6 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Jimenogreen2 sentences2018Rather, courts must use the following objective reasonableness standard to measure the scope of consent: "[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)); see also State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1989) ("When the police are relying upon consent to conduct a warrantless search, they have no more authority than that reasonably conferred by the terms of the consent."), aff'd sub nom. 1999That Court applied the objective reasonableness standard, finding that "[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container." Id. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wellsgreen1 sentence2018Rather, courts must use the following objective reasonableness standard to measure the scope of consent: "[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)); see also State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1989) ("When the police are relying upon consent to conduct a warrantless search, they have no more authority than that reasonably conferred by the terms of the consent."), aff'd sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Rather, courts must use the following objective reasonableness standard to measure the scope of consent: "[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)); see also State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1989) ("When the police are relying upon consent to conduct a warrantless search, they have no more authority than that reasonably conferred by the terms of the consent."), aff'd sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences1998While the United States Supreme Court in Leon stressed that an officer’s' good-faith belief in the validity of a search warrant must be measured according to the objective reasonableness of that belief and not according to the officer’s actual subjective good-faith belief in the warrant’s validity, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct at 3419 n. 20 the Court also emphasized that this objective reasonableness inquiry must focus not only on the officer who eventually executes the warrant, but also on the officer who originally obtains the warrant or provides information material ■ to the ma 1998While the United States Supreme Court in Leon stressed that an officer’s' good-faith belief in the validity of a search warrant must be measured according to the objective reasonableness of that belief and not according to the officer’s actual subjective good-faith belief in the warrant’s validity, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct at 3419 n. 20 the Court also emphasized that this objective reasonableness inquiry must focus not only on the officer who eventually executes the warrant, but also on the officer who originally obtains the warrant or provides information material ■ to the ma | 1 | 1 |
Ed Rich v. Larry C. Dollargreen1 sentence1997In Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit re-stated its two-step framework for analyzing the objective reasonableness test for qualified immunity: 1. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Wells
green
1 sentence2018Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Illinois v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2014The determinative phrases of the consent, and thus the scope of the use of the specimen, are: (1)' that the mouth swab specimen would be used for “investigative purposes,” with “purposes” in the plural and no limitation specified; and (2) “that this specimen will be entered into a DNA database after analysis,” disclosing that the specimen would be analyzed and that it would go into a collection of other DNA analyses used for those “investigative purposes.” Applying the objective reasonableness test of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), a reasonable p 2014The determinative phrases of the consent, and thus the scope of the use of the specimen, are: (1)' that the mouth swab specimen would be used for “investigative purposes,” with “purposes” in the plural and no limitation specified; and (2) “that this specimen will be entered into a DNA database after analysis,” disclosing that the specimen would be analyzed and that it would go into a collection of other DNA analyses used for those “investigative purposes.” Applying the objective reasonableness test of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 , 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), a reasonable p | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Tony A. Wilson v. Lucy Farley
green
1 sentence2008Under this approach, "a plaintiff must demonstrate both his [or her] subjective belief that his [or her] employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices and that his [or her] `belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.'" Wilson, 203 Fed.Appx. at 247 (quoting Weeks v. Harden Mfg. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.