enforcement rule in Kansas

1992App. 2d 638 , [ 42 Pac. 935 (1895),] the rule is stated as follows: ‘Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can any one be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which the defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.’ Further support for the rule is found in Septer v. Boyles, 149

1992App. 2d 638 , [ 42 Pac. 935 (1895),] the rule is stated as follows: ‘Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can any one be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which the defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.’ Further support for the rule is found in Septer v. Boyles, 149

2024When the policy does not provide coverage for P.B.'s claim, Mother, as P.B.'s judgment creditor, likewise cannot recover. 11 "'Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can anyone be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which the defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.'" LSF F

2019The Court framed the issue as one of preemption, asking whether "application of the State's notice-of-claim provision to § 1983 actions brought in state courts [is] consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does the enforcement of such a requirement instead ' "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" '? [Citations omitted.]" 487 U.S. at 138 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

2019The Court framed the issue as one of preemption, asking whether "application of the State's notice-of-claim provision to § 1983 actions brought in state courts [is] consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does the enforcement of such a requirement instead ' "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" '? [Citations omitted.]" 487 U.S. at 138 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

2017App. 2d 125, 129 , 832 P.2d 1206 (1992) (creditor stands in shoes of debtor and is not to be placed in more favorable position than debtor would have been for the enforcement of a claim against garnishee).

2016K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(e), the discretionary function exception, states that the government and its employees acting within the scope of the employment shall not be hable for “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of tire level of discretion involved.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(c), the enforcement exception, states that the government and its employees acting within the scope of the employment shall not be

2016“A statute waiving [states] immunity must be strictly construed and [a] court has no right to enlarge the scope of the statute or to amend law by judicial interpretation.” Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49, 50 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970).

2016“A statute waiving [states] immunity must be strictly construed and [a] court has no right to enlarge the scope of the statute or to amend law by judicial interpretation.” Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49, 50 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970).

2016K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(e), the discretionary function exception, states that the government and its employees acting within the scope of the employment shall not be hable for “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of tire level of discretion involved.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(c), the enforcement exception, states that the government and its employees acting within the scope of the employment shall not be

2007App. 638 , the rule is stated as follows: ‘Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can any one be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which tire defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.’ ” Harpster v. Reynolds, 215 Kan. 327, 330 , 524 P.2d 212 (1974).

2007App. 638 , the rule is stated as follows: ‘Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can any one be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which tire defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.’ ” Harpster v. Reynolds, 215 Kan. 327, 330 , 524 P.2d 212 (1974).

2000Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 .

1992App. 2d 638 , [ 42 Pac. 935 (1895),] the rule is stated as follows: ‘Proceedings in garnishment do not change the legal relations and rights existing between the defendant and the garnishee, nor place the plaintiff in a more favorable position for the enforcement of a claim against the garnishee than would be the defendant in an action brought by him for the same cause; nor can any one be held in such proceedings to the payment of a liability which the defendant could not himself enforce because of existing equities and set-offs.’ Further support for the rule is found in Septer v. Boyles, 149

1979Plaintiff directs this Court to State v. Leigh, 178 Kan. 549 , 289 P.2d 774 (1955), quoting at 552: “It is the honor of the legal profession that its fidelity to its clients can be depended upon, that a person may safely go to a lawyer and counsel with him upon personal and confidential matters with the absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever divulging it, and a strict enforcement of this rule requires that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former cl

1979Plaintiff directs this Court to State v. Leigh, 178 Kan. 549 , 289 P.2d 774 (1955), quoting at 552: “It is the honor of the legal profession that its fidelity to its clients can be depended upon, that a person may safely go to a lawyer and counsel with him upon personal and confidential matters with the absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever divulging it, and a strict enforcement of this rule requires that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former cl

1979An attorney cannot be permitted to participate in the prosecution of a criminal case if, by reason of his professional relations with the accused, he has acquired knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven therewith.” Following closely on the heels of the Court’s decision in Leigh came Wilson v. Wahl, 182 Kan. 532, 539 , 322 P.2d 804 (1958).

1979An attorney cannot be permitted to participate in the prosecution of a criminal case if, by reason of his professional relations with the accused, he has acquired knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven therewith.” Following closely on the heels of the Court’s decision in Leigh came Wilson v. Wahl, 182 Kan. 532, 539 , 322 P.2d 804 (1958).

1949No one can be cut off by limitation until he has failed to prosecute the remedy limited; and no one can be compelled to prosecute, when he is already in possession of all that he demands.” To the same effect is Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480 , where the following statements appear: “. • • It may be admitted that it is competent for the Legislature to limit the time within which a party in possession may commence an action under our statutes, to remove a cloud from his title, or silence an adverse claim, but that it .may require him to bring such action as a condition to the enjoyment of his pro

1940The right of the state to subject the railroad property to taxation exists as before the cession.” (p. 542.) Commenting on this case in Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 , 73 L.

1940The right of the state to subject the railroad property to taxation exists as before the cession.” (p. 542.) Commenting on this case in Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 , 73 L.

1921While the general rule is that proof of a conspiracy to commit a crime must be shown before the acts of a coconspirator can be shown as evidence against a defendant conspirator, yet the order of proof is largely controlled by the discretion of the trial judge (The State v. Rogers, 54 Kan. 683 , 39 Pac. 219 ) ; and where the crime has to be established by circumstantial evidence the prosecutor .must be given permission to present that proof bit by bit as best he can without too rigid an enforcement of that rule.

1921(The State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328 , 10 Pac. 865 ; The State v. Rogers, supra; The State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 94 , 132 Pac. 982 ).

1921While the general rule is that proof of a conspiracy to commit a crime must be shown before the acts of a coconspirator can be shown as evidence against a defendant conspirator, yet the order of proof is largely controlled by the discretion of the trial judge (The State v. Rogers, 54 Kan. 683 , 39 Pac. 219 ) ; and where the crime has to be established by circumstantial evidence the prosecutor .must be given permission to present that proof bit by bit as best he can without too rigid an enforcement of that rule.

1921(The State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328 , 10 Pac. 865 ; The State v. Rogers, supra; The State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 94 , 132 Pac. 982 ).

1921(The State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328 , 10 Pac. 865 ; The State v. Rogers, supra; The State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 94 , 132 Pac. 982 ).

1908App. 71 , 41 Pac. 209 .) To avoid inconvenience from the enforcement of this rule ample opportunity is afforded under the statute to amend the petition at any time before judgment.

1903The author is entirely satisfied to assert that an unsigned writ is voidable only, and the subject of amendment.” (§40.) In this state it has been held that process issued without the seal of the courtis utterly void, by reason of the constitutional provision already referred to ( Gordon v. Bodwell, 59 Kan. 51 , 51 Pac. 906 , 68 Am.

1903The author is entirely satisfied to assert that an unsigned writ is voidable only, and the subject of amendment.” (§40.) In this state it has been held that process issued without the seal of the courtis utterly void, by reason of the constitutional provision already referred to ( Gordon v. Bodwell, 59 Kan. 51 , 51 Pac. 906 , 68 Am.

1903If, after the lapse of thirty years, the Indians and their grantee- are not barred strictly under the statute of limitations they are precluded from the enforcement of their claim under the doctrine of laches and stale claims, set forth in the opinion of this court in the case of Dunbar v. Green, ante, 557, 72 Pac. 243 .

1898In Kothman v. Skaggs, 29 Kan. 5 , it is said it is “universally recognized that statutes of limitation do not run against any claim or demand during any portion of the time while a suit is pending for the enforcement of such claim or demand.” And it seems that it would naturally follow as a corollary, that where a suit is pending to reverse a judgment declaring a tax deed void the statute would not run against the claim for taxes.

1895(Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478 ; Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 404 ; Parsons v. Moses, 16 Iowa, 444 ; Newland v. Baker, 26 Kas. 341 ; Barton v. Land Co., 27 id. 634.) The occupying-claimant act provides not only for the enforcement of this rule of equity, but goes further by saying that full compensation must be made to the owner of the improvements before his possession can be disturbed.

1895(Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478 ; Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 404 ; Parsons v. Moses, 16 Iowa, 444 ; Newland v. Baker, 26 Kas. 341 ; Barton v. Land Co., 27 id. 634.) The occupying-claimant act provides not only for the enforcement of this rule of equity, but goes further by saying that full compensation must be made to the owner of the improvements before his possession can be disturbed.