enforcement claim (Hawaii) · Go Syfert
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enforcement claim in Hawaii

16 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc.green
haw · 1981 · cited in 6 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2001–2021
2 sentences

2021HRS § 386-85(1) provides: “In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury[.]” “The statute nowhere requires . . . some preliminary showing that the injury occurred ‘in the course of employment’ before the presumption will be triggered.” Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 650 , 636 P.2d 721, 727 (1981). “[T]o rebut the presumption, the employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence, which is the burden of produ

2021HRS § 386-85(1) provides: “In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury[.]” “The statute nowhere requires . . . some preliminary showing that the injury occurred ‘in the course of employment’ before the presumption will be triggered.” Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 650 , 636 P.2d 721, 727 (1981). “[T]o rebut the presumption, the employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence, which is the burden of produ

66
Korsak v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc.green
haw · 2000 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2001–2008
2 sentences

2008In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (1) That the claim is for a covered work injury[.] [4] "[W]e construe the use of the word `any' [in HRS § 386-85] to mean that the presumption applies in all proceedings conducted pursuant to the workers' compensation chapter." Korsak, 94 Hawai`i at 306, 12 P.3d at 1247 . [5] "The term `substantial evidence' signifies a high quantum of evidence which, at the minimum, must be `relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity s

2008In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (1) That the claim is for a covered work injury[.] [4] "[W]e construe the use of the word `any' [in HRS § 386-85] to mean that the presumption applies in all proceedings conducted pursuant to the workers' compensation chapter." Korsak, 94 Hawai`i at 306, 12 P.3d at 1247 . [5] "The term `substantial evidence' signifies a high quantum of evidence which, at the minimum, must be `relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity s

22
Panoke v. Reef Development of Hawaii, Inc.green
haw · 2015 · cited in 5 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021HRS § 386-85(1) provides: “In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury[.]” “The statute nowhere requires . . . some preliminary showing that the injury occurred ‘in the course of employment’ before the presumption will be triggered.” Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 650 , 636 P.2d 721, 727 (1981). “[T]o rebut the presumption, the employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence, which is the burden of produ

2020HRS § 386-85(1) provides: “In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury[.]” “The statute nowhere requires . . . some preliminary showing that the injury occurred ‘in the course of employment’ before the presumption will be triggered.” Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 650 , 636 P.2d 721, 727 (1981). “[T]o rebut the presumption, the employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence, which is the burden of produ

15
Nakamura v. Stategreen
haw · 2002 · cited in 4 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021“The burden of production means that ‘the employer must initially introduce substantial evidence that, if true, could 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** rebut the presumption that the injury is work-related.’” Id. (quoting Nakamura v. State, 98 Hawai‘i 263, 267, 47 P.3d 730, 734 (2002)). “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ means ‘a high quantum of evidence which, at the minimum, must be relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to justify a conclusion by a reasonable [person] that an injury or death is not work connected.’” 136 Hawai‘i at

2021“The burden of production means that ‘the employer must initially introduce substantial evidence that, if true, could 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** rebut the presumption that the injury is work-related.’” Id. (quoting Nakamura v. State, 98 Hawai‘i 263, 267, 47 P.3d 730, 734 (2002)). “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ means ‘a high quantum of evidence which, at the minimum, must be relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to justify a conclusion by a reasonable [person] that an injury or death is not work connected.’” 136 Hawai‘i at

14
De Victoria v. H & K CONTRACTORSgreen
haw · 1976 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1977–2025
2 sentences

2025The applicable administrative rule for reopening a workers’ compensation case 5 We note that this court, in De Victoria v. H & K Contractors, 56 Haw. 552, 556, 561 , 545 P.2d 692, 696, 699 (1976), stated that “[w]e do not believe that a showing of substantial evidence is necessary as a prerequisite to a review by the Director or the [LIRAB] of an application under subparagraph (c) of HRS § 386–89,” and held that: a proceeding brought by a claimant under HRS s 386-89(c) is plainly a ‘proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under (our workmen's compensation) chapter.’ HRS s 38

2025The applicable administrative rule for reopening a workers’ compensation case 5 We note that this court, in De Victoria v. H & K Contractors, 56 Haw. 552, 556, 561 , 545 P.2d 692, 696, 699 (1976), stated that “[w]e do not believe that a showing of substantial evidence is necessary as a prerequisite to a review by the Director or the [LIRAB] of an application under subparagraph (c) of HRS § 386–89,” and held that: a proceeding brought by a claimant under HRS s 386-89(c) is plainly a ‘proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under (our workmen's compensation) chapter.’ HRS s 38

12
Flor v. Holguingreen
haw · 2000 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020“The presumption has been described as one of the ‘keystone principles’ of our workers’ compensation plan.” Flor, 94 Hawaiʻi at 79, 9 P.3d at 391 (citation omitted).

11
State v. Matsudagreen
haw · 1967 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004“In a criminal trial, the state has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Matsuda, 50 Haw. 128, 129 , 432 P.2d 888, 890 (1967).

2004“In a criminal trial, the state has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Matsuda, 50 Haw. 128, 129 , 432 P.2d 888, 890 (1967).

11
Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Telephone Co.green
haw · 1994 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Telephone Co., 77 Hawai`i 100, 103, 881 P.2d 1246, 1249 (1994); Chung, 63 Haw. at 647 , 636 P.2d at 724-25 . *21 HRS § 386-85(1) (1993) provides that, "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation ... it shall be presumed ... [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury." This presumption "applies to the `work-relatedness' of an injury." Korsak v. Hawai`i Permanente Medical Group, 94 Hawai`i 297, 306, 12 P.3d 1238, 1247 (2000); see also Tate , 77 Hawai`i at 107, 881 P.2d at 1253 ("The employer may overcome the [section 386-85(1)] presumption only wi

2001Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Telephone Co., 77 Hawai`i 100, 103, 881 P.2d 1246, 1249 (1994); Chung, 63 Haw. at 647 , 636 P.2d at 724-25 . *21 HRS § 386-85(1) (1993) provides that, "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation ... it shall be presumed ... [t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury." This presumption "applies to the `work-relatedness' of an injury." Korsak v. Hawai`i Permanente Medical Group, 94 Hawai`i 297, 306, 12 P.3d 1238, 1247 (2000); see also Tate , 77 Hawai`i at 107, 881 P.2d at 1253 ("The employer may overcome the [section 386-85(1)] presumption only wi

11
S & W Crane Service, Inc. v. Dependents of Berardgreen
haw · 1971 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974See also S & W Crane Service, Inc. v. Berard’s Dependents, 53 Haw. 161 , 489 P.2d 419 (1971); Acous., Insul’n & Drywall, Inc. v. Lab.

1974See also S & W Crane Service, Inc. v. Berard’s Dependents, 53 Haw. 161 , 489 P.2d 419 (1971); Acous., Insul’n & Drywall, Inc. v. Lab.

11
Hinds v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.green
me · 1959 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1971–1971
2 sentences

1971Co., 155 Me. 349, 354 , 155 A.2d 721, 725 (1959).

1971Co., 155 Me. 349, 354 , 155 A.2d 721, 725 (1959).

11
Claim for Compensation of Ikoma v. Oahu Sugar Co.green
haw · 1916 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1969–1969
1 sentence

1969In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary-: (1) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter; *315 . (2) That sufficient notice of such injury has been given; • (:3) That the injury was not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee; and' (4) That the injury was not caused by the willful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another. 1 In construing this provision, we are guided by the words of this court in Re Ichijiro Ikoma, 23

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
In Re Water Use Permit Applications green
haw · 2000
2 sentences

2012Nonetheless, the Commission’s ultimate decisions, particularly its treatment of HC & S, do not reflect the actual application of a higher level of scrutiny or the enforcement of the requirement that the permit applicants “demonstrate their actual needs and, within the constraints of available knowledge, the propriety of draining water from public streams to satisfy those needs.” Id. at 162 , 9 P.3d at 474 .

2012Nonetheless, the Commission’s ultimate decisions, particularly its treatment of HC & S, do not reflect the actual application of a higher level of scrutiny or the enforcement of the requirement that the permit applicants “demonstrate their actual needs and, within the constraints of available knowledge, the propriety of draining water from public streams to satisfy those needs.” Id. at 162 , 9 P.3d at 474 .

12012–2012
Coffin v. United States green
scotus · 1895
2 sentences

2004The enforcement of this principle “ ‘lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1985)).

2004The enforcement of this principle “ ‘lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1985)).

12004–2004
Estelle v. Williams green
scotus · 1976
1 sentence

2004The enforcement of this principle “ ‘lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 , 15 S.Ct. 394 , 39 L.Ed. 481 (1985)).

12004–2004
Kent v. United States green
scotus · 1966
1 sentence

1976This court has expressed its agreement with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), that “waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important rights of the juvenile”.

11976–1976
Acoustic, Insulation & Drywall, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Appeal Board green
haw · 1969
2 sentences

1970Appeal Board, 51 Haw. 312 , 459 P.2d 541 (1969) that this statutory presumption is more than a procedural device that disappears upon the introduction of contrary evidence; and that the court should instruct the jury that the presumed fact exists unless they, are persuaded by substantial evidence to the contrary. 2 If such were the case, appellees contend the “furnished transportation,” rule would apply.

1970Appeal Board, 51 Haw. 312 , 459 P.2d 541 (1969) that this statutory presumption is more than a procedural device that disappears upon the introduction of contrary evidence; and that the court should instruct the jury that the presumed fact exists unless they, are persuaded by substantial evidence to the contrary. 2 If such were the case, appellees contend the “furnished transportation,” rule would apply.

11970–1970

Statutes the citing opinions construe

HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-85 (11) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14 (9) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-3 (6) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-31 (6) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-1 (5) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-88 (4) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-96 (4) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-25 (3) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-87 (3) HI § Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-89 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 88 (1895–2026) NY 80 (1880–2025) IL 43 (1881–2023) MO 40 (1883–2025) AL 39 (1877–2026) PA 37 (1895–2026) CA 34 (1898–2025) OK 30 (1911–2020) MD 24 (1869–2026) AK 23 (1970–2018) NJ 22 (1931–2024) AR 20 (1909–2025) MS 19 (1895–2023) FL 18 (1889–2018) IN 17 (1894–2025) KS 17 (1895–2024) HI 16 (1969–2025) IA 16 (1871–2014) NC 14 (1903–2025) MI 14 (1878–2019) GA 13 (1936–2020) LA 13 (1906–2023) WA 13 (1905–2018) CT 13 (1823–2025) OH 13 (1910–2020) TN 11 (1897–2015) WI 11 (1899–2010) NE 11 (1881–2020) AZ 10 (1933–2022) MA 9 (1921–2026) OR 9 (1914–2005) SC 8 (1887–2011) KY 8 (1911–2023) DC 7 (1902–2017) MT 7 (1913–2006) ID 6 (1908–1963) NM 5 (1918–2003) MN 5 (1889–1982) ME 5 (1879–1993) WV 4 (1905–1992) CO 4 (1910–2007) VA 4 (1886–1952) UT 3 (1935–2009) DE 3 (1992–2025) WY 3 (1908–1964) SD 2 (1894–1909) VI 2 (2001–2006) NV 2 (1891–2006) VT 2 (1962–1988)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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