sensitive inquiry in California

2025(Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 225 .) “[T]he mere fact that appellant found [himself] 41 confined in a hospital rather than a prison does not eliminate the need to protect [him] against false confinement.” (Id. at p. 227, italics omitted.) Because pretrial confinement has different ramifications depending on its context, Camacho concluded that “[d]etermining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting from pretrial custody therefore requires a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances of the case.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393.) For example, individuals who have never been adjudicate

2025(Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 225 .) “[T]he mere fact that appellant found [himself] 41 confined in a hospital rather than a prison does not eliminate the need to protect [him] against false confinement.” (Id. at p. 227, italics omitted.) Because pretrial confinement has different ramifications depending on its context, Camacho concluded that “[d]etermining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting from pretrial custody therefore requires a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances of the case.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393.) For example, individuals who have never been adjudicate

2020(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 239-244, 246, 247, 253, 255, 263 (Miller-El).) The trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments to justify every instance in which it accepts as genuine the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, but “ ‘[w]hen the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/B

2019(Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477 (Snyder); Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 328-329 .) "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." (Snyder, at p. 478, citing Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239 .) " 'Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial . . . evidence of intent as may be available.' " (Foster v. Chatman (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1748 (Fost

2025(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., ante, at pp. 4-6.) The majority’s deferential analysis is also out of step with numerous decisions, both state 5 and federal6 which have 5 See, e.g., People v. Tennille (2016) 315 Mich.App. 51, 67, 68 (“the trial court is tasked with engaging in a more penetrating analysis” and “may not simply ‘accept’ a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation and terminate the inquiry there”); Cook v. State, (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2012) 104 So. 3d 1187, 1190 (trial court’s statement “ ‘I think it’s race-neutral’ ” did not “perform[] a genuineness analysis pursuant to step three”); Williams v.

2020Third, if the party has offered a nondiscriminatory reason, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) Courts must “undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’ ” (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 93 .) A defendant may rely on “ ‘all relevant circumstances’ ” to meet his or her burden of persuasion, including the prosecutor’s disproportionate use of strikes against a particular racial or ethnic group; side-by-side

2020(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 239-244, 246, 247, 253, 255, 263 (Miller-El).) The trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments to justify every instance in which it accepts as genuine the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, but “ ‘[w]hen the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/B

2020(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 , 239-244, 246, 247, 253, 255, 263 (Miller-El).) The trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments to justify every instance in which it accepts as genuine the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, but “ ‘[w]hen the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/B

2019(Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477 (Snyder); Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 328-329 .) "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." (Snyder, at p. 478, citing Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239 .) " 'Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial . . . evidence of intent as may be available.' " (Foster v. Chatman (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1748 (Fost

2019(Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477 (Snyder); Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 328-329 .) "[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted." (Snyder, at p. 478, citing Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 239 .) " 'Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial . . . evidence of intent as may be available.' " (Foster v. Chatman (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1748 (Fost

2013(Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282.) In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into the available circumstantial and direct evidence of intent.

2004See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] (1973); Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 [ 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ] (1981); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 [ 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (1983).

2004See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] (1973); Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 [ 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ] (1981); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 [ 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (1983).

2004See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] (1973); Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 [ 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ] (1981); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 [ 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (1983).

2004See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] (1973); Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 [ 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ] (1981); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 [ 103 S.Ct. 1478 , 75 L.Ed.2d 403 ] (1983).

1991For these reasons we hold that [the state rule] violates an accused's constitutional right to remain silent insofar as it requires him to testify first for the defense or not at all." (406 U.S. at pp. 611-612 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 363 ], italics added.) In my view, Brooks, supra, 406 U.S. 605 , establishes that in some circumstances a rule which requires a defendant to "accelerate" the disclosure of witnesses or evidence that he may disclose at trial can impinge on the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, and that, contrary to the majority's conclusion, a more sensitive analysis of both the purpose of t

1991For these reasons we hold that [the state rule] violates an accused’s constitutional right to remain silent insofar as it requires him to testify first for the defense or not at all.” (406 U.S. at pp. 611-612 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 363 ], italics added.) In my view, Brooks, supra, 406 U.S. 605 , establishes that in some circumstances a rule which requires a defendant to “accelerate” the disclosure of witnesses or evidence that he may disclose at trial can impinge on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, and that, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, a more sensitive analysis of both the purpose of t

1990For example, a statement made spontaneously to a close friend is more likely to be trustworthy than a statement elicited under police questioning. ( United States v. Rasmussen (8th Cir.1986) 790 F.2d 55, 56 ; United States v. Sarmiento-Perez (5th Cir.1981) 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 ; United States v. Gonzalez (5th Cir.1977) 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 .) Here, Rauch's statement to Sergeant Wingo was not spontaneous; it was the product of prolonged interrogation.

1990For example, a statement made spontaneously to a close friend is more likely to be trustworthy than a statement elicited under police questioning. ( United States v. Rasmussen (8th Cir.1986) 790 F.2d 55, 56 ; United States v. Sarmiento-Perez (5th Cir.1981) 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 ; United States v. Gonzalez (5th Cir.1977) 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 .) Here, Rauch's statement to Sergeant Wingo was not spontaneous; it was the product of prolonged interrogation.

1990What is required, rather, is "a sensitive analysis of the circumstances in which the statement was made and the precise nature of the statement." ( United States v. Palumbo (3d Cir.1981) 639 F.2d 123, 127 .) A number of factors have been identified as relevant to this analysis.

1990What is required, rather, is “a sensitive analysis of the circumstances in which the statement was made and the precise nature of the statement.” (United States v. Palumbo (3d Cir. 1981) 639 F.2d 123, 127 .) A number of factors have been identified as relevant to this analysis.

1990For example, a statement made spontaneously to a close friend is more likely to be trustworthy than a statement elicited under police questioning. ( United States v. Rasmussen (8th Cir.1986) 790 F.2d 55, 56 ; United States v. Sarmiento-Perez (5th Cir.1981) 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 ; United States v. Gonzalez (5th Cir.1977) 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 .) Here, Rauch's statement to Sergeant Wingo was not spontaneous; it was the product of prolonged interrogation.

1975The sensitive inquiry envisaged by Daniels into whether the movement was criminologically significant (see 71 Cal.2d at p. 1138 ) seems to have been abandoned in favor of the crude and arbitrary rule of "one block, one conviction." Equally predictable is the majority's holding ( ante, pp. 131-133) that the movement caused a substantial increase in the risk of harm to the victim.

1975The sensitive inquiry envisaged by Daniels into whether the movement was criminologically significant (see 71 Cal.2d at p. 1138 ) seems to have been abandoned in favor of the crude and arbitrary rule of “one block, one conviction.” Equally predictable is the majority’s holding (ante, pp. 131-133) that the movement caused a substantial increase in the risk of harm to the victim.