been directly decided in this state, it would be the plain statutory duty of this court to follow them. *582 But we think the even later case of First National Bank v. Dimmick, 177 Ala. 571 , 58 So. 658 , is ample authority for the holding we shall presently announce.

1912In such case the analogy upon which equity, before the statute of limitations was made applicable to its remedies, attributed laches — a species of estoppel — to the complainant who delayed beyond, the period of limitation, required also that, where the delay had been short of that time, the special circumstance, the change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties, which would render interference inequitable, should be brought forward in the way of defense. — Fowler v. Alabama Co., 164 Ala. 414 , 51 South. 393 .

1912In such case the analogy upon which equity, before the statute of limitations was made applicable to its remedies, attributed laches — a species of estoppel — to the complainant who delayed beyond, the period of limitation, required also that, where the delay had been short of that time, the special circumstance, the change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties, which would render interference inequitable, should be brought forward in the way of defense. — Fowler v. Alabama Co., 164 Ala. 414 , 51 South. 393 .

1912At an earlier period the rule, in this respect, seems to have been otherwise. — Powell v. Allred, 11 Ala. 318 ; Strickland v. Nance, 19 Ala. 233 ; Tutwiler v. Montgomery, 73 Ala. 263, 268, 269.

1912At an earlier period the rule, in this respect, seems to have been otherwise. — Powell v. Allred, 11 Ala. 318 ; Strickland v. Nance, 19 Ala. 233 ; Tutwiler v. Montgomery, 73 Ala. 263, 268, 269.

1909In each case the plaintiff must show facts which .avoid the effect of the plea, and, if he relies on a parol contract, the burden is on him to establish a contract not required by the statute to be in writing. — Jonas v. Field, 83 Ala. 445 , 3 South. 893 .

1889Gordon v. Ross, 63 Ala. 363 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 .

1889Gordon v. Ross, 63 Ala. 363 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 .

1886The subsequent payment of the debt 2’elates to the date of the suretyship, and constitutes him a creditor, who may avoid a fraudulent conveyance, though made during the period his claim was contingent. — Jenkins v. Lockard, 66 Ala. 377 ; Keel v. Larkin, 72 Ala. 493 .

1886The subsequent payment of the debt 2’elates to the date of the suretyship, and constitutes him a creditor, who may avoid a fraudulent conveyance, though made during the period his claim was contingent. — Jenkins v. Lockard, 66 Ala. 377 ; Keel v. Larkin, 72 Ala. 493 .

1874Smoot & Nicholson v. Lecatt, 1 Stew. 590 .