13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniel v. Danielgreen2 sentences2020See Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 850-852 (2) ( 301 SE2d 643 ) (1983) (affirming the enforcement of a waiver of the right to seek modification of alimony). 2020See Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 850-852 (2) ( 301 SE2d 643 ) (1983) (affirming the enforcement of a waiver of the right to seek modification of alimony). | 1 | 1 |
Iero v. Mohawk Finishing Products, Inc.green1 sentence2010See Iero, supra, 243 Ga. App. at 671-672 (forum selection clause providing that actions stemming from an agreement “ ‘shall be instituted, prosecuted, and maintained’ ” in Montgomery County, New York, made bringing suit there mandatory). | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Stategreen2 sentences1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). 1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). | 1 | 1 |
Hardy v. Stategreen2 sentences1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). 1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson v. Stategreen2 sentences1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). 1987The enforcement of the rule has been vested in the discretion of the trial court (Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347 ( 276 SE2d 224 )) and our appellate courts have always held “ ‘[t]he orderly presentation of evidence ... a proper reason for an exception to the rule. . . .’ Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 276 (1) ( 264 SE2d 209 ).” Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 285 SE2d 213 ). | 1 | 1 |
Wilkinson v. Leegreen2 sentences1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank 1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1 |
Joy v. St. Louisgreen1 sentence1950Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 50 (11 Sup. Ct. 243, 34 L. ed. 843), the principle is announced that, when a party has received payment for a privilege, it cannot resist the enforcement of that privilege on the mere ground that it cannot compel the other party to continue in its enjoyment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jarrell v. State
green
2 sentences1984Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410 (6) ( 216 SE2d 258 ) (1975). 1984Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410 (6) ( 216 SE2d 258 ) (1975). | 2 | 1977–1984 |
Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Mobley
neutral
2 sentences1969Co. v. Mobley, 6 Ga. App. 33 (4) ( 64 SE 300 ), holds: "A corporation knows of the violation of its rules and acquiesces therein whenever the particular agent of the corporation, who is charged with the enforcement of the rule in question, knows of its violation and acquiesces therein. 1969Co. v. Mobley, 6 Ga. App. 33 (4) ( 64 SE 300 ), holds: "A corporation knows of the violation of its rules and acquiesces therein whenever the particular agent of the corporation, who is charged with the enforcement of the rule in question, knows of its violation and acquiesces therein. | 2 | 1953–1969 |
Beavers v. LeSueur
green
2 sentences1959“A stipulation in a deed that it is given to secure a specified note and future advances, and that it 'shall also operate as security for any and all other indebtedness which the grantor herein may now owe or may hereafter owe to grantee’, does not embrace a contingent and unliquidated claim for damages based upon am alleged breach by the grantor of an independent contract of employment entered into by him in his professional capacity as an attorney at law; hence the security deed was not subject to foreclosure for the enforcement of such claim.” Beavers v. LeSueur, 188 Ga. *459 393 (3) ( 3 S. 1940When this case was formerly before this court it was held: “A stipulation in a deed that it is given to secure a specified note and future advances, and that it ‘shall also operate as security for any and all other indebtedness which the grantor herein may now owe or may hereafter owe to grantee/ does not embrace a contingent and unliquidated claim for damages based upon an alleged breach by the grantor of an independent contract of employment entered into by him in his professional capacity as an attorney at law; hence the security deed *362 was not subject to foreclosure for the enforcement | 2 | 1940–1959 |
Green v. Beaumont
green
2 sentences1961This principle was applied in Green v. Beaumont, 179 Ga. 804 ( 177 SE 572 ), where the judgment for alimony, based on a contract between the parties, was rendered in the City Court of Atlanta. 1961This principle was applied in Green v. Beaumont, 179 Ga. 804 ( 177 SE 572 ), where the judgment for alimony, based on a contract between the parties, was rendered in the City Court of Atlanta. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Smith v. Bush
neutral
1 sentence1954He has not as yet, insofar as this récord reveals, been cited for contempt for refusal to comply .with the rule absolute, nor has any execution been issued against him, and there is nothing to indicate that these methods providing for the enforcement of the rule absolute (Code § 24-214; Smith v. Bush, 58 Ga. 121, 124 ) shall ever become necessary. ■ The respondent in all probability will comply with the rule absolute and pay the amount of the judgment when he determines that he has exhausted his legal remedies, and is precluded by the former judgments. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Hardin v. Case
green
1 sentence1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Granger v. Knight
green
1 sentence1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co.
neutral
2 sentences1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank 1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright
green
2 sentences1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank 1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank
green
2 sentences1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank 1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co.
green
2 sentences1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank 1950In Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699 (7) ( 51 S. E. 2d, 409 ), it is held: “An option founded on a consideration is a unilateral agreement binding from the date of its execution on the party who executes it; and after notice by the optionee to exercise his option rights, it becomes a bilateral contract binding on both parties.” See also Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 364 ( 75 S. E. 477 ); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867 (1-e) ( 115 S. E. 801 ); Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33 ( 86 S. E. 242 ); Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813 ( 68 S. E. 648 ); Hollingsworth v. Peoples Bank | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Laramore v. Chastian
neutral
1 sentence1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Duggar v. Lackey
green
2 sentences1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). 1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Wood v. Wood
neutral
1 sentence1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Chester v. Lanford
neutral
1 sentence1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Nixon v. Lehman
green
2 sentences1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). 1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Ausley v. Cummings
green
2 sentences1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). 1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Frost v. Pennington
green
1 sentence1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Wolff v. Turner
green
1 sentence1936Nixon v. Lehman, 137 Ga. 516 (2) ( 73 S. E. 747 ); Wood v. Wood, 135 Ga. 385 ( 69 S. E. 549 ); Laramore v. Chastain, 25 Ga. 592 ; Ausley v. Cummings, 145 Ga. 750 (5), 757 ( 89 S. E. 1071 ); Duggar v. Lackey, 85 Ga. 631 ( 11 S. E. 1025 ); Frost v. Pennington, 6 Ga. App. 298 ( 65 S. E. 41 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.