objective reasonableness standard in Maryland

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 , 109 S. Ct. at 1867–68 (holding claims of excessive force by law enforcement officials “in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [the] person . . . are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard. . . .”).

2020To preface the objective reasonableness inquiry, we begin with the oft-quoted language from Graham: “[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022App. 593, 604-05, 607 (2018) (noting in a case affirming a police officer’s convictions for first-degree assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, that when “an officer has been accused of using excessive force in the course of an arrest, evidence is relevant as to whether the officer’s actions [were] objectively reasonable” under the Graham standard); Wilson v. State, 87 Md.

2020Therefore, the testimony should not be considered in the objective reasonableness inquiry. “[I]t is the general rule that an expert witness may not opine on questions of law.” Solomon v. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 155 Md.

2020Yet, crucially in an excessive force analysis, “the issue is whether the government official violated the Constitution . . . , not whether he violated the policies of a state agency.” Cole, 993 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis added); see also Richardson, 361 Md. at 458 (declining to consider an officer’s decision not to wait for additional backup, in violation of “police guideline or regulation,” in the objective reasonableness inquiry).

2020App. 687, 706 (2003); see also Franceschina v. Hope, 267 Md. 632, 642 (1973) (“Shivers [v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585 (1960)] should not be interpreted to mean that an expert witness may in his opinion on the facts include an opinion on a matter of law.”); Md.

2020App. 687, 706 (2003); see also Franceschina v. Hope, 267 Md. 632, 642 (1973) (“Shivers [v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585 (1960)] should not be interpreted to mean that an expert witness may in his opinion on the facts include an opinion on a matter of law.”); Md.

2020To preface the objective reasonableness inquiry, we begin with the oft-quoted language from Graham: “[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

2020“Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ . . . its proper 5 application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted).

2020In other words, we employ an objective reasonableness standard to avoid a “20/20 hindsight” assessment of “what may have or could have occurred[.]” Id. at 332 , 139 A.3d at 944 .

2020Such hindsight bias has the power to “distort the risk of parental inaction so that all risk becomes 39 substantial.” Id. at 331–32, 139 A.3d at 944 (emphasis added) (citing David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 Utah L.

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2015See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). “[D]etermining what is reasonable requires a factual analysis, ‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 621 , 826 A.2d 486, 501 (2003) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996)).

2000Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 635 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting H.R.Rep.

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

2000See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 , 117 S.Ct. 2512 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1997), confirming Greenidge .

1999See Branch , 123 Md.