11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2006See State v. Garcia, 1999-NMCA-097, ¶ 9 , 127 N.M. 695 , 986 P.2d 491 (stating that the scope of a search is limited to the consent given, as measured by an objective reasonableness standard). 2006See State v. Garcia, 1999-NMCA-097, ¶ 9 , 127 N.M. 695 , 986 P.2d 491 (stating that the scope of a search is limited to the consent given, as measured by an objective reasonableness standard). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Robert Mosleygreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 269 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“The exclusionary rule expresses, inherently and always, a standard of reasonableness that evolves along with . . . social norms.”); see also Florida v. Jardines,__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (relying on social norms to illustrate that it is reasonable for police to approach a private citizen’s home and knock on the door just as “any private citizen might do[,]” but those norms do not permit police to use a trained police dog to explore the area around the home, an activity that if done by a private citizen might inspi 2014See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 269 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“The 7 exclusionary rule expresses, inherently and always, a standard of reasonableness that evolves along with . . . social norms.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S.___ , 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (relying on social norms to illustrate that it is reasonable for police to approach a private citizen’s home and knock on the door just as “any private citizen might do[,]” but those norms do not permit police to use a trained police dog to explore the area around the home, an activity that if done by a private citizen might | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ryangreen2 sentences2014See State v. Ryan, 2006-NMCA-044, ¶ 30 , 139 N.M. 354 , 132 P.3d 1040 (noting that “the scope of a search is limited to the consent given, as measured by an objective reasonableness standard”). {25} In determining what is or is not reasonable, courts may rely on social norms to guide the inquiry. 2014See State v. Ryan, 2006-NMCA-044, ¶ 30 , 139 N.M. 354 , 132 P.3d 1040 (noting that “the scope of a search is limited to the consent given, as measured by an objective reasonableness standard”). {25} In determining what is or is not reasonable, courts may rely on social norms to guide the inquiry. | 2 | 2 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 269 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“The exclusionary rule expresses, inherently and always, a standard of reasonableness that evolves along with . . . social norms.”); see also Florida v. Jardines,__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (relying on social norms to illustrate that it is reasonable for police to approach a private citizen’s home and knock on the door just as “any private citizen might do[,]” but those norms do not permit police to use a trained police dog to explore the area around the home, an activity that if done by a private citizen might inspi 2014See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 269 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“The 7 exclusionary rule expresses, inherently and always, a standard of reasonableness that evolves along with . . . social norms.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S.___ , 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (relying on social norms to illustrate that it is reasonable for police to approach a private citizen’s home and knock on the door just as “any private citizen might do[,]” but those norms do not permit police to use a trained police dog to explore the area around the home, an activity that if done by a private citizen might | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rudolfogreen1 sentence2024See Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 18 . {8} Further, the circumstances described by Defendant do not meet the objective reasonableness standard. | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jimenogreen2 sentences1999See id. ¶ 23; see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). 1999See id. ¶ 23; see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen2 sentences1995Under the Harlow standard “we examine whether the [party opposing summary judgment] has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 615 , 845 P.2d 130, 138 (1992); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (stating that “[u]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (same). 1995Under the Harlow standard “we examine whether the [party opposing summary judgment] has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 615 , 845 P.2d 130, 138 (1992); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (stating that “[u]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Paul Romero v. Damon Fay, Bob Stover, Chief of Police, and Albuquerque, City of John Doe, Albuquerque Police Officersgreen1 sentence1995Under the Harlow standard “we examine whether the [party opposing summary judgment] has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 615 , 845 P.2d 130, 138 (1992); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (stating that “[u]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Carrillo v. Rostrogreen2 sentences1995Under the Harlow standard “we examine whether the [party opposing summary judgment] has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 615 , 845 P.2d 130, 138 (1992); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (stating that “[u]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (same). 1995Under the Harlow standard “we examine whether the [party opposing summary judgment] has presented evidence to support a violation of clearly established law.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 615 , 845 P.2d 130, 138 (1992); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (stating that “[u]nless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal”); Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995) (same). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Romero v. Bachicha
green
2 sentences2017A district 6 court may dismiss a complaint if, based on an objective reasonableness standard, the 7 plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence in serving the complaint upon a defendant. 8 Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 23-26 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 . 2017A district 6 court may dismiss a complaint if, based on an objective reasonableness standard, the 7 plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence in serving the complaint upon a defendant. 8 Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 23-26 , 130 N.M. 610 , 28 P.3d 1151 . | 2 | 2016–2017 |
State v. Gomez
green
1 sentence2025We agree. {14} We reiterate that exigency is determined by an objective reasonableness standard and is determined by “whether a reasonable, well-trained officer would have made the judgment this officer made.” See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 40 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1995As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Harlow, using the objective reasonableness standard to determine qualified immunity issues “permit[s] the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . 1995As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Harlow, using the objective reasonableness standard to determine qualified immunity issues “permit[s] the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.