enforcement claim in Texas

2008The Texas Supreme Court explained that “a right, in a legal sense, exists, when in consequence of given facts the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a claim or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.” Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253 (emphasis added); see also Corpus Christi People’s Baptist Church, 904 S.W.2d at 626 (noting that taxes that were due on receipt and became delinquent next year if unpaid, represented liability “for which the taxing unit may enforce collection”).

2008The Texas Supreme Court explained that "a right, in a legal sense, exists, when in consequence of given facts the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a claim or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another." Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253 (emphasis added); see also Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 904 S.W.2d at 626 (noting that taxes that were due on receipt and became delinquent next year if unpaid, represented liability "for which the taxing unit may enforce collection").

2010Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887); see also Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at 572-73 (observing that “[considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations play a prominent role” when determining rights entitled to constitutional protection); Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916) (observing that a vested common law right of action is a property right that the legislation at issue did not affect).

2010Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887); see also Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at 572-73 (observing that “[considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations play a prominent role” when determining rights entitled to constitutional protection); Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916) (observing that a vested common law right of action is a property right that the legislation at issue did not affect).

2008See Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 261-62 (Tex. 1981) (citing City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009 , 1012- 13 (Tex. 1937)). [A] right, in a legal sense, exists when, in consequence of the existence of given facts, the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a given claim, or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.

2008See Ex parte Abell , 613 S.W.2d 255, 261-62 (Tex. 1981) (citing City of Dallas v. Trammell , 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Tex. 1937)). [A] right, in a legal sense, exists when, in consequence of the existence of given facts, the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a given claim, or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.

2015See CenterPoint Energy, 213 S.W.3d at 369 (“If the decision made during a ratemaking proceeding reflects a policy choice that has not been committed to a formal rule, it can be considered an ad hoc rulemaking.”); Witcher, 2013 WL 1876467 , at *8 (majority opinion concluding “a policy that establishes a bright-line rule that is applicable without regard to individual circumstances” met definition of “rule” under APA).

2013See CenterPoint Energy, 213 S.W.3d at 369 (“If the decision made during a ratemaking proceeding reflects a policy choice that has not been committed to a formal rule, it can be considered an ad hoc rulemaking.”); Witcher, 2013 WL 1876467 , at *8 (majority opinion concluding “a policy that establishes a bright-line rule that is applicable without regard to individual circumstances” met definition of “rule” under APA).

2007See Ex parte Boyle, 545 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, orig. proceeding) (upholding attorney's fees award against father, who had paid off his child support arrearage by the time of the enforcement hearing, because he had been in default when served with notice of the hearing, and merely paying off the arrearage did not correct his prior failures to comply with the payment deadlines specified in the divorce decree).

2007See Ex parte Boyle, 545 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, orig. proceeding) (upholding attorney’s fees award against father, who had paid off his child support arrearage by the time of the enforcement hearing, because he had been in default when served with notice of the hearing, and merely paying off the arrearage did not correct his prior failures to comply with the payment deadlines specified in the divorce decree).

2011Thus, we cannot conclude that the State is “so connected in law with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.” Benson v. Anderson, 899 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (quoting Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied)). 7 Because the State cannot establish the three required elements of the virtual-representation doctrine, it has no standing to appeal as a deemed party of record.

2011Thus, we cannot conclude that the State is “so connected in law with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.” Benson v. Anderson, 899 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (quoting Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied)).7 Because the State cannot establish the three required elements of the virtual-representation doctrine, it has no standing to appeal as a deemed party of record.

2011Thus, we cannot conclude that the State is “so connected in law with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.” Benson v. Anderson, 899 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (quoting Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied)). 7 Because the State cannot establish the three required elements of the virtual-representation doctrine, it has no standing to appeal as a deemed party of record.

2011Thus, we cannot conclude that the State is “so connected in law with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.” Benson v. Anderson, 899 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (quoting Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied)).7 Because the State cannot establish the three required elements of the virtual-representation doctrine, it has no standing to appeal as a deemed party of record.

2009Second, the Act specifically states that "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 920 ; see Turner , 661 F.2d at 1038 .

2009Second, the Act specifically states that “[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ... [t]hat the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 920 ; see Turner, 661 F.2d at 1038 .

2008The Texas Supreme Court explained that “a right, in a legal sense, exists, when in consequence of given facts the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a claim or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.” Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253 (emphasis added); see also Corpus Christi People’s Baptist Church, 904 S.W.2d at 626 (noting that taxes that were due on receipt and became delinquent next year if unpaid, represented liability “for which the taxing unit may enforce collection”).

2008The Texas Supreme Court explained that "a right, in a legal sense, exists, when in consequence of given facts the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a claim or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another." Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253 (emphasis added); see also Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 904 S.W.2d at 626 (noting that taxes that were due on receipt and became delinquent next year if unpaid, represented liability "for which the taxing unit may enforce collection").

2008This, so far as we have been able to ascertain, has been the ruling in every State in this Union which has a constitutional provision in terms forbidding retroactive laws in which any ruling upon the question has been made. 3 S.W. at 253 ; see also Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502 ; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916).

2008This, so far as we have been able to ascertain, has been the ruling in every State in this Union which has a constitutional provision in terms forbidding retroactive laws in which any ruling upon the question has been made. 3 S.W. at 253 ; see also Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502 ; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916).

2019Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014Former section 157.162(d), which was enacted in 2007, was known as a “purging provision” because it allowed “a child support obligor to escape a valid finding of contempt if the obligor demonstrate[d] at the enforcement hearing that he or she [was] ‘current in the payment of child support as ordered by the court.’” In re Office of Attorney General, 422 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (quoting former Tex. Fam.

2013See 631 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).

2013See 631 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2012See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 462 ; Cook, 243 S.W.3d at 803 .

2012See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 462 ; Cook, 243 S.W.3d at 803 . .

2012“In all such cases the plaintiff [in the underlying suit] must have gone beyond the proper remedy for the enforcement of his claim, such as procuring an illegal order of arrest, or requiring excessive bail before the action could be maintained.” Woods, 13 Bush at 632 ; see also Smith v. Mich. Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619 , 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898) (observing that after Statute of Marlbridge, “it came to be held that an action for malicious prosecution would not lie in civil actions, unless in cases where there had been arrest of the person, or seizure of property, or other special injury”).

2012“In all such cases the plaintiff [in the underlying suit] must have gone beyond the proper remedy for the enforcement of his claim, such as procuring an illegal order of arrest, or requiring excessive bail before the action could be maintained.” Woods, 13 Bush at 632 ; see also Smith v. Mich. Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619 , 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898) (observing that after Statute of Marlbridge, “it came to be held that an action for malicious prosecution would not lie in civil actions, unless in cases where there had been arrest of the person, or seizure of property, or other special injury”).

2008See Ex parte Abell , 613 S.W.2d 255, 261-62 (Tex. 1981) (citing City of Dallas v. Trammell , 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Tex. 1937)). [A] right, in a legal sense, exists when, in consequence of the existence of given facts, the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a given claim, or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.

2008See Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 261-62 (Tex. 1981) (citing City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009 , 1012- 13 (Tex. 1937)). [A] right, in a legal sense, exists when, in consequence of the existence of given facts, the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce against another a given claim, or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by another.

1993The United States Supreme Court has stated that "an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. . . . [T]o assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made." Alexander v. Choate , 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (discussing Southeastern Community College v. Davis , 442 U.S. 397 (1979)) (emphasis added).

1993The United States Supreme Court has stated that “an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.... [T]o assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit may have to be made.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 , 105 S.Ct. 712, 720 , 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (discussing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 , 99 S.Ct. 2361 , 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)) (emphasis added).

1992Berrios-Torres v. State, 802 S.W.2d 91, 96 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no pet.) (citing Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Tex.Crim. *217 App.1971)). 2 According to appellant’s testimony, the prior conviction occurred in a municipal court.

1990“The test is whether the enforcement of the rule serves a legitimate state interest, or whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the disregard of the rules did not affect such state interest.” Id. at 876 .

1990Duckett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

1971The test is whether the enforcement of the rule serves a legitimate state interest, or whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the disregard of the rules did not affect such state interest. 3 In Duckett, supra, the two convictions were in the same court, on the same day, before the same judge, and were based on the same evidence.

1985See Marshburn v. State, 491 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (on motion for rehearing)- We also reject appellant’s argument that the court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Franklin and Johnson.

1973Marshburn v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 491 S.W.2d 663 (1973), and Article 36.04, supra. *846 Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.

2025See In re Gabrielova, 527 S.W.3d at 295 . 4 Mother’s petition does not dispute personal service, only that the allegations in the Motion for Enforcement were ambiguous. 11 Although we previously concluded that this is a hybrid contempt judgment, given the punitive nature of criminal contempt and the liberty interest at stake, we conclude it is both appropriate and equitable to apply the heightened criminal standard.

2025See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 124 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).

2022See Pettus v. Pettus, 237 S.W.3d 405, 416 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“Typically, temporary orders expire with the entry of a final judgment and cannot function as a final disposition on an issue.”); Word v. Word, 46 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1932, writ ref’d) (“A decretal order although interlocutory in its nature may, of course, be carried forward and embodied in a final decree and thus become an essential part of that decree, but until it is so embodied in the final decree no appeal will lie.”); cf. Hendren v. Lazar, 641 S.W.3d 814 , 819–20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022

2022See Pettus v. Pettus, 237 S.W.3d 405, 416 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“Typically, temporary orders expire with the entry of a final judgment and cannot function as a final disposition on an issue.”); Word v. Word, 46 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1932, writ ref’d) (“A decretal order although interlocutory in its nature may, of course, be carried forward and embodied in a final decree and thus become an essential part of that decree, but until it is so embodied in the final decree no appeal will lie.”); cf. Hendren v. Lazar, 641 S.W.3d 814 , 819–20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022

2021Code § 122.301(b)).” 4 (quoting Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002)).

2021App. P. 33.1(a); In re Marriage of Slagle, No. 14-16-00113- CV, 2018 WL 2306736 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“We hold Paul did not preserve this issue for appellate review because he did not raise his complaints with the trial court.”); Garcia v. Alvarez, 367 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (holding appellant failed to preserve error when she failed to object after “the trial court announced at the conclusion of the enforcement hearing that this would be the form of the judgment”).