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32 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1891–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stephenson v. Stephensongreen2 sentences2014Stephenson v. Stephenson, 351 Mo. 8 , 171 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1943) (“The enforcement of the principle of equity — he who seeks equity must do equity-”) (emphasis added). 2014Stephenson v. Stephenson, 171 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. 1943) ("The enforcement of the principle of equity—he who seeks equity must do equity . . . .") (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
Scheidegger v. Greenegreen2 sentences1987“No person may claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights, and where a new [law] deals only with procedure it applies to all actions including those pending or filed in the future.” Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo.1970); See Jackman v. Century Brick Corporation of America, 412 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Mo.1967); Goodman v. St. 1986“No person may claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights, and where a new statute deals only with procedure it applies to all actions including those pending or filed in the future.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Huffman v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Grab v. Dillon , 103 S.W.3d 228 , 234-36 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (noting that since its inception into Missouri law, "the rule" permitting exclusion of witnesses has been at discretion of trial court); Huffman v. State , 451 S.W.2d 21 , 23 (Mo. 1970) ("Appellant had no right to the enforcement of the rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom. | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Detringgreen2 sentences2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App. 1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n.7 (Mo.App. 2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App. 1984). 2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App.1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n. 7 (Mo.App.2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp.green2 sentences2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App. 1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n.7 (Mo.App. 2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App. 1984). 2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App.1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n. 7 (Mo.App.2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. Hankinsgreen2 sentences2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App. 1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n.7 (Mo.App. 2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App. 1984). 2014The Smiths did not plead or otherwise raise the statute of frauds prior to the enforcement hearing; even had they done so, “failure to object to the testimony of the oral agreement would waive any protection of the statute.” Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Mo.App.1998); see also Owen v. Hankins, 289 S.W.3d 299 , 304 n. 7 (Mo.App.2009); Sheinbein v. First Boston Corp., 670 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Weinshenkergreen1 sentence2006In re Marriage of Weinshenker, 177 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.green1 sentence1998Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. banc 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. St. Louis Children's Hospitalgreen1 sentence1987Louis Children’s Hospital, 687 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. bane 1985); see also 37 Mo.Dig.2d, Statutes, Key No. 263 at 799; Danaher v. Smith, 666 S.W.2d 452 (Mo.App.1984) (enlarging class of persons as witnesses). | 1 | 1 |
Jackman v. Century Brick Corporation of Americagreen1 sentence1987“No person may claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights, and where a new [law] deals only with procedure it applies to all actions including those pending or filed in the future.” Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo.1970); See Jackman v. Century Brick Corporation of America, 412 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Mo.1967); Goodman v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co.green2 sentences1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. 1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. | 1 | 1 |
Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co.green2 sentences1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. 1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Kansas City, St. Louis & Chicago Railroad
green
2 sentences1966Co., 219 Mo., 524 , 118 S.W. 40, 43 , is that "[n]o person can claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights. 1966Co., 219 Mo., 524 , 118 S.W. 40, 43 , is that "[n]o person can claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights. | 4 | 1938–1966 |
Grab Ex Rel. Grab v. Dillon
green
1 sentence2018Grab v. Dillon , 103 S.W.3d 228 , 234-36 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (noting that since its inception into Missouri law, "the rule" permitting exclusion of witnesses has been at discretion of trial court); Huffman v. State , 451 S.W.2d 21 , 23 (Mo. 1970) ("Appellant had no right to the enforcement of the rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Casaretto
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp.
green
1 sentence1992There the court stated that forum selection clauses do “not deprive the non-designated state of jurisdiction except to the extent that in its discretion it determines that the enforcement of the clause is neither unfair nor unreasonable.” 823 S.W.2d at 496 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
red
2 sentences1992This argument was justified by M/S Bremen, GMBH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 , 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), which made the point that the majority rule that enforces such clauses, so long as doing so is neither unfair nor unreasonable, does not deprive the non-designated state of jurisdiction except to the extent that in its discretion it determines that the enforcement of the clause is neither unfair nor unreasonable. 1992This argument was justified by M/S Bremen, GMBH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 , 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), which made the point that the majority rule that enforces such clauses, so long as doing so is neither unfair nor unreasonable, does not deprive the non-designated state of jurisdiction except to the extent that in its discretion it determines that the enforcement of the clause is neither unfair nor unreasonable. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Danaher v. Smith
green
1 sentence1987Louis Children’s Hospital, 687 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. bane 1985); see also 37 Mo.Dig.2d, Statutes, Key No. 263 at 799; Danaher v. Smith, 666 S.W.2d 452 (Mo.App.1984) (enlarging class of persons as witnesses). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Gibbes v. Zimmerman
green
2 sentences1986Nor does the federal constitution prevent a remedial or procedural provision from being applied retroactively because “although a vested cause of action is property ..., the [plaintiff] has no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; all that he is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of his substantial right to redress by some effective procedure.” Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 , 54 S.Ct. 140, 142 , 78 L.Ed. 342 (1933). 1986Nor does the federal constitution prevent a remedial or procedural provision from being applied retroactively because “although a vested cause of action is property ..., the [plaintiff] has no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; all that he is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of his substantial right to redress by some effective procedure.” Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 , 54 S.Ct. 140, 142 , 78 L.Ed. 342 (1933). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Avenue Bank
green
2 sentences1961Bank, 191 Mo.App. 287 , 177 S.W. 1092 . *562 The rule as stated is followed in the majority of jurisdictions, though we must admit there is a lack of uniformity in the reasons given in the decisions for the enforcement of the rule. 1961Bank, 191 Mo.App. 287 , 177 S.W. 1092 . *562 The rule as stated is followed in the majority of jurisdictions, though we must admit there is a lack of uniformity in the reasons given in the decisions for the enforcement of the rule. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Clyde Mattox v. United States
green
2 sentences1954Being conscious, he must have known that the physicians were treating him for a bullet wound in the brain. “* * * We insist that no stronger case than this is likely to arise for the enforcement of the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Mattox Case, supra, [Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 ] where it was said that the sense of impending death may be made to appear from what the injured person said, ‘or from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously such that he must have felt or known that he could no[t] surviv 1954Being conscious, he must have known that the physicians were treating him for a bullet wound in the brain. “* * * We insist that no stronger case than this is likely to arise for the enforcement of the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Mattox Case, supra, [Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 , 13 S.Ct. 50 , 36 L.Ed. 917 ] where it was said that the sense of impending death may be made to appear from what the injured person said, ‘or from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously such that he must have felt or known that he could no[t] surviv | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Phillips v. Phillips
green
1 sentence1951In Phillips v. Phillips, 50 Mo. 603 , the trial court quieted the title to' certain land in the plaintiff but this court, upon its own initiative, conditioned the relief to the plaintiff for the benefit of an infant defendant by imposing conditions similar to those imposed by the trial court in this case. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Johnson v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences1951For the general situation, demanding the enforcement of the rule of estoppel, sée the following: Johnson v. Ferguson, 329 Mo. 363 , 44 S. W. (2d) 650 -653; State ex rel. 1951For the general situation, demanding the enforcement of the rule of estoppel, sée the following: Johnson v. Ferguson, 329 Mo. 363 , 44 S. W. (2d) 650 -653; State ex rel. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
State Ex Rel. Consolidated School District No. 2 of Pike County v. Haid
green
1 sentence1951Consolidated School District No. 2 of Pike County v. Haid (Mo.) 41 S. W. (2d) 806 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Pierce v. Stablemen's Local 8760
green
2 sentences1939Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 P. 1027 ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 , 103 P. 324 .] In support of its right to an injunction plaintiff has relied very largely (as also did the court below) upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, supra, which likewise was a case in which the plaintiff, a concern engaged locally in the planing mill business, sought a decree enjoining the defendants, the then officers of the District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, from declaring and prosecuting a 1939Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 P. 1027 ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 , 103 P. 324 .] In support of its right to an injunction plaintiff has relied very largely (as also did the court below) upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, supra, which likewise was a case in which the plaintiff, a concern engaged locally in the planing mill business, sought a decree enjoining the defendants, the then officers of the District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, from declaring and prosecuting a | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Bossert v. . Dhuy
green
2 sentences1939Any products of plaintiff bearing the union label would undoubtedly be handled and erected by union carpenters without question or objection; and so for want of proof of a malicious intent to injure plaintiff, and with threats, intimidation, and violence absent from the case, we think that defendant are not to be restrained from the enforcement of the rule which was only adopted by the members of the union for purposes deemed beneficial to themselves. [Bossert v. Dhury, 221 N.Y. 342 , 117 N.E. 582 ; J.F. 1939Any products of plaintiff bearing the union label would undoubtedly be handled and erected by union carpenters without question or objection; and so for want of proof of a malicious intent to injure plaintiff, and with threats, intimidation, and violence absent from the case, we think that defendant are not to be restrained from the enforcement of the rule which was only adopted by the members of the union for purposes deemed beneficial to themselves. [Bossert v. Dhury, 221 N.Y. 342 , 117 N.E. 582 ; J.F. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
green
2 sentences1939Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 P. 1027 ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 , 103 P. 324 .] In support of its right to an injunction plaintiff has relied very largely (as also did the court below) upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, supra, which likewise was a case in which the plaintiff, a concern engaged locally in the planing mill business, sought a decree enjoining the defendants, the then officers of the District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, from declaring and prosecuting a 1939Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 P. 1027 ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 , 103 P. 324 .] In support of its right to an injunction plaintiff has relied very largely (as also did the court below) upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, supra, which likewise was a case in which the plaintiff, a concern engaged locally in the planing mill business, sought a decree enjoining the defendants, the then officers of the District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, from declaring and prosecuting a | 1 | 1939–1939 |
State v. Compton
green
2 sentences1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. 1937However, in most states as in this State the enforcement of this rule has been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. [64 C.J. 118, sec. 127; 26 R.C.L. 1058, sec. 65; State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475 , 296 S.W. 137 ; Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655 , 276 S.W. 36 ; see, also, Id., 319 Mo. 275 , 3 S.W.2d 1025 ; State v. Sloan (Mo.), 186 S.W. 1002 .] We think this is the better view because it never has been considered necessary by courts or lawyers to enforce the rule in all cases, and it might be used to unnecessarily delay and obstruct trials. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Leicher v. Keeney
green
2 sentences1934And in a sale of land, misrepresentations affecting the value of land by overstating the quantity are material, whether the sale was by the acre or in gross, as was ruled in the case of Leicher v. Keeney, 98 Mo. App. 394, 1 . c. 404, 72 S. W. 145 . 1934And in a sale of land, misrepresentations affecting the value of land by overstating the quantity are material, whether the sale was by the acre or in gross, as was ruled in the case of Leicher v. Keeney, 98 Mo. App. 394, 1 . c. 404, 72 S. W. 145 . | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Gantt v. Brown
green
1 sentence1923These rulings, the court held in Gantt v. Brown, 238 Mo. 560 , were not in harmony with the purpose of the statute, and that the enforcement of the rule as thus announced would fender contests of elections nugatory. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Linville v. Savage neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Haynes v. Railroad neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Hadley v. Pickett neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Gruwell v. National Council Knights & Ladies of Security green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Schuster v. Weiss neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| J. H. Rothman Distilling Co. v. Kermis neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Keaton v. Boughton neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Cranor v. Reardon neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| State ex rel. Bay v. Holman neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Brookshier v. McIlrath neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Howard v. Hurst green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Jenkins v. York Cliffs Imp. Co. neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Johnson v. Franklin Bank neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Harburg v. Kumpf neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Petty v. Douglass neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Owings v. McKenzie green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Hayes v. Michigan Central Railroad green | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.