period bar in Oklahoma

2016Hurst v. Stowers, 1965 OK 30 , 399 P.2d 477 . §11 The clear weight of the evidence in this case shows that the road at *1169 issue was created by permission.

1989As stated by the Supreme Court in Hurst v. Stowers, 399 P.2d 477 (Okla.1965), at page 480: To establish an easement for roadway by prescription, the land in question must have been used by the public with the actual or implied knowledge of the landowners, adversely under claim or color of right, and not merely by the owners’ permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly, for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.

2007Even after county maintenance was discontinued in 1974, "anybody" and "everybody" continued using the road another 18 years until Mr. Wilson installed the gates in 1992. "119 It is well settled that "[a] public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner's permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise presc

2007Even after county maintenance was discontinued in 1974, "anybody" and "everybody" continued using the road another 18 years until Mr. Wilson installed the gates in 1992. "119 It is well settled that "[a] public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner's permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise presc

2014Historical Supreme Court Interpretation of the Bonding Statute ¶ 14 Further inquiry regarding the period in which a claim against the Bond may be filed reveals that, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1968 OK 23, 15 , 442 P.2d 303 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: [{TJhe limitation provision for bringing the action referred to in 61 0.8.1961, §§ 1 and 2, is subject to waiver and estoppel where the necessary facts are established as in other instances of the application of waiver and estoppel to a statute of limitation.

2014Historical Supreme Court Interpretation of the Bonding Statute ¶ 14 Further inquiry regarding the period in which a claim against the Bond may be filed reveals that, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1968 OK 23, 15 , 442 P.2d 303 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: [{TJhe limitation provision for bringing the action referred to in 61 0.8.1961, §§ 1 and 2, is subject to waiver and estoppel where the necessary facts are established as in other instances of the application of waiver and estoppel to a statute of limitation.

1966To support the correctness of the judgment plaintiff relies upon Liggett v. Peck, 197 Okl. 74 , 168 P.2d 622 , wherein syllabus 1 states the rule: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Also cited are Seaman v. Chesnu

1966To support the correctness of the judgment plaintiff relies upon Liggett v. Peck, 197 Okl. 74 , 168 P.2d 622 , wherein syllabus 1 states the rule: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Also cited are Seaman v. Chesnu

1966To support the correctness of the judgment plaintiff relies upon Liggett v. Peck, 197 Okl. 74 , 168 P.2d 622 , wherein syllabus 1 states the rule: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Also cited are Seaman v. Chesnu

1966To support the correctness of the judgment plaintiff relies upon Liggett v. Peck, 197 Okl. 74 , 168 P.2d 622 , wherein syllabus 1 states the rule: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim or color of right and not merely with the owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Also cited are Seaman v. Chesnu

1965In Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Lloyd, Old., 322 P.2d 406 , in t-he syllabus we liqld: “To establish an easement for roadway by prescription, the land in question must have been used by the public with the actual or implied knowledge of the landowners, adversely under claim dr color of right, and not merely by the owners’ permission, and continuously and'uninterruptedly, for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of possession of land or otherwise prescribed by .statute; when these conditions are present, the easement' for roadway exists by prescription, othe

1965The case of Messinger v. Messinger, Okl., 341 P.2d 601, 604 , contains certain language we consider applicable to the instant case as follows: “In ordinary cases of equitable cognizance, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly against the weight of the evi *481 dence, but where, as here, a particular fact is required to be established by proof of a certain degree or character, the two rules must be taken and considered together, and in such cases this court upon appeal will weigh the evidence and determine whether or not the proof conforms to the required

1965In Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Lloyd, Old., 322 P.2d 406 , in t-he syllabus we liqld: “To establish an easement for roadway by prescription, the land in question must have been used by the public with the actual or implied knowledge of the landowners, adversely under claim dr color of right, and not merely by the owners’ permission, and continuously and'uninterruptedly, for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of possession of land or otherwise prescribed by .statute; when these conditions are present, the easement' for roadway exists by prescription, othe

1956In Kisner v. McCurry, 196 Okl. 210 , 163 P.2d 963 , the first syllabus states: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used-by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim of color of right and not merely -with the. owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Defendant’s uninterrupted, adverse possession’ was sufficient to establish title by prescription.

1956In Kisner v. McCurry, 196 Okl. 210 , 163 P.2d 963 , the first syllabus states: “A public highway may be established by prescription in Oklahoma if the land is actually used-by the public for that purpose, with the knowledge of the owner, actual or implied, adversely under a claim of color of right and not merely -with the. owner’s permission, and continuously and uninterruptedly for the period required to bar an action for the recovery of the possession of land or otherwise prescribed by statute.” Defendant’s uninterrupted, adverse possession’ was sufficient to establish title by prescription.