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14 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. Connorgreen2 sentences2011See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard). 2011See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard). | 3 | 5 |
City of Lancaster v. Chambersgreen2 sentences2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this 1996The Supreme Court of Texas has noted, "Citation to federal authority is appropriate because these holdings flow not from the more liberal summary judgment rules in the federal courts, but rather from the appropriate meaning of an objective reasonableness requirement in an immunity analysis.” City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 657 n. 8. 7 . | 3 | 4 |
Burns v. Stategreen2 sentences2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth 2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (suspect’s head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). 59 See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’ | 2 | 2 |
State v. Krausegreen2 sentences2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth 2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth | 2 | 2 |
Post v. City of Fort Lauderdalegreen2 sentences2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this 2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this | 1 | 1 |
University of Houston v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2024Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015). 65 Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 586 (Tex. 2000). 66 Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 645 . 20 faith.” 67 And in a given situation, a reasonably prudent officer might not have been “able to thoroughly analyze each need or risk factor.” 68 Depending on the circumstances, “this alone should not prevent the officer from establishing good faith”—in responding to emergencies, officers must make split-second decisions while under intense pressure, 69 and an objective-reasonableness test must allow for that fact. 2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this | 1 | 1 |
City of San Antonio v. Ytuartegreen1 sentence2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Bonillagreen2 sentences2024Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015). 65 Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 586 (Tex. 2000). 66 Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 645 . 20 faith.” 67 And in a given situation, a reasonably prudent officer might not have been “able to thoroughly analyze each need or risk factor.” 68 Depending on the circumstances, “this alone should not prevent the officer from establishing good faith”—in responding to emergencies, officers must make split-second decisions while under intense pressure, 69 and an objective-reasonableness test must allow for that fact. 2024Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2015). 65 Univ. of Hous. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 586 (Tex. 2000). 66 Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 645 . 20 faith.” 67 And in a given situation, a reasonably prudent officer might not have been “able to thoroughly analyze each need or risk factor.” 68 Depending on the circumstances, “this alone should not prevent the officer from establishing good faith”—in responding to emergencies, officers must make split-second decisions while under intense pressure, 69 and an objective-reasonableness test must allow for that fact. | 1 | 1 |
Malley v. Briggsgreen1 sentence2024The nonmovant, in contrast, bears an “elevated standard of proof” to “defeat a claim of official immunity in response to a motion for summary judgment.” 70 Proof that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the needs and risks differently is insufficient. 71 To controvert proof of good faith, the plaintiff must show, with “reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test,” 72 that no reasonably prudent officer “in the defendant’s position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant’s acts.” 73 If reasonably prudent officers “could disagree on this | 1 | 1 |
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2011See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 862 (Tex.2009) (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex.2003)). *781 The jury could not answer Question One without first determining whether the deputies’ use of force was “objectively unreasonable.” The trial court included detailed instructions explaining both the factual and legal components of the objective-reasonableness inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawleygreen1 sentence2011See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 862 (Tex.2009) (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 771 (Tex.2003)). *781 The jury could not answer Question One without first determining whether the deputies’ use of force was “objectively unreasonable.” The trial court included detailed instructions explaining both the factual and legal components of the objective-reasonableness inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth 2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maygreen2 sentences2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth 2011App. LEXIS, at *44 (subdues by use of mace); State v. Krause, 168 Wis.2d 578 , 484 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (suspect's head covered with pillow case and extremities tied); see also Burns v. State, 807 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (restraint of suspect by officers in hospital so technician could draw blood not unconstitutional). [59] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (a civil rights claim alleging that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or oth | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones Bros. Dirt & Paving Contractorsgreen2 sentences2002See 24 S.W.3d at 893 (“Because the BOP is a subdivision within [TxDOT], we believe that this satisfaction clause was effectively subject to the determination of a party; accordingly the applicable standard is the objective reasonableness test.”). 2002See 24 S.W.3d at 893 ("Because the BOP is a subdivision within [TxDOT], we believe that this satisfaction clause was effectively subject to the determination of a party; accordingly the applicable standard is the objective reasonableness test."). | 1 | 1 |
Landry v. Travelers Insurance Companygreen1 sentence1994Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.1970). [8] Citation to federal authority is appropriate because these holdings flow not from the more liberal summary judgment rules in the federal courts, but rather from the appropriate meaning of an objective reasonableness requirement in an immunity analysis. [9] In Anderson , the Court rejected this very argument when it rejected the notion that an officer necessarily operates outside of the scope of the officer's authority when acting unlawfully. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Creightongreen2 sentences1994Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45 , 107 S.Ct. at 3041-42 (noting that defining scope of authority in this manner "would introduce into qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we found sufficiently daunting to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to the nature of officials' duties or of the rights allegedly violated"). [10] In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single g 1994Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45 , 107 S.Ct. at 3041-42 (noting that defining scope of authority in this manner "would introduce into qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we found sufficiently daunting to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to the nature of officials' duties or of the rights allegedly violated"). [10] In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single g | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422 , 2004 WL 1533950 (Tex.2004); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994). 2004Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422 , 2004 WL 1533950 (Tex.2004); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Crawford-El v. Britton
green
2 sentences2004Evidence concerning the defendant’s subjective intent is simply irrelevant to that defense.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). 2004Evidence concerning the defendant’s subjective intent is simply irrelevant to that defense.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2002Black Lake, 538 S.W.2d at 88 . 2002Black Lake, 538 S.W.2d at 88 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnati
green
2 sentences1998While statutes that “d[o] not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation ... depend[s]” are likely to run afoul of the vagueness doctrine, see Coates, 402 U.S. at 618 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , a restriction banning only “what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause [harm]” is less objectionable. 1998While statutes that “d[o] not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation ... depend[s]” are likely to run afoul of the vagueness doctrine, see Coates, 402 U.S. at 618 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , a restriction banning only “what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause [harm]” is less objectionable. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wichita County, Texas v. Hart
green
1 sentence1997The objective-reasonableness requirement ensures that an employer violates the Whistleblower Act only "if a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed that the facts as reported were a violation of law." Hart , 917 S.W.2d at 785 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.