Martinez claim in California

2025On July 12, 2023 the trial court denied Martinez’s motion to replace his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2022Thereafter, the trial court denied Martinez’s motion to replace counsel (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)) and sentenced him pursuant to the plea agreement.

2019We conclude Henderson has failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning Shell’s ability to control his wages, hours, or conditions of employment, and Shell is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all claims based upon the IWC’s definition of an “employer.” Under the second Martinez test for joint employment, whether Shell suffered or permitted Henderson to work, the Curry court explained this test “was derived from a desire to prevent evasion from liability by a claim that a person was not employed in a traditional master/servant relationship.” ( Curry, supra, 23 Cal.Ap

2019Under the third Martinez test, which concerns whether Shell was the plaintiff’s employer under the common law definition of employment, the Curry court explained 11 that the “essence of the common law employment test “ ‘is the “control of details”—that is, whether the principal has the right to control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work,’ ” along with eight other secondary factors.4 ( Curry, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 304–305.) After a detailed analysis of all the factors, the court concluded that while Shell, along with ARS, had provided the plaintiff with a plac

2019(See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428 , 1435–1436 [moving victim 15 feet into his apartment met asportation requirement]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 , 168– 169 [moving victim nine feet from the front to the back of a store was substantial].) Newman ordered H from her bed to his waiting car.

2019(See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428 , 1435–1436 [moving victim 15 feet into his apartment met asportation requirement]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 , 168– 169 [moving victim nine feet from the front to the back of a store was substantial].) Newman ordered H from her bed to his waiting car.

2019(See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428 , 1435–1436 [moving victim 15 feet into his apartment met asportation requirement]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 , 168– 169 [moving victim nine feet from the front to the back of a store was substantial].) Newman ordered H from her bed to his waiting car.

2019(See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428 , 1435–1436 [moving victim 15 feet into his apartment met asportation requirement]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 , 168– 169 [moving victim nine feet from the front to the back of a store was substantial].) Newman ordered H from her bed to his waiting car.

2019Substantial Evidence of Identity and Premeditation* A. Contentions Medrano and Martinez challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show they were the perpetrators of the shooting, and they contend there is insufficient evidence of premeditation to kill Machado.7 Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the *See footnote, ante, page 1. 7Citing to People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335 , 363–364, the People characterized Avellanoza’s incorporation by reference of several of the arguments set forth in his codefendants’ briefs as a wholesale and improper application of Cal

2019Substantial Evidence of Identity and Premeditation* A. Contentions Medrano and Martinez challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show they were the perpetrators of the shooting, and they contend there is insufficient evidence of premeditation to kill Machado.7 Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the *See footnote, ante, page 1. 7Citing to People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335 , 363–364, the People characterized Avellanoza’s incorporation by reference of several of the arguments set forth in his codefendants’ briefs as a wholesale and improper application of Cal

2026Unique Defense Our analysis of the typicality of Martinez’s claim proceeds to the defenses or arguments raised by Lifestar. “[A] proposed class representative’s claim may not be typical if it is subject to a so-called ‘unique defense’ that does not apply to the other class members’ claims.” (1 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions, supra, § 3:45 [presence of unique defenses].) One court described the concept of a unique defense as a “defense peculiar to the named plaintiff or a small subset of the plaintiff class.” (CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc. (7th Cir. 2011) 637 F.3d 7

2025Given our conclusion the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the DAI’s expert opinion under Evidence Code sections 801 and 802, Martinez’s claim the ruling violated his federal constitutional right to due 23 process necessarily fails. “[T]he routine application of provisions of the state Evidence Code law does not implicate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 957 ; accord People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 .) B.

2024Consecutive terms are considered “one, single sentence.” (See People v. Nunez (2017) 167 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 .) That Rodgers was still serving his sentence on case 2 after the remittitur from this court in case 1 is made apparent by the abstract of judgment issued by the court at his resentencing, which shows that his sentence on case 2 was executed at the time of the initial sentencing, while the sentence on case 1 was executed, as modified, at the time of his resentencing.

2024Consecutive terms are considered “one, single sentence.” (See People v. Nunez (2017) 167 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 .) That Rodgers was still serving his sentence on case 2 after the remittitur from this court in case 1 is made apparent by the abstract of judgment issued by the court at his resentencing, which shows that his sentence on case 2 was executed at the time of the initial sentencing, while the sentence on case 1 was executed, as modified, at the time of his resentencing.

2024“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 728 .) However, the rejection of each of a defendant’s individual claims “cannot logically be used to support a cumulative error claim [where] we have already found there was no error to cumulate.” (In re Reno, at p. 483.) In this case, we found Martinez’s claim of evidentiary error was not prejudicial, and hi

2024We conclude there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present on May 3, 2022. 18 18 For the same reason, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Martinez’s motion for new trial. ( Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 75–76.) Martinez does not specifically challenge the trial court’s decision to proceed with the trial in his absence.

2024(Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 75 .) We note that considerable effort and time went into reaching the stage of trial when Martinez was absent, beyond those typically encountered, such as expending resources and inconveniencing jurors and witnesses.

2024“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 728 .) However, the rejection of each of a defendant’s individual claims “cannot logically be used to support a cumulative error claim [where] we have already found there was no error to cumulate.” (In re Reno, at p. 483.) In this case, we found Martinez’s claim of evidentiary error was not prejudicial, and hi

2024(See Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 880 [“Granted, defendant’s alleged taking of the handguns from a box in the kitchen does appear to differ in nature from the other three takings described above, because defendant was allegedly himself the perpetrator.

2023(See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528 , 541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview lasted under two hours].) We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective. “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of th

2023Either way, the fact remains that Martinez seeks relief that extends “beyond [her] particular circumstances,” and she therefore must “satisfy our standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach.” (Doe v. Reed (2010) 561 U.S. 186, 194 .) To prevail on a facial challenge, litigants must show that the challenged rule creates constitutional problems in “at least ‘ “the generality” ’ [citation] or ‘vast majority’ ” of cases.

2023(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 ; cf. Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 301 [noting that a facial challenge to a regulation is subject to the same standards as a facial challenge to a statute].) Here, Martinez advances no theory on which she could establish the invalidity of section 2076 in the generality or vast majority of cases without also establishing the invalidity of section 2076 as applied to the class of arrangements involving incarcerated 9 PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. persons.7 Accordingly, re

2023(State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353 ; see Dominguez v. Pantalone (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 201, 208 [causation is an ultimate fact].) 57. disparate impact.

2022Martinez’s motion to reconsider the trial court’s strike ruling Prior to sentencing, Martinez filed a brief requesting that the trial court “re[ ]consider its prior ruling,” that Martinez’s juvenile adjudication in JCM237568 was a strike.40 After explaining that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a strike if it meets the four criteria (A through D) outlined in Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1 , and in part III.B.2.a, ante, Martinez argued in relevant part: “The defense does not dispute that . . .

2022Martinez’s motion to reconsider the trial court’s strike ruling Prior to sentencing, Martinez filed a brief requesting that the trial court “re[ ]consider its prior ruling,” that Martinez’s juvenile adjudication in JCM237568 was a strike.40 After explaining that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a strike if it meets the four criteria (A through D) outlined in Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1 , and in part III.B.2.a, ante, Martinez argued in relevant part: “The defense does not dispute that . . .