Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mahdigreen2 sentences2018The scope of consent is considered under an objective reasonableness standard, considering what “the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Id. at 461 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2018The scope of consent is considered under an objective reasonableness standard, considering what “the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Id. at 461 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Price v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Sharkey’s, Inc v Waukesha, 265 F Supp 2d 984, 993 (ED Wis, 2003) (“Although there are cases to the contrary, anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a ‘reasonable person’ standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny.”) (citations omitted); Price v State, 622 NE2d 954, 967 (Ind, 1993) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute prohibiting “unreasonable noise” because an objective reasonableness standard constrained the discretion of those charged with enforcing the statute and provided fair notice of what conduct was prohibited); Seattle v Eze, 111 Wash 2d 22, 29-30; 759 | 1 | 1 |
Sharkey's, Inc. v. City of Waukeshagreen1 sentence2021See Sharkey’s, Inc v Waukesha, 265 F Supp 2d 984, 993 (ED Wis, 2003) (“Although there are cases to the contrary, anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a ‘reasonable person’ standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny.”) (citations omitted); Price v State, 622 NE2d 954, 967 (Ind, 1993) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute prohibiting “unreasonable noise” because an objective reasonableness standard constrained the discretion of those charged with enforcing the statute and provided fair notice of what conduct was prohibited); Seattle v Eze, 111 Wash 2d 22, 29-30; 759 | 1 | 1 |
Radtke v. Everettgreen2 sentences1993See Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 385-394 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), where the Court, after discussing the reasonable person standard, defined an objective reasonableness standard in a case involving a hostile work environment as pertaining to a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position. 1993See Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 385-394 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), where the Court, after discussing the reasonable person standard, defined an objective reasonableness standard in a case involving a hostile work environment as pertaining to a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Galloway
green
2 sentences2018In addition, under the plain-view exception, police officers may seize evidence “in plain view if the officer is lawfully in the position to have that view and the evidence is obviously incriminatory.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 639 ; 675 NW2d 883 (2003). 2018In addition, under the plain-view exception, police officers may seize evidence “in plain view if the officer is lawfully in the position to have that view and the evidence is obviously incriminatory.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 639 ; 675 NW2d 883 (2003). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Frohriep
green
2 sentences2026People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 703 ; 637 NW2d 562 (2001). 2026People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 703 ; 637 NW2d 562 (2001). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
City of Seattle v. Eze
green
1 sentence2021See Sharkey’s, Inc v Waukesha, 265 F Supp 2d 984, 993 (ED Wis, 2003) (“Although there are cases to the contrary, anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a ‘reasonable person’ standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny.”) (citations omitted); Price v State, 622 NE2d 954, 967 (Ind, 1993) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute prohibiting “unreasonable noise” because an objective reasonableness standard constrained the discretion of those charged with enforcing the statute and provided fair notice of what conduct was prohibited); Seattle v Eze, 111 Wash 2d 22, 29-30; 759 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Garner v. Michigan State University
green
2 sentences1997In our view, the trial court improperly collapsed the excessive force and the assault and battery claims, despite the fact that they involve distinct harms, Garner v Michigan State Univ, 185 Mich App 750, 764 ; 462 NW2d 832 (1990), and failed in its duty to provide clear guidance with regard to the governing law. 1997In our view, the trial court improperly collapsed the excessive force and the assault and battery claims, despite the fact that they involve distinct harms, Garner v Michigan State Univ, 185 Mich App 750, 764 ; 462 NW2d 832 (1990), and failed in its duty to provide clear guidance with regard to the governing law. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products
green
2 sentences1993When interpreting the Michigan Civil Rights Act, this Court must "give effect to the plain meaning of the language used." Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9 ; 345 NW2d 184 (1984). 1993When interpreting the Michigan Civil Rights Act, this Court must "give effect to the plain meaning of the language used." Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 9 ; 345 NW2d 184 (1984). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.