Martinez motion in Texas

2009We agree that “[o]rdinarily, a directed verdict should not be granted against a party before the party has had a full opportunity to present its case and has rested.” Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. McCall, 104 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Tex. 2003).

2009We agree that "[o]rdinarily, a directed verdict should not be granted against a party before the party has had a full opportunity to present its case and has rested." Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. McCall, 104 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Tex. 2003).

2009See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2009See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

2008Nevertheless, we note this Court's opinion in Menchaca v. Menchaca, 679 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).

2008Nevertheless, we note this Court’s opinion in Menchaca v. Menchaca, 679 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1984, no writ).

2005Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 943 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992).

2005Vuong v. State , 830 S.W.2d 929, 943 (Tex. Crim.

2017Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 (applying Martinez factors to noncapital cases).

2017Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77 (applying Martinez factors to noncapital cases).

2012Assuming without deciding that we may consider Martinez’s claim on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s request for appointment of an expert. 6 In Ake v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the State ensure an indigent defendant “access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.” 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).

2012On this premise, the Court held that an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of an expert when the defendant demonstrates to the trial court that there is a substantial need for the assistance of the expert in the case.8 See id. at 83 .

2012See In the Interest of Z.L.T. , 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003).

2012See In the Interest of Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003).

2011See Williams, 705 S.W.2d at 191-93 .

2011See Williams , 705 S.W.2d at 191-93 .

2010See Williams , 15 S.W.3d at 115-16 (no abuse of discretion where appellant given approximately forty days to secure new counsel and prepare for summary judgment); Holt v. D’Hanis State Bank , 993 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (trial court did not err in setting hearing on motion for summary judgment where appellant had approximately thirty-five days to hire a new attorney to represent him in the summary judgment proceeding).

2010See Williams, 15 -7- 04-10-00318-CV S.W.3d at 115-16 (no abuse of discretion where appellant given approximately forty days to secure new counsel and prepare for summary judgment); Holt v. D’Hanis State Bank, 993 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (trial court did not err in setting hearing on motion for summary judgment where appellant had approximately thirty-five days to hire a new attorney to represent him in the summary judgment proceeding).

2006See, e.g. , Houston Printing Co. , 44 S.W. at 560 .

2006See, e.g., Houston Printing Co., 44 S.W. at 560 .

2003See Kirk v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Service, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ).

2003See Kirk v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Service, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1973, no writ).

2014Again considering the nature of an Anders appeal and the expiration of time 2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 2 to file a merits brief, this Court issued a letter on January 10, 2014, construing Mr. Martinez’s motion to substitute as a notice of appearance per Rule 6.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and granting an extension of time until February 7, 2014, in which Appellant could file a pro se response.3 The letter provided, “Mr. Martinez is permitted to assist Appellant in preparing his response” and noted that no further extensions of t

2014Again considering the nature of an Anders appeal and the expiration of time 2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 2 to file a merits brief, this Court issued a letter on January 10, 2014, construing Mr. Martinez’s motion to substitute as a notice of appearance per Rule 6.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and granting an extension of time until February 7, 2014, in which Appellant could file a pro se response.3 The letter provided, “Mr. Martinez is permitted to assist Appellant in preparing his response” and noted that no further extensions of t

2008The panel found that “the Respondents intentionally slandered Mr. Martinez knowing, at the time, that their accusations of criminal conduct were untrue.” The panel said, “This case is well ‘outside the scope of an ordinary employment dispute and into the realm of extreme and outrageous conduct.’ ” The panel imposed joint and several liability on Greenspoint and the individual Respondents by considering the factors outlined by the supreme court in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611-16 (Tex.1999). 3 In its opinion, the panel stated, In particular, we considered (and rejected) the

2008The panel found that “the Respondents intentionally slandered Mr. Martinez knowing, at the time, that their accusations of criminal conduct were untrue.” The panel said, “This case is well ‘outside the scope of an ordinary employment dispute and into the realm of extreme and outrageous conduct.’” The panel imposed joint and several liability on Greenspoint and the individual Respondents by considering the factors outlined by the supreme court in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce , 998 S.W.2d 605 , 611–16 (Tex. 1999).

2026See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 503 ; Jaimes, 611 S.W.3d at 85.9 We overrule Martinez’s issue.

2025See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim.

2024See, e.g., id. at 17 , 38–70.

2024See Flagstar Bank, 451 S.W.3d at 504 .

2023See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 .

2023Otherwise, Martinez’s challenge to the credibility of Rodriguez’s English communication was a jury issue, and “we will not second-guess the jury’s assessment of the credibility and weight of witness testimony.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 765–67 (overruling sufficiency challenge to identification of defendant); see Meeks, 897 S.W.2d at 955 (recognizing that lack of in-court identification at trial “goes only to the weight and credibility of the witnesses and was before the jury for their consideration”); cf. 5 Martinez suggests, for example, that another individual could have been present at defen

2021See id. 2 4.

2021“When a defendant moves for summary judgment, he must expressly state in the motion the specific grounds upon which relief is sought, and summary judgment may only be granted on those grounds.” Hardaway v. Nixon, 544 S.W.3d 402, 412 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied); see TEX.