period rule in Illinois

1915In the case of Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill. 439 , it was held that under section 1 of the Limitation statute a deed is not necessary to transfer the possession of land held adversely to the owner, and where one person succeeds to the possession of another and. it becomes necessary to connect the possession of the two to make the period required to bar the owner, the transfer of possession may be shown by parol evidence.

1900In Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill. 439 , it was held that a deed is not necessary to transfer the possession of land held adversely to the owner, and that where land is held adversely by different occupants and one succeeds to the possession of "another, the identity and continuity of their possession, in order to make the period required to bar the owner, may be shown by parol evidence.” Under this rule and the evidence in the record before us, we are of opinion that appellants here may avail themselves of such prior possession as their predecessors had.

2023The court held that because the trial court acted without authority to grant this extension, as the motion was filed outside the period allowed by the rule, the trial court’s order was “void and without effect.” Id.

2020Section 5 of the Statute provides the following with respect to trusts: “(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this Section, a trust containing any limitation which, but for this paragraph (a), would violate the rule against perpetuities *** shall terminate at the expiration of a period of (A) 21 years after the death of the last to die of all the beneficiaries of the instrument who were living at the date when the period of the rule against perpetuities commenced to run ***.” Id. § 5(a)(A).

2020As defined in the Statute, a trust “means any trust created by any written instrument, including, without limitation, a trust created by the exercise of a power of appointment.” Id. § 3(a). ¶ 42 “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The best indicator of the legislature’s intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” Rushton v. Department of Corrections, 2019 IL App (4th) 180206, ¶ 28 , 123 N.E.3d 1171 .

2020As defined in the Statute, a trust “means any trust created by any written instrument, including, without limitation, a trust created by the exercise of a power of appointment.” Id. § 3(a). ¶ 42 “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The best indicator of the legislature’s intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” Rushton v. Department of Corrections, 2019 IL App (4th) 180206, ¶ 28 , 123 N.E.3d 1171 .

2010People v. Walter, 335 Ill.

2010People v. Walter, 335 Ill.

2002Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 .

2002Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 .

1975City National Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 337 Ill. 442 , 169 N.E. 197 (1929).

1975City National Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 337 Ill. 442 , 169 N.E. 197 (1929).

1966Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill 256, 13 NE2d 487 .

1932(Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149 ; Eldred v. Meek, 183 id. 26; Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 id. 39; Dime Savings and Trust Co. v. Watson, 254 id. 419; Easton v. Hall, 323 id. 397; Gray’s Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 201.) By item 27 of his will the testator undertakes to dispose of all the residue of his estate, and in so doing devises and bequeaths it to the First National Bank of Danville in trust, to convert the real estate into cash or interest-bearing securities, “whenever the general business conditions of the country malee it advisable or desirable to sell such real estate.” He mentions t

1925Div. 562, and cases based thereon, such as Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362 , Barton v. Thaw, 41 Pa. Co. Ct. 396 , and Starcher v. Duty, 61 W.

1925Div. 562, and cases based thereon, such as Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362 , Barton v. Thaw, 41 Pa. Co. Ct. 396 , and Starcher v. Duty, 61 W.

1912(Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 630 .) It is an essential element of laches that the parties charged with it should have knowledge. ( Wright v. Stice, 173 Ill. 571 .) As a general rule, where the statute has fixed the period of limitation under which a claim in a court of law will be barred, courts of equity, by analogy, will adopt the limitation 'thus fixed, but they will often adopt a less period as a bar on the ground of discouraging stale claims or gross laches or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right.

1912(Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287 .) It is only when the delay is accompanied by some other element rendering it inequitable to permit the owner to assert his title that the laches will bar his right within the statutory period.

1912(Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 630 .) It is an essential element of laches that the parties charged with it should have knowledge. ( Wright v. Stice, 173 Ill. 571 .) As a general rule, where the statute has fixed the period of limitation under which a claim in a court of law will be barred, courts of equity, by analogy, will adopt the limitation 'thus fixed, but they will often adopt a less period as a bar on the ground of discouraging stale claims or gross laches or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right.