Doyle error in California

2023Analysis “In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process and fundamental fairness to use a defendant’s postarrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony.” (Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 203 .) Jones contends the prosecutor committed a Doyle violation by asking why Jones did not call the sheriff’s department before he was arrested to tell his side of the story and compounded the error by referring to Jones’s failure to talk to the deputies when they were looking for him on the night of the incident.

2023(People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 202 [an objection is required to preserve Doyle error for appellate review]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 [preservation of prosecutorial misconduct claim on appeal required timely objection and request for admonition].) Jones acknowledges the omission but claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

2025(See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 118 (Coffman and Marlow) [claim of Doyle violation forfeited by failure to object at trial].) In an effort to overcome the forfeiture and obtain direct review of the asserted errors, Contreras argues her trial counsel’s inaction made his performance ineffective.

2025No Prejudice Moreover, even if we assume error, “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 60 (Coffman and Marlow); see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 [Doyle error].) As discussed, defendant did not testify, and the defense did not offer any evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2025Moreover, a “Doyle violation does not occur unless the prosecutor is permitted to use a defendant’s postarrest silence against him at trial .…” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 959 .) Permission occurs when the court overrules a defense objection, “thus conveying to the jury the unmistakable impression that what the prosecution is doing is legitimate.” (People v. Evans (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 ; see Greer v. Miller (1987) 483 U.S. 756, 762 .) In this case, the prosecutor did not attempt and was not permitted by the court to use Garcia’s silence against him.

2023(See Greer v. Miller, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 761-765.) Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly denied the mistrial motion based on alleged Doyle error, as well as the new trial motion made on the same ground. 17 D.

2016“The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the record on appeal concern documents ‘file[d] or lodged’ in the superior court and transcripts of ‘oral proceedings’ that occurred 7 (Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494 ]; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 238-239 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 95-96 ].) But even assuming that the prosecutor’s inquiry about defendant’s silence violated Doyle, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any such Doyle error did not contribute to the verdict. “ ‘ “When deciding whether a prosecutor’s reference to a defendan

2016“The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the record on appeal concern documents ‘file[d] or lodged’ in the superior court and transcripts of ‘oral proceedings’ that occurred 7 (Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494 ]; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 238-239 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 95-96 ].) But even assuming that the prosecutor’s inquiry about defendant’s silence violated Doyle, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any such Doyle error did not contribute to the verdict. “ ‘ “When deciding whether a prosecutor’s reference to a defendan

2025As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.” (Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 408 .) “‘An assessment of whether the prosecutor made inappropriate use of [the] defendant’s postarrest silence requires consideration of the context of the prosecutor’s inquiry or filed a motion for a new trial prior to sentencing that raised Griffin error and, discussed, post, Schuler error. (§ 1181, subd. (5); Schuler, supra, 813 F.2d at pp. 981–982.) Although the People address defendant’s IAC claim, they do not argue that defendant forfeited his claim of Doyle error,

2023Analysis “In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process and fundamental fairness to use a defendant’s postarrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony. [Citation.] However, Doyle does not apply when a defendant presents exculpatory testimony at trial inconsistent with a voluntary post-Miranda statement. [Citation.]” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 203 (Collins).) The United States Supreme Court addressed Doyle error in Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404 (Anderson v. Charles).

2025No Prejudice Moreover, even if we assume error, “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 60 (Coffman and Marlow); see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 [Doyle error].) As discussed, defendant did not testify, and the defense did not offer any evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2023(Greer v. Miller, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 761–764.) However, the “Doyle rule is not 4. violated when ‘ “the evidence of defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel was received without objection and the remarks of the prosecutor did not invite the jury to draw any adverse inference from either the fact or the timing of defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 .) Violations of Doyle will require reversal unless they meet the standard set out in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ,3 that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

2025(Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1068, fn. 10 ; Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 150 ; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 333, fn. 11.) Moreover, although Contreras later clearly invoked her right to counsel when she confirmed she did not want to keep talking to the investigators without her attorney, and the jury was permitted to hear this part of the interview, it is not Doyle error merely “to permit evidence that a defendant exercised [her] right to counsel.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198 .) Rather, Doyle error occurs when the prosecutor invites the jury to draw an “ ‘adverse

2025(See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 332 ; People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1333 [objection required to preserve Doyle error for appellate review].) He acknowledges this omission but contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this respect, and thus, we will reach the merits of his contention.

2025(People v. Lewis (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 246, 256 .) Given that representation, a prosecutor that later comments on the defendant’s silence―or failure to answer questions or disclose exculpatory facts or evidence―after the defendant has been arrested and read a Miranda warning may violate the defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 619–620.) Such errors are commonly referred to as Doyle errors, and a prosecutor can commit a prejudicial Doyle error by asking a single question that improperly refers to the defendant’s silence.

2025We also reject defendant’s claim of Doyle error by the prosecutor, which moots defendant’s related claim of IAC, and we 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 (Doyle); United States v. Schuler (1987) 813 F.2d 978 (Schuler). 2. reject his claim of Schuler error by the prosecutor.

2025(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293 , 1334 & fn. 10.) However, in Hollinquest, the Court of Appeal concluded that “‘the principles of Doyle apply even if a defendant does not take the stand in his own defense thereby subjecting himself to potential impeachment.’” (Hollinquest, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557 , quoting United States v. Fambro (2008) 526 F.3d 836, 841 .) The claim in Hollinquest nevertheless related to testimony, in contrast with this case. ( Hollinquest, supra, at pp. 1554 , 1560–1561 [admission of investigator’s testimony violated Doyle, but error harmless].) Assuming

2025(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293 , 1334 & fn. 10.) However, in Hollinquest, the Court of Appeal concluded that “‘the principles of Doyle apply even if a defendant does not take the stand in his own defense thereby subjecting himself to potential impeachment.’” (Hollinquest, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557 , quoting United States v. Fambro (2008) 526 F.3d 836, 841 .) The claim in Hollinquest nevertheless related to testimony, in contrast with this case. ( Hollinquest, supra, at pp. 1554 , 1560–1561 [admission of investigator’s testimony violated Doyle, but error harmless].) Assuming

2025No Prejudice Moreover, even if we assume error, “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 60 (Coffman and Marlow); see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 [Doyle error].) As discussed, defendant did not testify, and the defense did not offer any evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2025No Prejudice Moreover, even if we assume error, “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 60 (Coffman and Marlow); see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 [Doyle error].) As discussed, defendant did not testify, and the defense did not offer any evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2025(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856 , 958–959 (Clark) [the officer’s testimony that the defendant failed to react when he was being accused of murder and attempted murder was an improper reference to the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent].) The basis of the rule in Doyle is that “ ‘it is fundamentally unfair, and a deprivation of due process, to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him, and then to breach that promise by using silence to impeach his trial testimony.’ ” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 959 .) A Doyle error also occurs when a

2025(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856 , 958–959 (Clark) [the officer’s testimony that the defendant failed to react when he was being accused of murder and attempted murder was an improper reference to the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent].) The basis of the rule in Doyle is that “ ‘it is fundamentally unfair, and a deprivation of due process, to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him, and then to breach that promise by using silence to impeach his trial testimony.’ ” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 959 .) A Doyle error also occurs when a

2025(Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1068, fn. 10 ; Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 150 ; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 333, fn. 11.) Moreover, although Contreras later clearly invoked her right to counsel when she confirmed she did not want to keep talking to the investigators without her attorney, and the jury was permitted to hear this part of the interview, it is not Doyle error merely “to permit evidence that a defendant exercised [her] right to counsel.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198 .) Rather, Doyle error occurs when the prosecutor invites the jury to draw an “ ‘adverse

2015(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 66 ; Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 879 ; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 868 .) We acknowledge that a single question can constitute Doyle error if it seeks to exploit the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence after proper advisement.

2023(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 ; People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 559 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) To determine whether reversal is necessary based on a Doyle error, we must consider the extent of the comments made, how the statement would have been understood by a reasonable juror in context, whether the prosecutor suggested an inference of guilt based on the invocation, and the overall strength of the case.

2023(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 ; People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 559 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) To determine whether reversal is necessary based on a Doyle error, we must consider the extent of the comments made, how the statement would have been understood by a reasonable juror in context, whether the prosecutor suggested an inference of guilt based on the invocation, and the overall strength of the case.

2016“The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the record on appeal concern documents ‘file[d] or lodged’ in the superior court and transcripts of ‘oral proceedings’ that occurred 7 (Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494 ]; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 238-239 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 95-96 ].) But even assuming that the prosecutor’s inquiry about defendant’s silence violated Doyle, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any such Doyle error did not contribute to the verdict. “ ‘ “When deciding whether a prosecutor’s reference to a defendan

2016“The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the record on appeal concern documents ‘file[d] or lodged’ in the superior court and transcripts of ‘oral proceedings’ that occurred 7 (Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494 ]; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 238-239 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 95-96 ].) But even assuming that the prosecutor’s inquiry about defendant’s silence violated Doyle, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any such Doyle error did not contribute to the verdict. “ ‘ “When deciding whether a prosecutor’s reference to a defendan

2016Doyle error does not occur if a defendant presents exculpatory testimony at trial that is inconsistent with earlier voluntary statements about the crime (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 203 ), and it does not apply to a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, whether such silence occurs before an arrest (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826 , 856- 857) or after custodial detention (People v. Delgado (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1841 ).

2004Doyle “prohibits the prosecution from impeaching a defendant’s trial testimony with evidence of the defendant’s silence after the defendant, having been advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , . . . chooses to remain silent.” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 856 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ].) Because none of the comments refer, in any way, to defendant’s post-Miranda silence, no Doyle error occurred. 4 The verdict form stated: “We, the jury in the above entitled action, find that the defendant has been convicted of more than one offense

2024“The prosecutor cannot use the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent or refusal to answer questions as evidence against him. [Citations.] Particularly, the defendant’s silence may not be used to impeach his credibility. [Citations.] [¶] To establish a violation of due process under Doyle, the defendant must show that the prosecution inappropriately used his postarrest silence for impeachment purposes and the trial court permitted the prosecution to engage in such inquiry or argument.” (People v. Champion (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448 .) “‘To assess whether these questions co

2022(People v. Champion (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448 (Champion).) Here, we conclude there was no Doyle error because the prosecutor’s remarks were made in reference to the evidence and the credibility (or lack thereof) of the witnesses.

2015(Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 629-630 [noting the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to Doyle error]; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936-937 .) 12 An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the People establish beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2012(See Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 630 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 353 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 ] [the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to Doyle error]; Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 299 [no prejudicial Doyle error occurred when the testimony did not “impeach defendant’s later statements to the police by reference to his earlier decision not to talk with them, which is the harm the holding of Doyle seeks to prevent”]; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 868 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 , 126 P.3d 981 ] [“defendant

2023(See Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 198 [“ ‘ “[A] defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the 15 same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety” ’ ”]; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635 , 691–692 [forfeiture rule applies to Doyle violation claims].) Even if the claim had been preserved, there was no error.

2015(See Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 691-692 [Doyle violation forfeited]; see also People v. Ramos (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 195, 206-209 [generic Fifth Amendment objection is 10 It was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on defendant’s pre-arrest/pre- Miranda silence.

2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 , citing Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 (Griffin).) On appeal, defendant argues that if his objections were not sufficient to preserve his claim of Doyle error, he received IAC.

2021(Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 614-615 (Griffin).) Nor can a prosecutor ordinarily comment on a defendant’s post-Miranda silence (a Doyle error).

2024Because this instruction permitted the jury to use defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt, this instruction violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, as articulated in both Doyle and Griffin. 15 In contrast, the Court of Appeal, held that “[a] defendant has no right to remain silent selectively [and] [o]nce a defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights.” (Hurd, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093 .) As discusse

2004(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 856 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ]; People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1092 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 ].) Doyle error can occur either in questioning of witnesses or jury argument.

2023(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 ; People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 559 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) To determine whether reversal is necessary based on a Doyle error, we must consider the extent of the comments made, how the statement would have been understood by a reasonable juror in context, whether the prosecutor suggested an inference of guilt based on the invocation, and the overall strength of the case.

2023(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621 ; People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 559 ; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) To determine whether reversal is necessary based on a Doyle error, we must consider the extent of the comments made, how the statement would have been understood by a reasonable juror in context, whether the prosecutor suggested an inference of guilt based on the invocation, and the overall strength of the case.

2016Moreover, Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th 908 , said that, even if the testimony could be considered a Doyle violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ], because the defendant’s initial denial of involvement in a robbery was impeached, not by his invocation of right to counsel, but by his later admission to police that he had participated in the crimes, and evidence of guilt was overwhelming and uncontested at trial. ( Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 936-937, citing People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 299 [no prejudicial

2016Moreover, Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th 908 , said that, even if the testimony could be considered a Doyle violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ], because the defendant’s initial denial of involvement in a robbery was impeached, not by his invocation of right to counsel, but by his later admission to police that he had participated in the crimes, and evidence of guilt was overwhelming and uncontested at trial. ( Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 936-937, citing People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 299 [no prejudicial

2025Moreover, a “Doyle violation does not occur unless the prosecutor is permitted to use a defendant’s postarrest silence against him at trial .…” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 959 .) Permission occurs when the court overrules a defense objection, “thus conveying to the jury the unmistakable impression that what the prosecution is doing is legitimate.” (People v. Evans (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 ; see Greer v. Miller (1987) 483 U.S. 756, 762 .) In this case, the prosecutor did not attempt and was not permitted by the court to use Garcia’s silence against him.

2022(Greer [v. Miller (1987) 483 U.S. 756 ,] 761-764 [(Greer)].) The type of permission specified in Greer will usually take the form of overruling a defense objection, thus conveying to the jury the unmistakable impression that what the prosecution is doing is legitimate.” (See People v. Evans (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 , fn. omitted (Evans); see also People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 959 (Clark) [“The United States Supreme Court has explained a Doyle violation does not occur unless the prosecutor is permitted to use a defendant’s postarrest silence against him at trial.”].) In assessing

2025We also reject defendant’s claim of Doyle error by the prosecutor, which moots defendant’s related claim of IAC, and we 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 (Doyle); United States v. Schuler (1987) 813 F.2d 978 (Schuler). 2. reject his claim of Schuler error by the prosecutor.

2014Sustained.” (Italics added.) 20 Iraheta argued in his new trial motion that Hispanic inmates in prison are subject to the control of the Mexican Mafia, and if he had refused orders to assault other inmates, he would have been targeted for attack. 21 Miranda v. Arizona (1996) 384 U.S. 436 . 32 Subsequently, defense counsel complained that the italicized portions of the prosecutor’s question constituted Doyle error,22 in that the prosecutor implied Iraheta had “never told the police.” Defense counsel acknowledged that the court had sustained her objection, but “the question was already out there

2025(Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1068, fn. 10 ; Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 150 ; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 333, fn. 11.) Moreover, although Contreras later clearly invoked her right to counsel when she confirmed she did not want to keep talking to the investigators without her attorney, and the jury was permitted to hear this part of the interview, it is not Doyle error merely “to permit evidence that a defendant exercised [her] right to counsel.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198 .) Rather, Doyle error occurs when the prosecutor invites the jury to draw an “ ‘adverse

2015Under Doyle, “the use against defendant of a postarrest invocation of rights following a Miranda admonition violates due process.” (People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 936 (Thomas), citing Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 619.) However, the Doyle rule is not violated where “ ‘ “the evidence of defendant’s invocation . . . was received without objection and the remarks of the prosecutor did not invite the jury to draw any adverse inference from either the fact or the timing of defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right.” ’ ” (Thomas, at p. 936, italics added, original italics omitted, cit

2023(Coffman and Marlow, at p. 118.) Finally, in People v. Eshelman (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1513 , the appellate court held that post- Miranda silence in the presence of a private citizen implicates Doyle “when the evidence demonstrates that [a] defendant’s silence in [such a circumstance] results primarily from the conscious exercise of his constitutional rights.” (Eshelman, at p. 1520 [Doyle error when prosecutor questioned the defendant on why he did not answer a witness’s questions about why he killed her son, and the defendant answered it was, in part, because his attorney told him not to talk]

2023(See id. at pp. 1520–1521 [prosecutor, during cross-examination and closing argument, challenged defendant’s post-Miranda refusal to discuss the crime with his girlfriend].) In short, there was no Doyle error.

2025(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690 ; accord, People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105 .) The People did not commit a Doyle violation by impermissibly impeaching Chandra with his post-Miranda silence.

2025(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 690 ; accord, People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105 .) The People did not commit a Doyle violation by impermissibly impeaching Chandra with his post-Miranda silence.

2025(See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 332 ; People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1333 [objection required to preserve Doyle error for appellate review].) He acknowledges this omission but contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this respect, and thus, we will reach the merits of his contention.

2025(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293 , 1334 & fn. 10.) However, in Hollinquest, the Court of Appeal concluded that “‘the principles of Doyle apply even if a defendant does not take the stand in his own defense thereby subjecting himself to potential impeachment.’” (Hollinquest, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557 , quoting United States v. Fambro (2008) 526 F.3d 836, 841 .) The claim in Hollinquest nevertheless related to testimony, in contrast with this case. ( Hollinquest, supra, at pp. 1554 , 1560–1561 [admission of investigator’s testimony violated Doyle, but error harmless].) Assuming